



**PUBLIC ORDER  
EMERGENCY  
COMMISSION**

**COMMISSION  
SUR L'ÉTAT  
D'URGENCE**

**Public Hearing**

**Audience publique**

**Commissioner / Commissaire  
The Honourable / L'honorable  
Paul S. Rouleau**

**VOLUME 7**

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### III

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Ms. Andrea Gonsalves  
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Mr. Michael Finley  
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Ms. Rebecca Jones  
Mr. Nikolas De Stefano

## IV

### Appearances / Comparutions

Ottawa Police Service	Mr. David Migicovsky Ms. Jessica Barrow
Ontario Provincial Police	Mr. Christopher Diana Ms. Jinan Kubursi
Windsor Police Service	Mr. Thomas McRae Mr. Bryce Chandler Ms. Heather Paterson
National Police Federation	Ms. Nini Jones Ms. Lauren Pearce Ms. Jen Del Riccio
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National Crowdfunding & Fintech Association	Mr. Jason Beitchman
Canadian Constitution Foundation and Professor Alford	Ms. Sujit Choudhry Ms. Janani Shanmuganathan Prof. Ryan Alford

## V

### Appearances / Comparutions

Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses	Mr. Paul Champ Ms. Emilie Taman Ms. Christine Johnson
The Democracy Fund, Citizens for Freedom, JCCF Coalition	Mr. Rob Kittredge Mr. Antoine D'Ailly Mr. Alan Honner Mr. Dan Santoro Mr. Hatim Kheir Mr. James Manson
Canadian Civil Liberties Association	Ms. Cara Zwibel Ms. Ewa Krajewska
The Convoy Organizers	Mr. Brendan Miller Ms. Bath Sheba Van den Berg
Insurance Bureau of Canada	Mr. Mario Fiorino

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Ottawa, Ontario

--- Upon commencing on Friday, October 21, 2022 at 9:30 a.m.

**THE REGISTRAR:** Order. À l'ordre. The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session. La Commission sur l'état d'urgence est maintenant ouverte.

**COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Good morning, bonjour. So we have Supt. Abrams. If you could come forward, please?

(SHORT PAUSE)

--- SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS, Resumed:

**COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Are you ready to proceed?

**SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, Commissioner. Thank you.

**COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. So the first up, I believe, is the Ottawa Police Service.

(SHORT PAUSE)

--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:

**MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Good morning, Superintendent. My name is David Migicovsky; I'm a lawyer here for the Ottawa Police Service. How are you?

**SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Good, sir. Thank you.

**MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** One of the things you mentioned yesterday, and I believe it's also in your notes as well, is that police actions in Ottawa, you indicated, can have a provincial and a national impact, so there's a need for the police to be measured and careful in their approach to dealing with the protesters; is that fair?

**SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sure.

1                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And how the police treat  
2 the protesters, I take it, from the time they arrive in Ottawa  
3 to the time they leave, will, therefore, be expected to have an  
4 impact, both in Ottawa and nationally?

5                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what I believe, yes.

6                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And I believe you said  
7 that once the convoy was en route to Ottawa, and some people had  
8 come from, you know, the West Coast, far away, there was no way  
9 that you could just cause them to turn around and go home  
10 without making their statement in Ottawa somehow; correct?

11                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I don't recall stating that,  
12 but I think that I stated that they're committed in their goal  
13 of attending Ottawa fairly because they left their homes,  
14 thousands of kilometres away and their intent was to attend  
15 Ottawa.

16                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the practice of the  
17 police prior to the Freedom Convoy and previous protests was to  
18 let groups come to town and protest even if it would cause  
19 significant traffic disruption and inconvenience to residents,  
20 as long as it was peaceful and not engaging in criminality; is  
21 that fair?

22                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Obviously not being a member  
23 of the Ottawa Police Service, they dealt with the majority of  
24 those protests. In my role with the Provincial Police, I can't  
25 say that I've had to deal with that type of event, but in  
26 general terms, I would agree when people exercise their *Charter*  
27 rights, there's certainly going to be some disruption to members  
28 of the public while that's being done. But, generally, in most

1 circumstances, that disruption is short-lived, in my experience.

2 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Right. But if somebody  
3 says, "I'm coming to protest for one day," or, "I'm coming to  
4 protest for three days," but it's going to be peaceful and  
5 there's no criminality, you'll let them protest; fair enough?

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There certainly would be  
7 lots of planning, that's what we talk about; pre-event planning,  
8 trying to speak to the organizers, come up to agreements to make  
9 sure everybody's on the same page. I've not been involved in  
10 agreements where we've allowed protests that lasted multiple  
11 days. That's just been my experience. I haven't been involved  
12 in that so I can't really speculate or experience, whether I  
13 would approve something like that.

14 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** The OPP has dealt with  
15 long-term protests.

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** As an organization we have,  
17 yes.

18 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Sorry?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** As an organization we have.

20 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Right. You personally  
21 have not.

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No.

23 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And some of those  
24 demonstrations went on for long periods had injunctions that ---

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** The longest period I was  
26 involved in was the three-week protest at the Tyendinaga rail  
27 blockades in 2020.

28 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** The Hendon reports, as I

1 recall, indicated that the groups did espouse peaceful protests,  
2 although there were concern about fringe groups and lone wolves;  
3 is that right?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That sounds accurate, yes.

5 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the reports from the  
6 PLT's prior to the convoy arriving in Ottawa had been that they  
7 were peaceful and cooperative with police in other  
8 jurisdictions?

9 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what I recall, yes.

10 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the reports from  
11 Hendon did not indicate honking horns or idling engines or  
12 harassment or antisocial behaviour or fireworks; is that fair?

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** The only thing I would say  
14 is there was some reports of antisocial behaviour in respect to  
15 perhaps not abiding by mask mandates within the Province of  
16 Ontario, but outside of that, I would agree with your statement,  
17 yes.

18 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And blocking the access to  
19 the Wellington Street, or to a large chunk or to chunks of  
20 downtown, could have meant that the trucks would go elsewhere,  
21 you said, in the city.

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

23 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And that would mean,  
24 though, potentially that the footprint could be bigger and there  
25 could be more disruption in residential neighbourhoods; fair?

26 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly. It's a large  
27 city so wherever the trucks are going to park there's going to  
28 be disruption wherever they tend to park, for sure.

1                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And because peaceful  
2 protest is lawful, and because of the need to take a measured  
3 approach, the OPP, as I understand it, is a huge proponent of  
4 the use of PLTs.

5                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** They very much are, yes.

6                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** They connect with groups;  
7 they get contacts, they form relationships.

8                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

9                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And in fact, the OPP PLTs  
10 here did have their PLTs connect with the protesters well prior  
11 to arrival; correct?

12                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. Many of the convoy  
13 organizers they connected when they arrived within the Province  
14 of Ontario.

15                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And those PLT who were in  
16 contact with the protesters were not, I take it, telling them  
17 the message, "You'd better not come to Ottawa. You're not  
18 welcome." Right? They were trying to establish relationships  
19 because they understood it to be a peaceful protest.

20                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. Many times our  
21 PLTs will message what you stated but also message the  
22 importance of understanding the law; sometimes they'll educate  
23 them on the law, make sure they understand, you know, "When you  
24 attend, this is what the expectation is; this is what the laws  
25 will be in relation to your behaviour." So many times the PLT  
26 will be part of that messaging to make sure that all  
27 participants are aware of their responsibilities and  
28 expectations of their behaviours.

1                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And, in fact, consistent  
2 with that role that PLTs assisted the convoy in arriving safely  
3 in Ottawa.

4                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would agree. Just through  
5 conversation, that allowed more structured movement of vehicles  
6 which made things ultimately safer. I would agree with that.

7                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And I think you said you'd  
8 read the Hendon reports and became involved, if I have that  
9 right, on January 24<sup>th</sup> as the OPP's Strategic Commander in charge  
10 of policing?

11                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, I became Strategic  
12 Commander in charge of the OPP's portion of the event, which was  
13 what we saw at that time as a traffic event involving the  
14 vehicles travelling through our jurisdiction into the City of  
15 Ottawa.

16                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And you set up an  
17 emergency operation centre that involved traffic,  
18 communications, PLTs.

19                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

20                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the plan focussed on  
21 traffic along the highways from the convoy; correct?

22                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It focussed on the traffic  
23 and also what impacts that they may have in the communities that  
24 they overnighted in.

25                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the 400 series of  
26 highways, I believe you said, the OPP has jurisdiction on?

27                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

28                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And that is the -- the

1 417, of course, leads directly into Ottawa, downtown; correct?  
2 It's the -- becomes the Queensway in Ottawa?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

4 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And what you and your team  
5 did, as I understand it, was ensure that there was the safe flow  
6 of traffic and that they could arrive safely, and you and your  
7 team took steps to coordinate planning of that with the Ottawa  
8 Police?

9 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

10 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And so you liaised with  
11 Deputy Chief Bell?

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

13 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And he was cooperative in  
14 your interactions with him?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Very much so. We agreed  
16 that our traffic inspectors would connect with each other and  
17 they would do the bulk of the work to do the coordination.

18 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And so you had an  
19 inspector, I believe her name was Dawn Ferguson, and you had a  
20 staff sergeant, Lisa Nicholson coordinate with the Ottawa  
21 Police?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. Lisa Nicholas was  
23 her last name, but they helped coordinate, yes.

24 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And Inspector Ferguson, we  
25 have a lot of Fergusons in this case, but Inspector Dawn  
26 Ferguson of the OPP was the officer assigned to be the  
27 representative of the OPP, and then I understand she worked with  
28 the OPS and others at the NCRCC; correct?

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

2                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And she was there as of  
3 January 25th, so a few days before the protesters arrived.

4                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sounds accurate.

5                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And Staff  
6 Sergeant Nicholson, did you say?

7                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Nicholas.

8                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Nicholas, I'm sorry, was  
9 placed at a separate OPS Command Centre outside of -- with the  
10 Ottawa Police; is that correct?

11                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. I believe Staff  
12 Sergeant Nicholas, she kind of moved between the two locations.  
13 There was kind of a traffic hub that had MTO cameras that Staff  
14 Sergeant Nicholas would work with our MTO partners and Ottawa  
15 Police partners at, and she would also make her way over to the  
16 NCRCC as well. So she kind of worked at both locations.

17                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And she assisted  
18 Inspector Ferguson.

19                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** She did. Inspector Ferguson  
20 relied on some assistance from Staff Sergeant Nicholas, so she  
21 helped assist her in different ways.

22                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the OPP worked with  
23 the OPS to control Highway 17 coming into Ottawa and make sure  
24 that you didn't have blockades on the highway?

25                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

26                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the -- your team,  
27 along with the OPS team, ensured that -- wanted to make sure  
28 that trucks didn't just abandon their vehicles on the 417, on

1 the Queensway in downtown Ottawa, but that they safely got off  
2 and were staged somewhere?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. And we wanted --  
4 obviously, and when we talk about safety, it's not just safety  
5 of the convoy participants, it's the safety of the motoring  
6 public who are using the highway. And we didn't close the  
7 highway, so the highway was open to normal traffic so we had to  
8 make sure that we were ensuring the safety of the general  
9 motoring public as well.

10 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** One of the things, and I  
11 can turn up the document if you need it, but I think you said  
12 this yesterday, was you talked about Chief Sloly on the weekend  
13 of the February 5th weekend, the 4th, 5th, wanting -- and again,  
14 I think the following weekend as well, wanting to shut down all  
15 the 417 offramps. Do you recall that?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do recall that.

17 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And Inspector Ferguson, as  
18 I understand, said in one of those emails, "Will do our best to  
19 help the convoys to the identified exits, but the OPP is not  
20 going to permanently close any 417 exits unless there's an  
21 immediate threat to public safety." And there wasn't; correct?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

23 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And so the OPP did not  
24 exercise its power to close all the exits to downtown as a  
25 result?

26 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

27 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And you instead controlled  
28 access so that they could come in safely?

1           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. And just so we're  
2 clear, I apologise if I misunderstood your question. The  
3 permanent shutdown that Chief Sloly spoke about in us  
4 selectively picking offramps for the convoy to come in were on  
5 separate dates.

6           **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Right. And -- but you did  
7 make clear that, and I believe she says it in her email, "we  
8 will not permanently, like, close all the exits unless there is  
9 an immediate public safety risk, and there isn't."

10          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. And certainly, we  
11 wanted to not disrupt the general motoring public as much -- as  
12 little as possible, that was the idea, so we would close ramps  
13 as needed and then as soon as we could we would reopen them so  
14 that the normal flow of traffic could continue.

15          **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Sure. And because if you  
16 close everything it not only affects the convoy but it affects  
17 everyone else.

18          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sure, it does.

19          **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** All of the residents,  
20 trucks that are -- have legitimate business downtown delivering  
21 goods and supplies, other motorists, residents who have a need  
22 to be in that downtown core; correct?

23          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would agree, yes.

24          **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And we saw one of the  
25 Hendon reports had pictures of some heavy equipment, an air  
26 compressor and an ATV.

27          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

28          **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And you didn't receive any

1 instructions, I take it, to stop those transports or to inspect  
2 them or to not let them into the city, did you?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I never received  
4 instructions like that, no.

5 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And some of those -- and  
6 there were only a couple of pieces of heavy equipment that we  
7 saw; correct?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

9 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And some of those may well  
10 have come into the city on a 400-series highway.

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

12 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** If we could please turn up  
13 OPP0774, please.

14 Which are -- I don't know if you have the hard  
15 copy of it.

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do.

17 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** You do. So it's your  
18 January 25th notes.

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

20 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And it is on page 3 of 167  
21 in the PDF. And so this is January 21st, and you'll ---

22 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** 25th.

23 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** January 25th, I apologise.  
24 And you'll see at 8:30, you request someone with the Ministry of  
25 Transport of Ontario:

26 "...to see if they plan to use weigh  
27 scales for convoy trucks."

28 Correct?

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

2                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And the MTO has no plans  
3 to do so; correct?

4                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

5                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And so one of the things  
6 that perhaps could have prevented some of that heavy equipment  
7 or some of those vehicles was to have weigh stations opened  
8 along the highway; correct? But the MTO decided not to do that.

9                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I just wanted to see if that  
10 was part of their plan, and I was advised that it was not.

11                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And if I could please ask  
12 you to look at, again this is in your -- it's not in your notes,  
13 I apologise.

14                   It's OPP0773. Thanks.

15                   That's, as you'll recall, is the will-say  
16 statement that you prepared I believe, yeah, in March of 2022?

17                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

18                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And so you prepared that  
19 at the time when the events were pretty clear in your mind, you  
20 just finished dealing with the convoy; correct?

21                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

22                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And you'd read the Hendon  
23 reports back in January; correct?

24                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I did.

25                   **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And so if we could please  
26 look at page 2 of that -- of the PDF of that.

27                   And on the third bullet, you indicate:

28                                    "It became clear on January 29th...that

1 many of the convoy participants had  
2 plans to stay for a [long] period of  
3 time and the convoy had attracted  
4 thousands to the downtown core."

5 Correct?

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

7 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And then if we also look -  
8 - if we could scroll down to the bottom of the page. Sorry,  
9 just go up a bit. I'm sorry, go to the -- sorry, a little bit -  
10 - go up to the top again if you don't mind.

11 I'm sorry, if you could go to the following page  
12 as well? Yeah. Just a little bit higher. Thanks very much.

13 You'll see in the bullets that we have on the  
14 screen, on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, it then became clear that this event was  
15 no longer a traffic related event; correct?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

17 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** In your notes, and I --  
18 again, we can turn them up, but if you recall, then, you know, I  
19 don't need you to, but I know in your notes of February 5<sup>th</sup>, and  
20 it's on page 28 of your notes, but you have a note that the  
21 Chief is in charge and won't change it.

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm sorry, you said page 28?

23 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** I thought it was. I was  
24 trying to also give you yours, but I'll -- it is, I believe,  
25 page 28 of your notes, which is February 5<sup>th</sup>, and it is on page  
26 28, which is the second page.

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Okay.

28 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And you see what ---

1           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, correct, I can see it  
2 now.

3           **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** --- I'm referring to?

4           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

5           **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Yeah, can you just explain  
6 that? What did you mean the Chief is in charge and won't change  
7 it?

8           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So if we go back, this is  
9 part of a teleconference I was involved in where Inspector Jason  
10 Younan is kind of giving us an overview of an email that was  
11 sent by Chief Sloly, and giving an overview of what he saw, and  
12 the context of what Chief Sloly's email had to say. And so  
13 these are Inspector Younan's words to me saying that there was  
14 Major Critical Incident Commander Superintendent Dunlop but no  
15 Major Incident Commander. No one was in charge. The Chief is  
16 in charge and will not change that. Wants lockdown. So these  
17 are Inspector Younan's words being relayed to me and me making  
18 notes ---

19           **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And so what he's saying is  
20 this is a problem that Chief Sloly is saying he has to be in  
21 charge of this, no one else is; is that right?

22           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** This is Inspector Younan's  
23 interpretation of what he ---

24           **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** What he wanted.

25           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

26           **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Thank you. The following  
27 -- on page 29 of your notes as well, you also have a note that,  
28                                   "[Inspector -- Commissioner Carrique

1 must become engaged with --] need to  
2 display [i.e.] did a measured approach.  
3 Inspector Carrique needs to become  
4 engaged with Sloly over members and  
5 risks with his unreasonable demands."

6 And what were those unreasonable demands that  
7 were being referred to?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So in Inspector Younan's  
9 briefing to us, he spoke about what Chief Sloly was asking not  
10 only of his members, but what appeared to be also partner  
11 agencies, which included the OPP. So there was talk about  
12 wanting all streets barricaded and contained, and these were  
13 activities I was not comfortable with our members being involved  
14 in, and it caused me a great concern. So on this call, I  
15 expressed that we needed to communicate with Commissioner  
16 Carrique, so that he could become aware of this direction by  
17 Chief Sloly through Chief Sloly's email, and then perhaps  
18 Commissioner Carrique and Chief Sloly could have a conversation  
19 because I felt that these were unreasonable demands, and I  
20 directed my Inspector Ferguson that if there was a request for  
21 OPP to be a part of any of this, it was not to happen. It was  
22 to come through myself before any OPP members would become  
23 engaged in the types of activity that I had heard about.

24 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And I just have a few  
25 further questions. On February 6<sup>th</sup> in your notes, and you've  
26 actually put an asterisk on it, and just for the benefit of  
27 those who are following it online, it is page 28 of 167 of the  
28 PDF, but I don't need you to call it up. You indicate at the

1 bottom, "lack of autonomy to make decisions." Who's that a  
2 reference to?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So further up in the notes  
4 at 15:43, I was speaking with Inspector Marcel Beaudin, who's  
5 our PLT Coordinator who the Commission will hear from as a  
6 witness. And he's describing his member's experiences on the  
7 ground in Ottawa and that inability to make decisions and be  
8 given autonomy to do their work. That's -- sorry, go ahead.

9 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** I apologize. I didn't  
10 mean to cut you off.

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So that was very concerning  
12 for him and for his team because that's what they do. They're  
13 job is to get engaged with protesters, in this case it was  
14 convoy protesters, establish relationships, determine what their  
15 goals are, how can we facilitate and exit? What does an exit  
16 look like? All those activities, trying to obtain those win-win  
17 situations where it's a bit of a give and take amongst  
18 protesters and PLT to try to establish rapport and trust with  
19 each other, and they weren't able to do any of that. And I can  
20 only imagine, if that's your sole job and you're being prevented  
21 from being able to do that, that can be frustrating. So ---

22 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Right.

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- in my role as strategic  
24 commander, I was asked to see what I could do to deconflict that  
25 or resolve that because that was their concern. They weren't  
26 allowed to make decisions.

27 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And you understood that  
28 that lack of autonomy was as a result of Chief Sloly's

1 direction, as I understand?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what I was informed  
3 of, correct.

4 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** But in your dealings with  
5 Deputy Chief Bell and Deputy Chief Ferguson, they appeared to  
6 welcome the assistance of the OPP and they were cooperative with  
7 you and engaged with you; is that fair?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Very much so, yes.

9 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** And ---

10 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Mr. Migicovsky, you're  
11 well over time, so I'm going to have to ask you to wrap up.

12 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Sorry. Last question  
13 then, you talked about the PLTs, and you understood that Staff  
14 Sergeant John Ferguson was in charge of the PLTs in Ottawa; is  
15 that right?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** For the Ottawa Police,  
17 correct.

18 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Right. And you understood  
19 that he too was frustrated with the lack of involvement of the  
20 PLTs. He was supporting what the OPP was -- wanted?

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I understood that, yes.

22 **MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY:** Thank you very much.  
23 Those are my questions.

24 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

25 Next up are the Convoy Organizers.

26 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:**

27 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Good morning, Mr.  
28 Commissioner, good morning, Superintendent Abrams, and good

1 morning, my friends. My name is Bath-Shéba van den Berg and I  
2 am Counsel representing Freedom Corp. and protesters. Thank you  
3 for your service, Superintendent and for your forthwith  
4 testimony so far. I have a few questions for you this morning.

5           You mentioned yesterday in your testimony that  
6 the PLT use a snatch and grab method; correct?

7           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** They do not use that method.  
8 I believe in my testimony yesterday I indicated that Major  
9 Critical Incident Commander Superintendent Patterson wanted to  
10 do snatch and grabs, and wanted PLT assistance with that, and  
11 that actually was one of my main concerns, because our PLT Units  
12 are not used in that fashion ever. So it actually is the  
13 opposite of your suggestion.

14           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** So you can confirm  
15 that the method of snatch and grab was not used between February  
16 6<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> of 2002 -- 2022 rather?

17           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Oh, no, I can't confirm  
18 that. Those operations would have been done by Ottawa Police  
19 Service if they did them. My purpose in communicating to  
20 Superintendent Patterson was if him and his service wished to do  
21 that, there would be no OPP support in doing so. They may have  
22 occurred, but if they did occur, they would have been done by  
23 the Ottawa Police Service without OPP member participation.

24           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** I want to speak  
25 with you about what snatch and grab means. You agree that it  
26 means police officers lined up in a horizontal line and in their  
27 riot gear; right?

28           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's not how I see it.

1 Snatch and grab is not a -- it's not a policing term, to be  
2 honest, that I'm familiar with as far as a technique that we're  
3 taught or instructed on. When I heard Superintendent Patterson  
4 explain that, he didn't explain it in great detail. I pictured  
5 it in my mind it was trying to locate certain individual persons  
6 who may have a reasonable grounds to be arrested and,  
7 essentially, when they're located, grab them off the street  
8 wherever they're located and arrest them under those  
9 authorities. That's how I viewed what snatch and grab was. I  
10 do not view it as a group activity. It was more an individual  
11 activity.

12 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** You would agree  
13 though that it does involve grabbing protesters; is that  
14 correct?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, I mean, the individual  
16 person may be a protester themselves, but I just -- I pictured  
17 an operation where officers are going out looking for one  
18 particular person or persons on a list, but not -- the persons  
19 aren't together in a group. And if an opportunity arose, they  
20 would affect an arrest of that singular person.

21 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Thank you. Was  
22 this method, to the best of your knowledge, used after the  
23 *Emergencies Act* was invoked?

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't speak to that  
25 because I wasn't connected with the Ottawa Police operations at  
26 that level.

27 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** You mentioned in  
28 your testimony yesterday that you only found out about the

1 creation of the red zone on February 17<sup>th</sup>; is that correct?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I believe that's correct,  
3 through media. That was posted on Ottawa Police Twitter and  
4 media releases that were released by Ottawa Police where they  
5 spoke about the formation of this red zone.

6 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Is it true that you  
7 also found out on the same date of February 17<sup>th</sup> that there would  
8 be 900 officers reporting at 6 a.m. the following morning,  
9 Friday morning, February 18<sup>th</sup> for deployment?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So, yeah. Yes, but if I  
11 could expand on that answer a little bit to add some context to  
12 it, so the evening -- so the date was February 19<sup>th</sup> you're  
13 indicating?

14 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** The -- in the  
15 evening of the February 17<sup>th</sup> ---

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** February ---

17 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** --- that you found  
18 out that at 6 a.m. the next morning on February 18<sup>th</sup> that there'd  
19 be 900 officers ---

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I believe the 17<sup>th</sup> was a  
21 Thursday; am I correct?

22 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** The 17<sup>th</sup> was a  
23 Thursday evening ---

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Right.

25 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** --- that's correct.

26 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So the next date was a  
27 planned, large Public Order Unit deployment, which that was the  
28 first time we would have seen a large number of Public Order

1 Unit members on the street. And my people's role, the people I  
2 was in control of, would be to be at traffic points to help  
3 contain and control any ground that Public Order Units were able  
4 to clear. And late that evening, I believe it was around 10  
5 o'clock, 50 RCMP members attended our OPP Command Post  
6 indicating that they were reporting to our location starting the  
7 next morning, along with Ottawa Police. And that was concerning  
8 to me only because I was already deploying close to 5 to 600 of  
9 my own members, and if we added Ottawa Police and RCMP, that  
10 would be 900 members, and we would not physically be able to get  
11 that many members onto the street in time to support the  
12 operation that was planned for the next day.

13 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** So was it, in your  
14 professional opinion, that there was insufficient time to  
15 properly brief these 900 police officers prior to them being  
16 deployed on the ground?

17 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There would not have been  
18 sufficient time to brief them and get them on the ground, so  
19 that's why that evening, as a team, I gathered my Incident  
20 Commander, Ottawa Police Service supervisors were on our Command  
21 Post helping us with telecommunications, and I gathered them in  
22 a group and we all said we have to solve this problem, because  
23 we're literally hours away from a major operation. So  
24 collaboratively and together, we all agreed on a solution, so  
25 that we did not have to deal with that issue the next morning,  
26 and we were able to get officers deployed in a reasonable amount  
27 of time.

28 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Was the name of

1 this major operation "Operation Takedown"?

2           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was never aware of what  
3 the Public Order Unit operation name was. I just knew that  
4 there was a Public Order operation happening the next morning,  
5 but I wasn't familiar with the name of it.

6           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** As per the *Ontario*  
7 *Police Services Act* Regulation 926, all police officers,  
8 including Public Order Unit members, performing active duty  
9 shall have an up-to-date Use of Force qualification within the  
10 last 12 months; is that correct?

11           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I believe that applies to  
12 all serving police officers in the province of Ontario, so it  
13 would apply to Public Order Unit members as well.

14           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Would you be able  
15 to confirm that all officers including those 900 received those  
16 -- had that qualification before they were deployed?

17           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would not be able to  
18 confirm that because I don't have that information. And if I  
19 could qualify my answer, there is a provision that allows the  
20 Associated Arms Office to provide an extension to that 12  
21 months, whether it be due to an emergency. Best example I can  
22 give you, in this case, when the Public Order process started,  
23 we had a large influx of OPP members come to the City of Ottawa.  
24 I had an additional almost over 400 officers come to the city.  
25 To be able to get that many members to the city, we had to do  
26 some logistical operations within our organization, and one of  
27 those was to cancel block training, which is annual training for  
28 members on use of force and firearm requalification. So in

1 doing so, some of those members may have gone outside the 12  
2 months. We needed to seek approval to allow them to maybe be  
3 beyond the 12-month period, but that is allowed within the  
4 *Police Service Act* with the proper authorities.

5 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Was your role after  
6 the *Emergencies Act* was invoked ER logistics and planning ---

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm sorry, after it was  
8 invoked what was my role?

9 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Yeah, was it  
10 logistics and planning?

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, my role was as the  
12 Strategic Commander. So I oversaw a team of officers that were  
13 led by an Incident Commander, who their job was to organize the  
14 logistics of finding out where Ottawa Police needed us because  
15 we were a support agency to the Ottawa Police, and then my  
16 Incident Commander and his team would provide Ottawa Police with  
17 the support that they needed under -- with me with frontline  
18 officers. So Public Order Unit Command and what they needed for  
19 Public Order Unit was separate from myself and I didn't have  
20 direction or control over our Public Unit ---

21 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Right.

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- members.

23 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And you were  
24 reporting to Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy; is that correct?

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

26 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** You considered him  
27 your commander?

28 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I did.

1                   **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Were you involved  
2 in the planning phase for the operation, the major operation?

3                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Only for -- I believe I said  
4 yesterday, only for about 48 hours, just in the initial stages  
5 when the Integrated Planning Team got started and we had our  
6 initial meetings on the 8<sup>th</sup> and the 9<sup>th</sup>, and that was the only  
7 time I had direct contact with the members of that planning  
8 team, and I reverted back to my role of managing our OPP members  
9 and our deployments in support of Ottawa Police.

10                  **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** With regard to the  
11 boots on the ground, were PLT supporting POUs?

12                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was not aware of what PLT  
13 was doing. I know PLT eventually had a seat in the NCRCC with  
14 our Critical Incident Commander, so there was always -- I  
15 believe it was a PLT Sergeant that sat beside our Critical  
16 Incident Commander. But I'm not aware exactly of what they were  
17 doing in the field because that would not have been reported to  
18 me.

19                  **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And yesterday you  
20 mentioned that OPP and OPS PLTs had an integration problem and  
21 communication's issues; is that right?

22                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what was reported to  
23 me. Correct.

24                  **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And also with the  
25 POUs?

26                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't say that I heard of  
27 a lack of integration within our Public Order Units. That  
28 wasn't reported to me.

1           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Do you agree with  
2 me that after the invocation the *Emergencies Act* that these  
3 integration problems, the communications problems continued and  
4 did not improve?

5           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Within the PLT teams, there  
6 was still issues. I would have calls with Inspector Beaudin and  
7 he would say some days they were making forward progress and  
8 other days they still lacked an ability to understand what the  
9 plan was. Because until the Integrated Planning Team came up  
10 with a plan, there was still no plan. So they still struggled  
11 to determine what their purpose was, were they truly integrated  
12 team between the Ottawa Police Service PLT team and the OPP PLT  
13 team. There were still those issues, yes.

14           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Okay. And that, in  
15 fact, that the problems worsened after the influx of 900  
16 additional officers on the ground on Friday morning the 18<sup>th</sup> of  
17 February?

18           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I don't know if they any  
19 worsened. I think the maintained and became -- they were  
20 similar, but I don't know that they became any worse.

21           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Would you agree  
22 with me that due to the lack of integration and communication  
23 problems, that that would lead to a problem ultimately in  
24 decision making throughout the major operations?

25           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly. The information  
26 that PLT is able to provide and tell us about conversations  
27 they're having with convoy organizers, and plans or what the  
28 intent of the organizers are is very important in forming

1 operational plans of how we're going to approach a protest. So  
2 being unable to get that information has an impact, yes, in a  
3 negative way.

4 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And when I mention  
5 major operation, I mean after the invocation of the *Emergencies*  
6 *Act*.

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ADAMS:** No, I consider it one giant  
8 operation and the lack of communication had impacts all along,  
9 from invocation period, prior to and during.

10 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** If it didn't  
11 improve after the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*, would you  
12 agree that it got worse?

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't say it got worse.  
14 It just seemed to be a similar theme throughout my time as  
15 strategic commander is I continued to hear the lack of  
16 communication, the lack of integration. That was a common  
17 theme. It didn't seem to increase through one day or the other,  
18 whether prior to February 14th or after. It seemed to be a  
19 similar theme throughout.

20 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And the final phase  
21 after this major operation after the indication of the  
22 *Emergencies Act* was called the maintenance phase. Is that  
23 correct?

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I recall that name being  
25 used. Just it was a phrase meant to maintain and hold ground  
26 that public org members were able to clear streets,  
27 intersections, those types of things.

28 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Do you agree that

1 every officer who draws their firearm in the presence of public  
2 and uses weapons or improved weapon other than a firearm on  
3 another person or uses physical force on a person that results  
4 in an injury to that person requiring medical attention shall  
5 complete a use of force report prior to the end of duty?

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can only speak to the OPP.  
7 There is a use of force reporting requirement.

8 I apologize. I'm not certain on the timelines of  
9 when it shall be done, whether it's at the end of their shift or  
10 within a certain number of days. I'd have to review the  
11 legislation, so unfortunately, I can't give you the exact answer  
12 on that.

13 But I tried to follow all what you were speaking  
14 about, but from what I heard you say, it seems to check all the  
15 boxes that are related to our members when they have to fill out  
16 use of force reports. And all the occasions you mentioned, from  
17 what I recall hearing, fit those needs to have a use of force  
18 report submitted.

19 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Well, timelines  
20 aside, were any of those use of force reports completed at the  
21 major operations after the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm not aware.

23 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Yesterday you  
24 mentioned that you listened and you watched Chief Superintendent  
25 -- rather, Superintendent Morris's testimony yesterday. Is that  
26 correct?

27 You mentioned that yesterday in your testimony,  
28 that you watched his ---

1           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Parts of his testimony, yes.

2           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And do you agree  
3 with it?

4           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I don't disagree with many  
5 of the things that Superintendent Morris said. It was his  
6 testimony and was consistent with our organizational values and  
7 his public -- Provincial Intelligence Bureau mandates.

8           **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Thank you. Those  
9 are all my questions.

10                   And thank you again for your service.

11           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Thank you.

12           **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

13                   Next I'd call on the Government of Canada.

14 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:**

15           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Thank you.

16                   Superintendent Abrams, my name is Brendan van  
17 Niejenhuis, and I'm one of the lawyers for the Government of  
18 Canada. And I just have a few questions for you about your  
19 testimony yesterday.

20           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Good morning.

21           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** You described  
22 yesterday at some length a difference of view or approach  
23 between yourself or members of your team at the OPP and Chief  
24 Sloly and some of those working under him at the OPS about the  
25 importance in this scenario of PLT techniques; right?

26           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

27           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And in particular,  
28 you described or you relayed information upwards about a

1 significant dispute that had arisen about the arrest of those  
2 who were removing gas cans from the Coventry Road encampment.

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

4 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Those gas cans which  
5 were in part there as a supply of fuel to vehicles in the red  
6 zone were a serious concern as to safety; right?

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly. Flammable  
8 products.

9 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Sure.

10 And their use as a supply was also a concern  
11 about it supporting the continued entrenchment of the trucks in  
12 the downtown core; right?

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sure. It was.

14 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** The OPP PLT and some  
15 of the OPS PLT members as well, I take it, were concerned that  
16 the trust that had been invested by them and by the protestors  
17 at that Coventry Road site had been disrupted or even destroyed  
18 by the arrests that were -- that occurred; right?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That was our concern, yes.

20 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And some of the PLT  
21 team members felt extremely demoralized and as though their work  
22 had been set back by days or even longer.

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

24 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Some days had  
25 already been invested, I take it, in building those  
26 relationships with the Coventry Road encampment participants.

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** As I understand it, yes.

28 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And I think that the

1 flash point for that disagreement as we saw from the document  
2 was on or around February the 8th. Does that accord with your  
3 recollection?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That seems accurate, yeah.

5 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And so by February  
6 the 8th the convoy had been ongoing in the downtown part of  
7 Ottawa for approximately 11 days running from January the 29th?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That seems accurate, yes.

9 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And now it would  
10 take several more days in the view of the PLT team to get back  
11 to that point, if not longer; right?

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That was -- that was what  
13 they felt a worst-case scenario would look like. They were  
14 certainly hoping it wouldn't take that many days, but that was  
15 their concern.

16 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** In negotiating with  
17 the participants in the fashion that the PLT units do, is it  
18 fair to say that some are more susceptible to being reasoned  
19 with than others?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Are people more -- are some  
21 people more reasonable to reason with than others? Is that what  
22 you're saying?

23 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Yes.

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would say that's an  
25 accurate statement, yes.

26 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Sure.

27 And if we -- if I just want to call up a  
28 document, OPS00010383.

1           Just by way of example, Superintendent, this is a  
2 report from OPS, some PLT members describing -- the name's  
3 redacted, but one of the organizers from the east convoy, give a  
4 sense of what certain groups or factions are looking for. Do  
5 you see that?

6           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do.

7           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And he's indicating  
8 that this individual wants a meeting with the Governor-General  
9 and the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Senate; right?

10          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's how it appears.

11          **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And that was not the  
12 sort of thing that would be readily within the control of a PLT  
13 unit; fair?

14          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct, yes. That's  
15 correct.

16          **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And so this would be  
17 an example of someone who's more difficult, at least on the --  
18 by appearances, at least, to come to deal with, so to speak, to  
19 resolve the situation peacefully. Is that fair?

20          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, certainly harder to  
21 resolve and would involve more time in trying to adjust their --  
22 you know, trying to measure their expectations, perhaps.

23          **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Sure.

24           And that informs the usefulness of a de-  
25 escalation or negotiation approach with a particular organizer  
26 or group of organizers; right? The reasonableness of their  
27 requirements in order to come into compliance with the law.

28          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, it certainly gives you

1 a very quick understanding of are we going to be able to have  
2 some type of back-and-forth reasoning or whether we're just  
3 never going to be able to come to an agreement.

4 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Just returning to  
5 this Coventry Road site, which was the locus of this, you know,  
6 contretemps or dispute, whatever you want to call it, that site  
7 is approximately a little more than four kilometres away from  
8 Parliament Hill and the centre of Wellington Street. Is that  
9 fair?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's fair.

11 I'm not from the City of Ottawa, so I'll have to  
12 take your word for that, but it seems accurate.

13 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** I'm going from  
14 Google Maps, so it's -- but it's several kilometres away. Is  
15 that reasonable, at least?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sure, sounds reasonable.

17 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And in speaking  
18 yesterday to my friend, Commission counsel, with respect to your  
19 -- the conversation that you didn't recall, I think, but that  
20 was recorded by Dana Earley in her notes from the Windsor side  
21 of things -- do you recall being asked about that?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, I call.

23 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And you were asked  
24 to, I guess, really speculate or -- about your apparent comment  
25 that in Ottawa, unlike in Windsor, the blockade was "not  
26 affecting livelihoods", at least that's what she had noted. Do  
27 you recall that?

28 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Like I said, I don't recall

1 the details of our conversation. I think the notes that were  
2 presented yesterday were scribe notes, so she had a scribe  
3 attached to her, so was writing down what we were conversing  
4 about. I didn't have a scribe during this event, so I'm trying  
5 to use my independent recollection about the details of that  
6 conversation.

7 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Sure. And I just  
8 want to ---

9 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't say ---

10 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** --- be fair to you  
11 to make it clear what you can recall and what you can't, which  
12 is perfectly fair.

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah.

14 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** But I just wanted to  
15 return to what you'd said as you speculated about it. You  
16 thought that you might have been speaking from your impression  
17 gathered driving around Ottawa outside of the downtown core in  
18 the Parliament precinct, that it was quite manageable to drive  
19 around town; right?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. I believe, from my  
21 recollection, we were speaking about the Ambassador Bridge being  
22 blocked and how it was -- if you're familiar with Windsor, it's  
23 the one way into Windsor and if it's blocked, it makes travel  
24 difficult within the whole city. And I recall having a  
25 conversation just about the economic impacts of that  
26 international bridge blockade and those kinds of things, and  
27 then I recall relating back to her how the blockade here in  
28 Ottawa was affecting the city as a whole, not just the downtown

1 core.

2 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Sure, sure. Just  
3 different geography and a different scenario.

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Right.

5 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** You could get back  
6 and forth down the 417, and off to the Coventry Road site  
7 relatively smoothly?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't speak to Coventry  
9 Road because it's on the -- I believe it's on the north side of  
10 417, but I was speaking more about, you know, areas south of the  
11 417 and the 417 itself.

12 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And that's quite  
13 distinct from what was going on in the heart of Downtown Ottawa  
14 and Parliament Hill?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

16 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** If I could just show  
17 you a photograph of -- it's OTT, this was from Mr. Ayotte's  
18 evidence, OTT00010005, and it'll be page 37. It doesn't want to  
19 come up quickly.

20 Well, do you recall at any point, if I can't get  
21 the photograph up, there being a large industrial crane on  
22 Wellington Street at certain points?

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I believe it was the one  
24 that had the large Canadian flag that was extended with a flag  
25 on the end of it?

26 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Yes.

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I recall seeing visuals of  
28 that, yes.

1                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And that industrial  
2 crane, for example, presented a potential for serious danger to  
3 persons or property if it were to be misused; right?

4                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would agree with that  
5 statement, yes.

6                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And there was also  
7 the presence, you know, again, not on Coventry Road, but on the  
8 Parliamentary Precinct and on Wellington Street, of an  
9 uncontrolled and unknown quantities of gas or diesel fuel there  
10 as well; right?

11                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah -- yes, there was fuel  
12 in that area.

13                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And just as in the  
14 Coventry Road area, those can explode and cause serious fires in  
15 that downtown sector of Ottawa as well if they're to be set  
16 alight; right?

17                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly.

18                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** I want to come back  
19 now to the difference of view about PLTs. You told us yesterday  
20 that in fairness to Chief Sloly, you know, in characterising the  
21 difference of view, that he may have been taking quite a high-  
22 level perspective in his preference by February 8th to enforce  
23 through public order operations in reference to investigating  
24 the PLT engagements; right?

25                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That seemed to be the case,  
26 and -- yes.

27                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And you appreciate  
28 that if Chief Sloly's perspective may have been high-level that

1 the perspective at the political level would probably have been  
2 at even higher level; is that fair?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't speculate on the  
4 political context.

5 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Okay. Is it fair  
6 say, though, that the differences of opinion and the  
7 disagreements or even arguments amongst the participants in the  
8 policing operations from OPP, OPS, and later the RCMP, that  
9 these were operational in nature?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would agree -- yes, I  
11 would agree.

12 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And these kinds of  
13 operational disagreements are not typically brought to the  
14 awareness of the political level; fair?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It's not something certainly  
16 not at my level.

17 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** It would not be  
18 appropriate to directly engage the political level in  
19 operational questions like that; is that fair?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It would not be  
21 inappropriate?

22 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** It would not be  
23 appropriate.

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Appropriate. I've -- at my  
25 level it's not something I've ever been engaged with. At a  
26 Commissioner level, a Chief level, I can't speculate, I've never  
27 held those ranks, so I'm not sure what is appropriate or not  
28 applicant for a Chief of Police or a Commissioner to communicate

1 with a politician.

2 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** At your level, it  
3 would not be appropriate or you would perceive it as concerning  
4 if a Minister, for example, were to try to intrude into or give  
5 direction on the operational questions you were discussing?

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It would concern me because  
7 of the operational impacts of somebody who's unknown to me  
8 having impacts on an operation we're trying to resolve.

9 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** When you expressed  
10 the opinion yesterday that there were ways to enforce that  
11 could've ended the convoy's occupation of Downtown , short of  
12 the *Emergencies Act*, you were speaking just from your own  
13 visibility; right?

14 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm sorry, what do you mean  
15 by "visibility"?

16 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Speaking just from  
17 the things that you can see on the ground in Ottawa and in the  
18 east region of Ontario.

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Apologies, I'll have to get  
20 you to repeat the question again. I don't know that I  
21 understand the context.

22 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Yes. When you  
23 expressed the view that there ways to enforce and end the convoy  
24 occupation in Downtown Ottawa, short of the *Emergencies Act* ---

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

26 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** --- you were  
27 speaking from your -- what you can see on the ground in Ottawa  
28 and the east region of Ontario?

1           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, and from past  
2 experience in resolving blockades and prior to the *Emergency*  
3 *Act*.

4           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** You also  
5 acknowledged yesterday, and you'll agree with me that this  
6 wasn't an isolated event, and that an event occurring in Ottawa  
7 would have an immediate impact on what was going on in Coutts  
8 and what was going on at the Ambassador Bridge; fair?

9           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, I agree. All those  
10 activities have linkages and have impacts to each other.

11           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And that may have  
12 been part of the assessment for all you know at the political  
13 level in terms of what was visible there?

14           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Perhaps, I can't be certain.

15           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Finally, just with  
16 respect to the measures being used, can we turn very briefly to  
17 ONT00000168.

18           This is a form letter from Commissioner Carrique  
19 "To all identified towing companies". Do you see that?

20           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do see it.

21           **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And if you just  
22 scroll down the page, you'll see that this is -- indicates...

23           Sorry, maybe not that far down. Just go back up.

24           This provides the guidelines for the requirement  
25 of towing to be provided by towing companies under the *Emergency*  
26 *Measures Regulations*; right?

27           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Okay. It seems to be that's  
28 the topic of the memo, yes.

1                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And that, you'll  
2 agree with me, was used by the OPP to require towing companies  
3 to supply services?

4                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It seems to be. I was not  
5 involved in that part of the Operations on that.

6                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Okay, fair enough.  
7 If we could go to OPP00003660.

8                   Do you see this is a Notice To Demonstration  
9 Participants from February the 17th?

10                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, I see that.

11                  **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And this was  
12 distributed by the teams on the ground, including members of the  
13 OPP, to protesters to warn them of the legal consequences of  
14 remaining in the red zone; right?

15                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

16                  **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And it refers to  
17 criminal offences, but if you go down the page, it refers as  
18 well, of course, to the consequences arising out of the  
19 *Emergencies Act*; right?

20                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's -- that seems to be  
21 what it says, yes.

22                  **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And by the time the  
23 public order operations began in earnest that day, the 17th,  
24 communications like this had had an effect on reducing the  
25 footprint of the crowd; is that fair?

26                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Because I wasn't involved in  
27 the Integrated Planning Group or seeing reports from PLT, I  
28 can't say whether it had a positive impact in members or people,

1 protesters choosing to leave or not leave. Just because of my  
2 role at that period of time, I was insulated and focussed on  
3 just deploying my members in support of the Ottawa Police  
4 Service, so I wasn't getting reports on, you know, how many  
5 protesters are choosing to leave or the success or non-success  
6 of items like this.

7 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** But you'll  
8 appreciate, at least from the perspective of the consequence  
9 that it's attempting to communicate, that that's the purpose of  
10 it, right, is to allow for a peaceful opportunity to depart?

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, I mean, this is exactly  
12 kind of what I spoke about. This is one of those communication  
13 mediums that PLT uses to communicate with protesters so that  
14 they understand, because some may not understand that they're  
15 committing an offence, and this may be the consequences if you  
16 don't -- sometimes there's timelines put on them, sometimes  
17 there is not, but this is classic PLT communication process,  
18 yes.

19 **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And in your  
20 experience, it's effective; right?

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** In my experience, it has  
22 been very effective, and -- because it's -- it follows the  
23 measured approach, it follows the framework, it makes sure that  
24 anybody involved in the protests clearly understands jeopardy,  
25 understands police timelines in relation to what we plan to do,  
26 we're open, we're being honest, and so there's no  
27 misunderstanding or miscommunication about what may be occurring  
28 into the future.

1                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And this public  
2 order operation, so far as you're aware, was able to proceed in  
3 Ottawa without death or serious bodily injury to any of the  
4 participants?

5                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There was bodily injury to  
6 participants from my side. I saw some people -- there was some  
7 injuries to people. I understand the SIU became engaged in some  
8 injuries, so there was injuries to participants that I'm aware  
9 of, and that's just me seeing the media. Those weren't things  
10 that were reported to me through a chain of command or anything  
11 like that.

12                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Sure. But you're  
13 not aware of any death or serious bodily injuries?

14                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm not aware of any deaths.  
15 I have to say that I saw serious bodily injury, because if you  
16 look at the definition and mandate of the Special Investigations  
17 Unit of Ontario, they only become involved when there's serious  
18 bodily injury. So because they were engaged in one incident,  
19 I'd have to say that serious bodily injury within that  
20 definition occurred in that situation.

21                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** All right. The  
22 encampment was -- sorry, the occupation at any rate was resolved  
23 after the enforcement operation went underway with the  
24 assistance of the Communications, as far as you knew?

25                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

26                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And that was the  
27 purpose of the OPP's assistance throughout the convoy to begin  
28 with; right? Was to resolve the situation?

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Along with our partners. It  
2 wasn't really OPP's job to resolve the situation.

3                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** No, no. But that's  
4 the purpose of OPP's assistance?

5                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, to try to help to  
6 resolve, yes.

7                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And when the EA was  
8 revoked, the Act was revoked on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, you directed the  
9 employment of common-law powers to prevent further assembly for  
10 approximately another 24 hours?

11                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

12                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** And then you  
13 concluded that that power was no longer necessary or applicable  
14 because the situation had been resolved?

15                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** The situation had been  
16 resolved, but more so, there was no police intelligence to  
17 indicate that the convoy or participants were going to reattend  
18 and continue to commit the offences that they were committing.  
19 So therefore we needed to fall back.

20                   **MR. BRENDAN van NIEJENHUIS:** Thank you. Those  
21 are my questions.

22                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you. Next I'd like  
23 to call on the lawyer for former Chief Sloly, Tom Curry.

24                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Commissioner, just before I  
25 begin, I believe I -- I think many of my friends -- some of my  
26 friends have gone a little bit over. I would be grateful if I  
27 could have a bit of an indulgence? If I need to use some of the  
28 time that I have been allocated for the witness this afternoon,

1 I will cash that time in.

2 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** I've not seen that type of  
3 trading going on ---

4 **MR. TOM CURRY:** No.

5 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** --- and I don't want to  
6 encourage it, ---

7 **MR. TOM CURRY:** It's a PLT -- it's a PLT ---

8 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** --- but I have been a  
9 little bit liberal because it's Friday ---

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes.

11 **MEMBER ROULEAU:** --- and we don't have as much of  
12 a heavy schedule. But I -- so I will have some indulgence, but  
13 please don't abuse it.

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. Thank you.

15 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TOM CURRY:**

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Superintendent, you first got  
17 engaged in this, you've told us, when you received an email  
18 assigning you to this event on the 24<sup>th</sup> of January; yeah?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, sir.

20 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Three days out from the first  
21 convoy truck rolling into the city?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm not -- I was away from  
23 the workplace prior to, so I'm not sure when one truck may have  
24 arrived in the city. The majority of the trucks were planned to  
25 arrive at the end of that week. So I can't state what trucks  
26 were in town on the 24<sup>th</sup> of January.

27 **MR. TOM CURRY:** No, sorry, three days out from  
28 when they arrive. You came on ---

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I apologize.

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- on the 24<sup>th</sup>; right?

3                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was going the other way in  
4 the calendar.

5                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** You were -- right. So am I right  
6 that you were given, by your commander, and I think you got it  
7 on the afternoon of the 24<sup>th</sup>, so you get it at 4:00 o'clock or  
8 some such thing on the 24<sup>th</sup>, and you've now got three days to  
9 develop your plan and your strategic command; yes?

10                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

11                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. And what you did was you  
12 looked at the information that was available to you, Project  
13 Hendon; yes?

14                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

15                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** And you spoke to your colleague,  
16 Supt. Morris?

17                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, Supt. Morris, I was  
18 part of conversations where he would inform us of the most  
19 current intelligence, what was occurring ---

20                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah, just stop. After you got  
21 the assignment, forgetting that you get the Hendon Reports, I  
22 get that you received them all?

23                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah.

24                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah. But after the 24<sup>th</sup>, before  
25 you deployed, you spoke to him and got a briefing from him;  
26 right?

27                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sounds accurate.

28                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Pardon me?

1 SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS: I'm assuming I did. I ---

2 MR. TOM CURRY: Yeah, sure.

3 SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS: --- can't recall.

4 MR. TOM CURRY: And I've got -- let's help you  
5 with the notes.

6 SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS: Sure.

7 MR. TOM CURRY: OPP00000774, please.

8 You've looked at these before you came today, I  
9 assume?

10 SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS: My notes?

11 MR. TOM CURRY: Did you look at your notes?

12 SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS: I've looked at my notes many  
13 times, yes.

14 MR. TOM CURRY: No, I know. But before you came  
15 here, did you look at these?

16 SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS: Yes.

17 MR. TOM CURRY: Okay. Good. So it's -- I don't  
18 want to test your memory, but let's look.

19 This is Monday. You're working from home at that  
20 time. Do you see?

21 SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS: Yes.

22 MR. TOM CURRY: And 0948, email to INTERSECT.  
23 You told us about that:

24 "...discuss the convoy issues [...] impacts in  
25 all of our areas."

26 "1305 Tovell."

27 I think that's one of your colleagues:

28 "...doing [a] traffic plan for [the] Convoy

1 arrival. [Speaking to] OPS Traffic..."  
2 "1554 Intersect email."

3 That's you sending them.

4 "convoy - 28-29 Jan[uary]."

5 Everybody thought this was a two-day protest;  
6 correct?

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. I'm just -- when I  
8 look at the dates, I think the dates are indicative of arrival  
9 date, as opposed to event dates.

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Well let's carry on. They  
11 were going to get through Arnprior on the 28<sup>th</sup>. Three convoys  
12 above that. 29<sup>th</sup> of January, into Ottawa. We'll -- this is  
13 OPP's plan:

14 "[We] will slow traffic but not block.  
15 The intention is to hold a peaceful  
16 demo[nstration] [with] no hostility.  
17 forward to Chief Thomas, Insp Tovell [and]  
18 Semple."

19 That's your team; right?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And just to add context, I'm  
21 not saying that the OPP will slow down traffic. The convoy  
22 organizers have stated that they will slow traffic, but not  
23 block it.

24 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. Thank you for that.  
25 And what you were going to do, to get to this -- the traffic  
26 plan was to effectively escort the convoy to Ottawa?

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** We didn't want to do any  
28 escorting. So there was no OPP vehicles necessarily, you know,

1 in front and back and follow us. It was more monitoring.

2 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. So you had cruisers. Did  
3 the cruisers have their overhead roof lights on or not?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't be 100 percent  
5 whether they did or not. We would not. But emergency lights  
6 activated or not, that deep into an operational plan, ---

7 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- that would be left to  
9 the officer's discretion ---

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Got it.

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- of how they feel they  
12 need to do it on the side of the road.

13 **MR. TOM CURRY:** So sometimes if protestors  
14 sympathetic were on the side of the highway supporting the  
15 convoys that went by, you might have had -- a cruiser might have  
16 had to use their emergency lights in that situation, for  
17 example?

18 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

19 **MR. TOM CURRY:** But you had cruisers in and  
20 around the convoy as -- from the time it crossed the Manitoba  
21 border until you handed them off to Ottawa; correct?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

23 **MR. TOM CURRY:** How many cruisers?

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't articulate a number.

25 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Be more than -- I mean, what --  
26 from your experience, we've got a train down many kilometres.  
27 Do you imagine that it's 10 unites?

28 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, I'm trying to ---

1           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Twenty (20) units?

2           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm trying to recall the  
3 operational plan, if it listed the traffic units. But I would  
4 say at least 15 to 20 units would be a fair number, yes.

5           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. And then just to carry on:  
6 "1622 Chief Thomas Email!"

7                           That's your Chief Superintendent?

8           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

9           **MR. TOM CURRY:** "MCIC [something] possibly"?

10           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** "to come over possibly."

11           **MR. TOM CURRY:**

12                           "to come over possibly.

13                           aviation consulted."

14                           That's your aviation team; yeah?

15           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

16           **MR. TOM CURRY:** And then it says -- POIB is, of  
17 course, the Intelligence Bureau. "Pat". You spoke with him?

18           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, I didn't speak with him  
19 that day. I just -- I knew that his role and what he was doing  
20 was he was engaging with police partners outside of Ontario so  
21 that we could have a picture of what was coming across Canada  
22 from west to east.

23           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Got it. And then finally, at  
24 1622, you note that in that conversation, or rather email, with  
25 your superintendent -- your chief superintendent, you were asked  
26 to be the strategic superintendent for the event and you went  
27 into action. Therefore, effectively, the next day, the --  
28 really into action the next day, the 25<sup>th</sup>; correct?

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Two days -- effectively two days  
3 before the -- what we understand to be the arrival of some of  
4 the first vehicles in Ottawa.

5                   Can I show you -- or can I ask you to confirm  
6 that what you then did was you got your colleagues, your team  
7 reporting to you to do a traffic plan? An operations plan for  
8 this event; right?

9                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** An operational plan, yes.

10                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** And that operational plan -- we  
11 have it. But that operational plan effectively had OPP  
12 monitoring the convoy through Ontario until there was a hand off  
13 into Ottawa; correct?

14                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, many other regions had  
15 similar plans and they were tracking the movements in a similar  
16 fashion.

17                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

18                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And so we had to create our  
19 plan obviously just for our geographic area.

20                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right east region. And the --  
21 you had a -- you then set up some of your own people in your  
22 operations centre in Ottawa; correct?

23                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It wasn't our operations  
24 centre. I put Insp. Ferguson in the NCRCC. S/Sgt. Nicholas  
25 between kind of a traffic building that OPS had in the NCRCC and  
26 I had my Emergency Operations Centre at our East Region  
27 headquarters in Smiths Falls.

28                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** And where were you located during

1 that time? The weekend of the convoy, were you in Smiths Falls?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was in Smiths Falls.

3 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay, good. And you had a couple  
4 of people, you've described, on the ground here in different  
5 places, and did you have in Smiths Falls any other people with  
6 you as part of your team managing the event?

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I had assigned an Incident  
8 Commander Scott Semple.

9 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah.

11 **MR. TOM CURRY:** In Smiths Falls?

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

13 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Got it. Smiths Falls to  
14 Ottawa, help us with the geography.

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Southwest 40 minutes.

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Got it. And then you had  
17 -- am I correct you did not have resources, logistical  
18 resources, any other kind of resources for an event that was  
19 going to be longer than a weekend protest; correct?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That is correct.

21 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And the reason that you didn't is  
22 because your review of the intelligence available and the  
23 information available to you at OPP pointed to a two-day  
24 protest? They come, they protest, they leave; right?

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I wouldn't agree with that.  
26 I would say that my plan was based on my conversations through  
27 Intersect calls with Ottawa Police, who indicated they were  
28 planning for that level of event; therefore, so was I.

1           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Well, so the one thing we  
2 don't do, or do we, is defer to another police service when we  
3 make our own plans at the OPP. That's an input, but you did not  
4 -- you're not telling the Commissioner that you didn't plan for  
5 an extended protracted three-week event in Ottawa because the  
6 Ottawa Police Service didn't; correct?

7           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly not, because ---

8           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

9           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- as we saw and as I  
10 explained in my evidence before is we expected a traffic event  
11 that was going to end downtown in the City of Ottawa. So we did  
12 not plan based on intelligence, based on Hendon, based on any  
13 other information source that we expected vehicles or protesters  
14 to clog up provincial highways, which we were responsible for,  
15 or communities for more than an evening, and we expected them to  
16 be lawful in that one evening. So all of those parts indicated  
17 for the OPP's perspective a very quick event, essentially, a  
18 one-day trip from different areas of the city into the downtown  
19 core and that would end the OPP's involvement in the movement of  
20 those vehicles.

21           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah, and the OPP plan, we can  
22 look at it if you need it, the OPP plan describes in language  
23 the handoff. You were going to hand off after they were  
24 finished travelling over the provincial highways into the City  
25 of Ottawa; correct?

26           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Right.

27           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Your expectation was that as many  
28 as 3,000 vehicles were going to be in the City of Ottawa and you

1 were quite content with what you saw from OPS was their plan to  
2 allow the convoy operators to protest; correct?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** The numbers were uncertain.  
4 Ottawa Police indicated that they thought they could handle  
5 3,000. Hendon and other reports as we've seen didn't  
6 specifically exactly say X number of vehicles. But I was  
7 satisfied based on my calls with Ottawa Police that they felt  
8 they could handle that number of vehicles.

9 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes, and you knew it wasn't 3,000  
10 once they got there, but you knew that ---

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No. Indicators were just  
12 the vehicles that crossed from the west that was in the 800  
13 range and they may ---

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- pick up some as they  
16 move south but ---

17 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Got it. And so you were content  
18 to hand off to Ottawa in the expectation that the team that you  
19 had put together as the Strategic Operations lead here would  
20 allow you to manage that convoy as they left Ottawa as well;  
21 correct?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There was no -- we didn't  
23 know what the exit plan was, so we always had to be ready and  
24 available to write what that exit plan was. So that was an  
25 unknown to us as to would they exit on mass, would they exit  
26 slowly. That was uncertain.

27 **MR. TOM CURRY:** But in addressing that  
28 uncertainty, you were content that the team that you had in

1 place was appropriate; correct?

2           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, we felt we could  
3 manage as a mass entry is not much different than a mass exit.

4           **MR. TOM CURRY:** And so therefore -- right, and  
5 therefore, you did not plan -- you didn't bring any additional  
6 resources for anything longer than the weekend protest that you  
7 thought was going to be on; correct?

8           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. Because as you  
9 noted in my notes, once it looked like it was going to be  
10 prolonged, I had to have meetings with my command team to say  
11 let's plan for an extended event.

12           **MR. TOM CURRY:** 29<sup>th</sup> of January, I believe, maybe  
13 a little later, is the first time that you began to assemble  
14 resources for a different event; correct?

15           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

16           **MR. TOM CURRY:** And the Ottawa Police Service was  
17 in the very same position that you were in; correct?

18           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Position as in not planned  
19 for an extended event?

20           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes.

21           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It seemed to be.

22           **MR. TOM CURRY:** You ---

23           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly, in my  
24 conversations with Deputy Bell on the 31<sup>st</sup>, I believe it was, was  
25 the first time that he indicated that he felt this was going to  
26 be a protracted event and they were planning for what could be a  
27 4-week event.

28           **MR. TOM CURRY:** And they made a shift in their

1 planning and operations just like you did; correct?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, they sent -- yes, for  
3 sure, they ---

4 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And you -- what you did in  
5 advance was send a Public Order Unit to Ottawa in advance, this  
6 was part of your planning, but you sent them to the PPS,  
7 Parliamentary Protective Service; correct?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, so I can explain the  
9 structure ---

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah, don't -- I don't -- yeah, I  
11 mean, if you need to make an explanation, go ahead, but I just  
12 need the facts.

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I need to explain because it  
14 wasn't my direction. That's why I need to explain.

15 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. I'm ---

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I did not direct those  
17 resources. As a Strategic Commander, I did not direct Public  
18 Order Unit operations. I did not direct where they went. They  
19 reported to me to tell me what they were doing, but that  
20 happened through our Field Support Bureau. So in your question,  
21 I did not direct that.

22 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Fair enough. Thank you for that  
23 clarification. OPP sent a Public Order Unit, but they didn't  
24 send them to the OPS. They sent them to the PPS; correct?

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That is correct.

26 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. And then you set out the  
27 calls for resources. You need to make a new plan and you began  
28 to get resources in the form of additional personnel; correct?

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** How many additional personnel?

3                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** At the very beginning, I  
4 reached out to say, "Look, we have 18 members right now that we  
5 could pull from local detachments." And it started from there  
6 and it continued -- every day ---

7                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

8                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- it continued to rise  
9 from there.

10                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** It was obvious to you as a person  
11 with experience in this area that the Ottawa Police Service  
12 would not be able with its existing resources to manage this  
13 event, correct, once it changed its complexion; right?

14                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I didn't know that until I  
15 heard that directly from their own Deputy Chief.

16                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

17                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I had made assumptions that  
18 I felt that they had come up with a plan to address many  
19 different options that may have occurred.

20                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** So the -- we'll talk about plans,  
21 but just talking about personnel, you knew from your experience  
22 with Intersect, the size of the Ottawa Police Service did not  
23 allow it to manage the event that this had become; correct?

24                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, and I learned that  
25 through those calls.

26                  **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes, but you do -- but did you  
27 need to be told that? If so, that's fine, or did you know it  
28 from your own experience that they were overwhelmed ---

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I ---

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- in numbers?

3                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- I had to be told that  
4 because I ---

5                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

6                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- couldn't assume. I knew  
7 they have I believe it's 1200 or 1400, they have many members,  
8 and at that early stage, it was hard to know whether that many  
9 members could contain what was happening in those first day or  
10 two or not.

11                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Good.

12                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I needed to hear that from  
13 them because I wasn't on the ground ---

14                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And so ---

15                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- to see what they were  
16 dealing with.

17                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- that's fair. So then you  
18 needed to be told that by them and they told you that.

19                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

20                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And what they asked for was help;  
21 correct?

22                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

23                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** They asked you for help as early  
24 as what; do you say, the 31<sup>st</sup>?

25                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'd have to check my notes,  
26 but it was on a Saturday or Sunday, yes.

27                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Got it. And when they  
28 said they wanted help, they told you they needed help in

1 particular areas; right?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

3 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Very specific areas; correct?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

5 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And am I correct that you were  
6 unable at that time to give them all the help that they wanted?

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I don't recall that. When I  
8 talked to Deputy Bell, he said his immediate need was for  
9 traffic control. He needed officers to be able to relieve his  
10 officers from downtown doing traffic, so we were able to provide  
11 those bodies. We started with 30 a day, and I was able to  
12 provide those bodies within my own region in short order. I  
13 never ---

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- there was never delay.

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** It was not adequate; correct?

17 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** He needed more after that,  
18 because he had indicated that it would probably come to 60.  
19 When the formal letter would come from Chief Sloly or the  
20 Commissioner Carrique, Deputy Chief Bell indicated to me that he  
21 felt it would probably be around the 60 number that they would  
22 be asking from the OPP from frontline, and then there would be  
23 Public Order section requests and PLT requests as well.

24 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Am I right though that you were  
25 not able to give them the resources they needed when they needed  
26 them; correct?

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I believe I was able to give  
28 them when they needed them.

1                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. So what did you do to get  
2 resources? Were you confined to moving resources within the  
3 East Region, or did you put in a call to your superiors or the  
4 other parts of your command to get additional resources?

5                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. In the early days  
6 I was able to contain it within my own region. I believe on my  
7 other evidence I described we have a Regional Deployment Plan  
8 for emergencies such as this, and we know how many officers are  
9 at each of our 16 detachments; we know who's working each day,  
10 and in an emergency we know how many officers we can ask to  
11 leave that area to attend whatever the emergency happens to be.  
12 So relied on that Emergency Regional Deployment Plan to gather  
13 those resources of 30 a day to assist Ottawa.

14                   Once, you know, a couple of days goes by and I'm  
15 aware that there's going to be an increased asked of 60, then,  
16 yes, I need to call our emergency, or Operations Centre, which  
17 is based out of Orillia at our General Headquarters, which falls  
18 under our Field Support Bureau, to then gather provincial  
19 resources to assist because, yes, regionally I wouldn't be able  
20 to ---

21                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** When did you first -- when did  
22 you first put in a call to the Emergency Resource Centre:

23                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Once again I'd have to refer  
24 to my notes but within probably three days to four days of the  
25 30 a day when it was clear -- when the letter came in from Chief  
26 Sloly asking for 60, I had to make the phone call through our  
27 EOC to say, "Okay, I need your help to gather resources to come  
28 to East Region."

1                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And am I correct that you came to  
2 the conclusion that 60 a day was not enough?

3                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I could only rely on what  
4 Ottawa Police said they needed from me.

5                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** You were told 60 a day was not  
6 enough; they needed many more; correct?

7                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** As other days went on, that  
8 would be communicated to me, say, "Can you give us more?" And  
9 we would be able to tell them, "Yeah, we can probably give you  
10 this many more or this many more."

11                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right. And on the -- you told us  
12 about the -- first, let me go back. You had never been through  
13 anything like this before; correct?

14                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Not to this scale.

15                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

16                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I ---

17                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** You've never seen an urban  
18 occupation -- a protest that had become an occupation; correct?

19                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** As it was explained to me,  
20 this was the largest unplanned deployment of OPP resources in  
21 our history.

22                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right, got it. So therefore in  
23 your history. You told us that you'd been to some other --  
24 been through some other blockade situations, but they have not  
25 involved the urban environment like this, and obviously the  
26 sheer scale of this one was beyond anything you had experienced,  
27 right?

28                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Not in my experience,

1 correct.

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And so when we talk about  
3 resources, you had participated in a call you told us, on the 6<sup>th</sup>  
4 of February when Chief Sloly requested his team to make an  
5 estimate of the resources they needed, right?

6                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. I recall that was a  
7 video call, yes.

8                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes. And you told us that you  
9 thought that it was unusual that he told his team to double the  
10 number; if they thought they needed 100, to double it to 200.  
11 You made that comment; correct?

12                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, it seemed odd to me,  
13 yes.

14                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes. It didn't seem odd enough  
15 to you, though, to record in your notes, right?

16                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And I addressed this in my  
17 Will State, it's because in the meeting they were discussing  
18 Ottawa Police business. I didn't feel it was appropriate for me  
19 to make notes on Ottawa Police operations, so I purposely did  
20 not note ---

21                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** You made a lot of notes,  
22 Superintendent, about Ottawa Police. You've made notes about  
23 rumours and innuendo and what people told you some other guy  
24 said all kinds of times, haven't you?

25                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I have. In that -- in that  
26 situation, I purposely chose not to ---

27                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

28                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- takes notes because it

1 seemed inappropriate for me ---

2 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- because they were  
4 talking about internal Ottawa Police operation matters that I  
5 didn't -- my purpose to be on the call was to talk about PLT.

6 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. So you didn't -- so can I  
7 put it this way: That whatever Chief Sloly said that you didn't  
8 record in your notes, you didn't think it was important enough  
9 to imagine that the number that they came back with, 1,800, when  
10 they came back 24 hours later with a number, that there was some  
11 lack of validity or integrity to that number, did you?

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I questioned where the  
13 number could have come from in that short period of time.

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** You didn't -- yeah. And did you  
15 tell Chief Sloly or anyone that you weren't going to take action  
16 in respect of their request for resources because you had heard  
17 him make a comment to his team, that you didn't record in your  
18 notes, but that you were going to use to deny them resources  
19 that they wanted?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I never communicated with  
21 Chief Sloly on that.

22 **MR. TOM CURRY:** No.

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And I never would deny  
24 resources. I communicated that to my command, as we spoke about  
25 in my testimony to the Commissioner, to say this is what I'd  
26 heard. While you're trying to address operational requests from  
27 the Ottawa Police Service, I thought it was important for him  
28 and the Deputy Commissioner to know that this statement was made

1 ---

2 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah.

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- that day.

4 **MR. TOM CURRY:** So what did you think that was  
5 going to do, Superintendent? Did you think that was going to  
6 get them the help they needed, or did you think that was going  
7 to cause people to believe that there was no actual number that  
8 they needed that had any validity? What did you think you were  
9 doing with that?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** What I was doing was  
11 protecting the members of the OPP.

12 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And what ---

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And not ---

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And what were you ---

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Can I finish?

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** What were you ---

17 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Let him finish.

18 **MR. TOM CURRY:** I'm sorry. Go ahead,  
19 Superintendent; how were you protecting the members of the OPP?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Because of a large request  
21 like that, it was important for me to communicate to my senior  
22 command that, (a), perhaps they're not truly needed based on  
23 what I heard, and (b), since we have no operational plan yet, to  
24 send that number of officers into a situation with no real plan  
25 on what to do with them was a concern, so that's why I felt it  
26 was important to communicate that to my command about that.

27 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Would you agree with me that it  
28 had the effect of causing your people, and everybody else, to

1 think that what Chief Sloly was asking for to help the citizens  
2 of this city and to help the Government of Canada and to help  
3 his own Police Service, did you think you were helping him, or  
4 them?

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I think it was helping  
6 everybody to have the proper knowledge before they made  
7 decisions to deploy resources.

8 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Sure. And so of course we now  
9 know, don't we, that the 1,800 estimate that his team put  
10 together was exactly right; maybe it was a little under,  
11 actually. You know that, don't you?

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, we've heard those  
13 numbers here.

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah. So it wasn't a rabbit  
15 pulled from a hat, and it wasn't a bunch of numbers that were  
16 just randomly doubled, was it?

17 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It seemed to me as a number  
18 pulled from a hat in that short period of time.

19 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Do you accept now that it wasn't  
20 a number pulled from a hat; that his team worked very hard to  
21 actually get the number that they needed? Do you accept that  
22 now?

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No.

24 **MR. TOM CURRY:** No.

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Because there was no plan.

26 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And so I can't accept that.

28 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And that's, of course ---

1                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Please ---

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** I'm sorry.---

3                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** --- again, you're  
4 interrupting. Please, let him finish.

5                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

6                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** I know you're over your  
7 time and I'm being generous.

8                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Thank you.

9                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** So it's important to be  
10 fair to the witness.

11                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Of course.

12                   Superintendent, go ahead.

13                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** From my experience, as we've  
14 talked about, we build a plan first and then we add members to  
15 it after. The fact that the numbers fit the integrated planning  
16 team's plan, I don't know that that connects to the work that  
17 his team did within those 24 hours.

18                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Did you look at it?

19                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** The integrated plan?

20                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** No. Did you look at the numbers  
21 that were on the table that his team put together?

22                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** On February 9<sup>th</sup> when I  
23 attended the meeting downtown with the integrated planning team,  
24 that's the first time I was presented with the three-page  
25 document that showed the numbers that they were requesting.

26                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** So before you even looked at it,  
27 you made the statement that it was an overestimate, and it was  
28 not a valid number; you didn't even look at it?

1           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I never indicated in any of  
2 my communications that I felt it was an overestimate. I just  
3 wanted our senior command to know that when Ottawa Police were  
4 trying to determine how many people they needed, this is the  
5 direction that their Chief gave them.

6           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes.

7           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's all -- I did not  
8 opine on whether I felt it was adequate or inadequate. I never  
9 said that.

10          **MR. TOM CURRY:** You cast doubt on it, didn't you?

11          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I only said that there was  
12 -- suspicious how they could come up with a number like that,  
13 and certainly the suggestion that that number would be doubled.

14          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Fine. And then you passed that  
15 on to the Minister.

16          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I did.

17          **MR. TOM CURRY:** You passed on -- you passed on an  
18 incorrect number to the Minister, didn't you?

19          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I did not do that, no.

20          **MR. TOM CURRY:** The Minister, the Solicitor-  
21 General?

22          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** The deployment ---

23          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Did you see the Minister's  
24 statement?

25          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** We're talking about two  
26 separate events here, sir.

27          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Let's move to the second  
28 one, then, if you want to think it is a second event.

1 Did you pass on the number to the Minister ---

2 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Please, let's -- you get  
3 to ask questions, don't turn things around, please. Be fair to  
4 this witness.

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So the video call when I met  
6 with Chief Sloly, and he talked about having his team go away.  
7 That date was February -- you'll have to help me, counsellor, on  
8 the date that video call happened. You just mentioned the date  
9 the call ---

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** I had moved on to the statement  
11 that the Minister made.

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Irregardless [*sic*] of the  
13 date ---

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** I'm happy to go back if you want.

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So February 2<sup>nd</sup>, I received  
16 an email requesting we have in the OPP a representative within  
17 the government buildings in Toronto, and they're liaison between  
18 government and the OPP. And I received an email from that unit  
19 saying that the Solicitor-General wanted the number of OPP  
20 members that have been in Ottawa since the beginning of the  
21 event. So I asked my team to create a chart which indicated the  
22 numbers from the beginning of the event until the 2<sup>nd</sup> of  
23 February, and I described what that chart looked like yesterday.  
24 It include numbers of logistical people, EOC members, frontline  
25 members, Public Unit Order members. And I emailed that to my  
26 Chief Superintendent, and since we're a paramilitary  
27 organization, we follow the chain of command. And then I assume  
28 from that point on those numbers that I obtained were moved up

1 to higher levels.

2 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And the Minister on that basis  
3 issued a statement to the public, and in the House, in the  
4 Legislature; correct?

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I became aware of that  
6 later. I wasn't aware of it at the time.

7 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah. And it was erroneous?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't say that.

9 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Well, there weren't 1,500 OPP  
10 officers here, were there?

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** In a day. Chief Sloly, in  
12 his concerns to me when we had our meeting, was he felt that  
13 that media release indicated that there was 1,500 OPP officers  
14 in his streets, in his town that day.

15 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes. And that impacted, you now  
16 know this, it impacted what the RCMP considered the Ottawa  
17 Police Service needed, it impacted the way the public in Ottawa  
18 thought that the OPS was handling the matter, it impacted the  
19 Council and all of the other things, didn't it?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** As I stated to Chief Sloly,  
21 I presented the daily numbers with a roll up of the total  
22 numbers. How those numbers were used or controlled after that  
23 was beyond my control.

24 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes, and did you tell -- what  
25 steps did you take to tell the Solicitor General that the  
26 information upon which she was relying was -- had been  
27 misunderstood, misinterpreted? Any steps?

28 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I -- it was not within my

1 purview to reach out to the Solicitor General.

2 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Did you tell your Commanding  
3 Officer ---

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I did not.

5 **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- that that had happened?

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, I did not, that ---

7 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Thank you.

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- meeting was the first  
9 time.

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Two quick things: The bridge.  
11 Have you seen Chief Sloly's news conference of February the 4th  
12 that you told the Commission about yesterday?

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I only saw the live portion  
14 when I was sitting in the Command Post and I saw him and  
15 Deputy Bell doing the news conference.

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** So you're relying on your memory  
17 from February 4th?

18 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. I recall hearing that  
19 and then reacting immediately ---

20 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah.

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- because I connected with  
22 the Deputy immediately.

23 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Well, I don't have the time to  
24 play it for you, but he never said that he was going to close  
25 bridges. What he said in his news conference was that  
26 consideration was being given to that, and that bridges or  
27 accesses -- access would be closed if needed or as needed. He  
28 didn't say he was closing bridges; did he?

1                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what I heard, and --  
2 so that would naturally precipitate a call to confirm what I  
3 heard. Maybe I misheard, that's why I needed to reach out to  
4 Deputy Bell to say, "Did I hear this correctly?"

5                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And you were ---

6                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I needed to understand.

7                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** I'm sorry to interrupt you. And  
8 you were told by Deputy Bell that you had misheard it, that  
9 there were no bridges being closed; right?

10                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah. My concern was more  
11 about the offramps. The bridges were within the City of Ottawa,  
12 so I wasn't concerned about the bridges. My main concern was  
13 about what I heard about offramps.

14                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Same thing, though. Deputy Bell  
15 said ---

16                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It's not the same thing for  
17 me as far as my concern and my operations because my operations  
18 didn't concern bridges.

19                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** He gave you the same answer.  
20 "You have misunderstood it. No one's closing a bridge, no one's  
21 closing an offramp. Relax."

22                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I heard it very clearly that  
23 there was a plan to close offramps, and that's what precipitated  
24 my call to Deputy Bell.

25                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Quick thing about the PLT. This  
26 PLT team, unfortunately, never had any success in negotiating  
27 the departure of convoy participants or protesters; correct?

28                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would disagree with that.

1 I felt that at the end much of their work allowed some of the  
2 convoy protesters to leave voluntarily.

3 **MR. TOM CURRY:** So prior to the -- I should have  
4 been clearer, thank you. Prior to the public order operation  
5 going into effect to clear these streets, PLT had not succeeded  
6 in negotiating an end to this protest, had they?

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Well, certainly the protest  
8 was still ongoing when public order had to do what they did.

9 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yes. And so the Coventry Road  
10 issue, what PLT had negotiated, am I correct, was that  
11 protesters could take their fuel from Coventry Road and place it  
12 in a different depo?

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I wasn't aware of the  
14 particulars of that because PLT didn't report to me. What I was  
15 engaged in was solely on the deconfliction end of it, to say  
16 that, "This happened, this miscommunication happened within the  
17 Ottawa Police Service, and could you help us?"

18 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And as my friend, Mr. van  
19 Niejenhuis had asked, the fuel on Coventry Road, whether it's on  
20 Coventry Road or it's somewhere else, was a significant public  
21 safety risk; correct?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

23 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And if PLT negotiated that  
24 they're going to move the fuel from Coventry Road to a different  
25 depo, you could appreciate why Ottawa Police Service would be  
26 very concerned; correct?

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't speak to what the  
28 idea was ---

1                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

2                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- or what the plan was  
3 because ---

4                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Got it.

5                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- I didn't ---

6                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** So you would not -- you're not  
7 telling the Commissioner that you're second-guessing the  
8 operational decision to seize fuel if that was a public safety  
9 risk; correct?

10                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct, because our teams  
11 were intended to integrate and they didn't report to me.

12                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. Thank you. And  
13 then, Windsor. The information that was available to OPP did  
14 not -- was not sufficient to allow it to avoid the blockade at  
15 Windsor.

16                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was not involved in any of  
17 the Windsor. I would not have any information on Windsor or ---

18                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood.

19                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- our plans in Windsor.

20                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And resources have to be  
21 allocated among the OPP detachments across the province so that  
22 when we saw the note from your colleague in Windsor about  
23 whether Windsor was a priority over Ottawa, that's a decision  
24 that has to be made at the level of the -- of OPP resource  
25 allocation; correct?

26                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Right. In a province the  
27 size of Ontario, there is various priorities that have to be  
28 decided on how we staff them.

1                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And the -- as to the *Emergencies*  
2 *Act*, the OPP, PLT notes to protesters included and relied upon  
3 terms under the *Emergencies Act*; right?

4                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I believe that's what we  
5 saw, yes.

6                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood.

7                   Thank you, Commissioner.

8                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay, thank you.

9                   Next, I'd like to call on the City of Ottawa.

10 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNE TARDIF:**

11                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Good morning, Superintendent.  
12 My name's Anne Tardif. I represent the City of Ottawa.

13                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Good morning.

14                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So I'd like to take you first  
15 to your notes. I know you have them in front of you, and I'll  
16 give you the date, but I'm going to give the number so that  
17 everyone else can follow along.

18                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly.

19                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** It's OPP00000774. And I'm  
20 going to go to the date at February 3rd, Superintendent.

21                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

22                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And it's page 19 of that  
23 document, Madam Clerk.

24                   Do you see the date there at the top of the page?

25                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, 3rd of February, yes.

26                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Correct?

27                   And I'd like to the before last entry on that  
28 page, Madam Clerk, so just scrolling down a little bit.

1 Perfect.

2 So do you see the entry there, Superintendent? I  
3 think it's 1752, it could be 1952, I'm not sure the time  
4 matters, but do you see that entry?

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do.

6 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And it says, "Supt.  
7 Alakas - FSB" in that note, and it's actually the last sentence  
8 I suppose of that entry that I want to draw your attention to.  
9 It says:

10 "No real plan for them & no meaningful  
11 dialogue with truckers occurring."

12 So first, is this something that you're reporting  
13 to Superintendent Alakas, or is he reporting it to you?

14 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'll correct you quickly.  
15 My Grade 4 teacher would still not be happy with me, my  
16 penmanship is not the best. It's, "There's no real plan  
17 forthcoming".

18 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Forthcoming; okay. It's the  
19 second part that I want to talk about, the "no meaningful  
20 dialogue with truckers occurring." Do you see that?

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, that's coming from  
22 Superintendent Alakas to me.

23 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And this is with respect  
24 to the Ottawa situation?

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

26 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So by February 3rd, we don't  
27 have any meaningful with dialogue with truckers occurring. And  
28 you described the events of February 6th yesterday and again

1 this morning; correct?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

3 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** PLT went into Coventry to  
4 negotiate the removal of gasoline?

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, that's what I  
6 understand.

7 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And Superintendent Patterson  
8 used the opportunity to seize the fuel and charge some of the  
9 protesters; is that correct?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

11 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And PLT felt they had lost all  
12 the goodwill they were able to reach with some of the convoy  
13 organisers.

14 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what was communicated  
15 to me, yes.

16 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And were you aware that  
17 two days later, on February 8th, Ottawa Police asked the City  
18 Manager, City of Ottawa Manager, to meet with protesters?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was not aware of that.

20 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And we've heard that police  
21 felt they didn't have anything to lose by facilitating a  
22 meeting, and it would be a win to gain trust with truckers, and  
23 they could use it as a bargaining chip to move trucks. Were you  
24 aware of that at the time?

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was not aware of that, no.

26 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** We've heard as well that the  
27 City negotiated an agreement to remove trucks from the  
28 residential neighbourhoods in the dates that followed. Were you

1 aware of that at the time?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Not at the time. I can  
3 indicate that I received messaging from our PLT members to  
4 indicate that they were frustrated by the involvement of  
5 municipal leaders and how it was impacting their work, but I was  
6 not aware of the exact times these were occurring.

7 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** But -- and I guess that's what  
8 I'm getting at, Superintendent, because that's reflected in your  
9 witness summary, which has been filed into evidence. And so at  
10 the time that you received those concerns from your PLT  
11 officers, I take it you were not aware that the City had spoken  
12 with protesters at the request of police?

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Right. Outside of what may  
14 have been reported in public media I wasn't aware of what was  
15 happening.

16 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And you were not aware  
17 that a senior OPS officer had been at the table to negotiate the  
18 logistics of how and where the trucks would move?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, I would not have been  
20 involved in that or aware of that.

21 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And just given in your --  
22 referenced it already, but in your witness summary, you indicate  
23 that your PLT officers were frustrated because they were hearing  
24 from protesters that they had met with the Mayor and that they  
25 wanted to continue to meet with the Mayor. That's what you were  
26 hearing on the 15th of February.

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

28 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And the evidence this

1 Commission has heard is that the protesters in fact never met  
2 with Mayor Watson.

3 I take it you're aware of that now?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Now I'm aware, yes.

5 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. I want to switch tracks  
6 a little bit and talk about Supt. Earley's notes. Now, she --  
7 it's -- I'm assuming Dana Earley is a she. Is that fair?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

9 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Just want to check. Thank you.  
10 And so Supt. Earley was in Windsor during the Ambassador Bridge  
11 blockade?

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** She was. She was  
13 essentially performing my role, but in ---

14 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Fair enough. And so I take it  
15 that if you did have a conversation with her, it's going to be  
16 about resources? I mean, that's really the only reason for you  
17 to speak to Supt. Earley during the events of February 2022;  
18 fair?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Fair.

20 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Now, when you were asked  
21 yesterday initially, you did not believe that you had spoken to  
22 Supt. Earley at that time. Do you recall saying that?

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, I didn't have an  
24 independent recollection of that conversation though.

25 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Fair enough. And to be fair to  
26 you, we see that there's no mention of it in your notes, except  
27 for the words "Dana [Earley] -" on February 10<sup>th</sup>; correct?

28 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

1                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** You were then taken to Supt.  
2 Earley's notes of that call. And I will ask that they be put up  
3 on the screen. It is OPP00004543.

4                   Thank you, Madam Clerk. And can we go to page  
5 15? One five.

6                   Okay. This -- just to be fair to the witness --  
7 oh, actually, the date is on it. Perfect.

8                   Do you see at the top there, 10<sup>th</sup> of February  
9 2022? Can you see that, Superintendent?

10                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do, yeah.

11                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. So just before we get  
12 into this, you described at some length in your testimony a  
13 meeting that occurred with the planning team and with the  
14 leadership of OPS at OPS headquarters on Elgin Street, and I  
15 believe that was on February 9<sup>th</sup>. Is that correct?

16                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct.

17                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

18                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** At 12:10, I believe.

19                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Pardon me?

20                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I believe it started at  
21 12:10.

22                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. We've got the same  
23 meeting in mind. So that's the day before February 10<sup>th</sup>,  
24 obviously. Okay.

25                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

26                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So you explained during that  
27 meeting -- and I'm not going to take you back through all of it.  
28 you've explained it in some detail. It's in your witness

1 summary, which has now been filed, but at some point, as I  
2 understand it, Supt. Phil Lou of the RCMP tells then Chief Sloly  
3 to "pump the brakes" on the enforcement plan? Is that fair?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's fair.

5 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And he says that he thinks he  
6 can get 400 POU officers to Ottawa in a week's time?

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And sorry, incorrect. I  
8 believe it was S/Sgt or Sgt. Darwin Tetreault who was saying  
9 that?

10 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Pardon me.

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Not to Phil Lou. The  
12 statement is as you claim, but I believe it was made by Darwin  
13 Tetreault, not Phil Lou.

14 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And is S/Sgt. Tetreault also  
15 with the RCMP?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** He is.

17 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

18 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And he has a Public Order  
19 component in his work.

20 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Perfect. So we've got an RCMP  
21 officer advising that they think they can get 400 POU officers  
22 in Ottawa in about a week's time; right?

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct, yeah.

24 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So if we're at February 9<sup>th</sup>,  
25 that means they think they can get their 400 POU officers in  
26 Ottawa on or about February 16<sup>th</sup>; fair?

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's fair.

28 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. But I think we've heard

1 at length that a number greater than that was actually needed in  
2 order to bring the convoy to an end; right?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly. And I ---

4 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Yeah.

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- believe S/Sgt. Tetreault  
6 believed that as well. He just indicated, "Let's start there,  
7 and then we'll work with our Public Order partners across the  
8 country to try to gather more."

9 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Fair enough. So the 400 was a  
10 start?

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

12 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Now, if we can scroll  
13 down here to 1021? That's the first indication of the call. Do  
14 you see that call? I can't tell if that's to or from. Not much  
15 turns on it. Craig Abrams, to confirm resources. And that's  
16 consistent with what you've told us. Any call with Supt. Earley  
17 really would have been to focus on resources; right?

18 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

19 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And then:

20 "Ottawa has been sending resource sheets..."

21 Is that sheets?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sheets, yeah.

23 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:**

24 "...to EOC."

25 That's the Emergency Operations Centre of the  
26 OPP?

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, based in Orillia.

28 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Based in ---

1           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** We use that term a lot. So  
2 every region had an Emergency Operations Centre. So in this  
3 case, she's talking about Orillia, because we were both using  
4 Orillia to help facilitate logistics, to obtain resources for  
5 both our operations.

6           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** That's right. So you've gotten  
7 exactly where I wanted to get at. This is the same place that  
8 you both are writing to to get resources; right?

9           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

10          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And then 1023 -- and  
11 then actually, before I get here, I think I heard you say that  
12 you believe that Supt. Earley had a scribe? Is that right?

13          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, I -- yes. I thought --  
14 I would assume she did, but.

15          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And so you believe that  
16 these are notes taken by her scribe?

17          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** And I have no confirmation  
18 of that.

19          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

20          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Just assuming it was. But I  
21 could be mistaken.

22          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. That's fine. So at  
23 1023:

24                         "Advised Abrams Windsor is priority  
25                         according to Deputy"

26                         Do you see that?

27          **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do.

28          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And the next line refers to a

1 gentleman named Hargins. Is that -- Harkins, pardon me. Is  
2 that Dept. Comm. Harkins?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

4 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And he's in charge of the Field  
5 Services Bureau? Do I have that right?

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** He's the deputy in charge of  
7 Field Operations.

8 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Field Operations. Okay. And  
9 so as I'm reading this, the Deputy Harkins advised that Windsor  
10 is priority? Am I -- is that the way to read this?

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what that ---

12 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** That's what that says. And  
13 Harkins, Deputy "Harkins told me" -- being Supt. Earley -- "to  
14 go through the EOC". And you advise that that's what was  
15 happening at that time; right?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

17 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So you're both going through  
18 the same Emergency Operations Centre to request resources for  
19 your operations?

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

21 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:**

22 "Will have a much better idea of #'s this  
23 afternoon after meeting w POU commanders."

24 And then at 1024 -- sorry, 1026. I'm just  
25 jumping over the 1024. You can see it there, Superintendent.

26 "Abrams will call EOC to confirm staffing  
27 process

28 You are priority - we will take leftovers"

1 Do you accept that you made that statement, Supt.  
2 Abrams? Either that or something to that effect?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, I don't recall making  
4 that statement.

5 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** You don't recall?

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No.

7 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Do you recall any discussion  
8 that Windsor was the priority for resources to be obtained out  
9 of the EOC at that time?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, I don't recall, because  
11 on that day, literally that day, the 10<sup>th</sup>, I spoke with Chief  
12 Pardy and we made resource requests and an extra 120 officers  
13 were coming to Ottawa by the Monday. So that's why I'm confused  
14 by the talk about resource allocations, because I asked and we  
15 required another 120 and it was approved, and it just --  
16 obviously to get people across the province into Ottawa was  
17 going to take us a couple of days. We planned to have an extra  
18 120 officers in Ottawa by that Monday.

19 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And at 1026 again, the  
20 second 1026:

21 "Abrams advised Windsor will need to tell  
22 you what you need"

23 So we've got three statements between 1021 and  
24 1026 suggesting that you were made advised here that Windsor was  
25 the priority, but you deny that?

26 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was never told that. I'm  
27 not denying that statement was made, but when we had  
28 discussions, she told me that the Deputy told her that Windsor

1 was a priority. So I'm saying, "Okay. If you're telling me  
2 that the Deputy told you Winsor is a priority, then okay." But  
3 that information, from what I'm seeing, is the Deputy, Deputy  
4 Harkins, I'm assuming, was telling her. I didn't tell her that.

5 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So we may just be lost in  
6 language and semantics. When I said you were never told, I was  
7 meaning to say by Supt. Earley. Do you accept that you were  
8 told by Supt. Earley that her understanding was that Windsor was  
9 the priority? I'm not asking you what you were told by Deputy  
10 Harkins.

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Right. I accept based on  
12 the notes. I don't have an independent recollection of our ---

13 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** That's fine. But you accept it  
14 based on the notes. Thank you.

15 If we could keep scrolling down? Okay.

16 So I'm looking at the second 1028 note. And you  
17 were taken to this, in fairness to you, Superintendent,  
18 yesterday. Do you see:

19 "Ottawa is just trucks on side streets"

20 Do you see that note there?

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

22 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And I think you said yesterday  
23 that you also did not have an independent recollection of this  
24 call; correct?

25 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I really don't. I'm trying,  
26 but so many calls over so many weeks. I can't say that I recall  
27 this one specifically.

28 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** But you explained what you may

1 have meant yesterday. You said that it was easy to drive around  
2 if you were south of Wellington, i.e., outside of the red zone.

3 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** I think he said south of  
4 the 401.

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Four seventeen (417),  
6 Commissioner.

7 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Oh, pardon me. Did you say  
8 south of the 417? My apologies. No, that's fine. I had south  
9 of -- south of the 417?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. It would have -- you  
11 know, based on what I'm reading and trying to recall, we would  
12 have had general conversations about what she was dealing with,  
13 and what I was dealing with, and what it looked like in her  
14 area, and what it looked like in my area, and we would have had  
15 conversations about the impacts to the City of Windsor overall,  
16 because of the location of the Ambassador Bridge and those types  
17 of things. So I believe that's the context of where this comes  
18 from.

19 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So if I understand it  
20 correctly, it was that if you were outside of the sort of  
21 impacted downtown core, you could drive around the city? You  
22 could navigate the city outside of the downtown core that was  
23 blocked? Is that fair? That was you ---

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That was ---

25 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** --- would have been ---

26 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That was just my personal  
27 experience in the times I had to be able to do that drive. I'm  
28 sure there were days due to traffic backups that there was

1 difficulty in some areas of the city. I'm just stating in  
2 general terms from my own experience, I didn't see a massive  
3 impact outside of that core area, traffic wise.

4 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And you were aware, I  
5 take it, at the time, that some of the bridges between Quebec --  
6 or between Gatineau and Ottawa were closed or subject to lane  
7 reductions?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ADAMS:** Lane reductions, for sure.  
9 Full closures, I believe they were kind of rotating depending on  
10 days because I recall there was impacts with nursing staff that  
11 were trying to get from Gatineau to the hospitals in Ottawa so  
12 there had to be some give and take to open up some lanes so  
13 people could get to work.

14 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** That's right.

15 So we had health professionals having difficulty  
16 accessing their place of work; correct?

17 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's what I recall.

18 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And you recall also, I take it,  
19 that we had patients having difficulty accessing their  
20 appointments.

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I only ---

22 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Were you aware of that?

23 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I don't. I only recall that  
24 some leaders of the hospitals had indicated that their staff  
25 were unable to get to work on time, which had obviously  
26 operational impacts for their agencies, and there was a request  
27 -- not controlled by the OPP, but there was a request whoever  
28 was controlling the bridges on either side that they could make

1 some accommodations for that.

2 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And those side streets that the  
3 trucks were parked on in Ottawa -- because as you say, they  
4 weren't parked on the bridge or on the 417. They were parked on  
5 side streets. Those side streets, you knew, weren't residential  
6 neighbourhoods.

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There may have been  
8 apartment buildings on them, as I'm -- when you say residential,  
9 I'm picturing suburban, but there may be urban apartments that  
10 were on those side streets, certainly.

11 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Yeah. And so the trucks were  
12 parked at the front door of some of these apartment and condo  
13 buildings.

14 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm sure they were, yes.

15 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** They were idling and honking?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There was lots of honking,  
17 yes.

18 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And we've heard complaints of  
19 resident harassment in these neighbourhoods as well. You heard,  
20 I take it, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson saying that they  
21 received complaints about that.

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I heard it personally myself  
23 in my own visits to store owners that told me directly.

24 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And I appreciate you weren't in  
25 Windsor, but my understanding is that there were roughly about  
26 100 trucks involved in the Windsor blockade. Is that accurate?

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I couldn't comment. I  
28 wasn't involved and I don't recall.

1                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** You're well over your  
2 time, so you're going to have to wrap up.

3                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Fine.

4                   Can you just confirm that the -- I mean, I don't  
5 think it's contentious, but that the blockade in Windsor was  
6 significantly smaller than in Ottawa in terms of number of  
7 trucks?

8                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It was smaller in number of  
9 trucks, certainly. Yes.

10                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And I just want to confirm --  
11 last point, Commissioner.

12                  Under the not affect livelihoods -- I won't go  
13 into details. You've explained yesterday that you were aware  
14 that businesses were affected in Ottawa, and I thank you for  
15 that. But I think I heard you say in response to my friend's  
16 questions earlier this morning that you and Superintendent  
17 Earley may have discussed, in fact, the economic impact of the  
18 Windsor blockade, in particular with respect to international  
19 trade. Is that fair?

20                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, I think we talked  
21 about what her blockade was doing in relation to mine, similar  
22 to, really, in my experiences to the rail blockades in  
23 Tyendinaga and the economic impacts rail blockade has. It was  
24 very similar in circumstance.

25                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** More significant than in  
26 Ottawa.

27                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Economically.

28                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Yeah.

1 Thank you very much, Superintendent.

2 Thank you, Commissioner, for your indulgence.

3 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Next is the Ottawa  
4 Coalition.

5 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PAUL CHAMP:**

6 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Good morning, Superintendent  
7 Abrams. Thank you so much for coming to Ottawa and answering  
8 these questions for all of us here.

9 My name is Paul Champ. I'm legal counsel for the  
10 Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses from downtown  
11 Ottawa, and I just have some questions for you.

12 Superintendent Abrams, were you aware or did you  
13 know about how many residents, roughly, lived in the red zone in  
14 downtown Ottawa?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm not aware at all, no.

16 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** So if I said 15,000,  
17 approximately, would that ---

18 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That would be the first time  
19 I heard that number, but based on the time I've spent downtown  
20 and the number of buildings I've seen, it certainly seems like  
21 an accurate number.

22 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And so when you were making  
23 decisions or being involved in the operations, the police  
24 operations in Ottawa, you were aware we're talking about  
25 thousands of people who are being impacted by these convoy  
26 protests in downtown Ottawa?

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly. And when it came  
28 to that, I mean, I -- how many people were required or the

1 impacts, I either rely on my partners at the Ottawa Police  
2 Service to indicate to me what was happening down there, what  
3 impacts were happening and what they needed to address those  
4 impacts.

5 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And you would have been aware  
6 there was a large number of businesses in downtown Ottawa that  
7 were shut down completely; correct?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sure. I saw them myself  
9 personally, as I said, in my own visits to business owners and  
10 saw many businesses were closed.

11 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And obviously, not only those  
12 business owners experiencing those losses. There would have  
13 been countless workers who were out of jobs during that period  
14 of time as well. You would have known that?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly. I live an hour  
16 from the city. I have family and friends who were directly  
17 impacted and talked about having to relocate because of the  
18 honking, because of the noise, so yes, I was aware.

19 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Right. And on -- with respect  
20 to the conditions on the streets, you were aware of the --  
21 obviously, the large number of semi trucks in some cases right  
22 outside of people's doors honking and so forth, but we also had  
23 other conditions downtown like the large stacks of wood, the  
24 large number of propane tanks, often together, the jerry cans of  
25 diesel fuel, the open fires at almost every other intersection,  
26 the fireworks that were going on at night.

27 You were aware of all those conditions; correct?

28 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

1           **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And we heard evidence last week,  
2 Superintendent Abrams, about residents being fearful that their  
3 building perhaps could catch on fire, there could be an  
4 explosion from this -- the dangerous propane and so forth that's  
5 around. You agree that that was a reasonable fear?

6           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly. I believe there  
7 was an actual arson-type incident not linked to the convoy, I  
8 guess, specifically, but we saw that it clearly could be  
9 something that could happen. So yeah, it was a valid concern of  
10 the residents, for sure.

11           **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And it was your view that the  
12 police -- well, it was the case, was it not, Superintendent  
13 Abrams, that the police were unable to effectively control or  
14 prevent these inflammatory and explosive materials from being  
15 regularly transported on a daily basis to the downtown core;  
16 correct?

17           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It certainly was a challenge  
18 to prevent the flow of gasoline.

19           **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Well, it wasn't a challenge. It  
20 couldn't be done. They weren't -- they couldn't do it. Maybe  
21 it could have been done, but they weren't stopping it; correct?

22           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I know my officers made  
23 attempts at times, but the times they'd get swarmed by other  
24 members, they'd have to pull back. So there was attempts made  
25 at certain times to do so, but it was difficult.

26           **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah, for sure.

27           I'm not saying it -- they couldn't do it. Like  
28 effectively, they couldn't do it given the numbers that were on

1 the ground of police at the time; correct?

2 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It was -- yeah. It was  
3 difficult.

4 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Well, it was -- it was  
5 impossible.

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I wouldn't say it was  
7 impossible. Our members tried and I believe some gas was  
8 seized. I can't be for certain about my membership because I  
9 told my members -- because my members were normally in two-  
10 person units, so it was highly dangerous to their safety to try  
11 to get involved ---

12 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Sure.

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- with multiple people  
14 carrying jerry cans when there's just two of them.

15 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Absolutely.

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So from an OPP perspective,  
17 I can say that yeah, we did not engage in trying to interdict  
18 gasoline simply because we were outnumbered with our numbers as  
19 they were.

20 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Right. And yeah, and that's a  
21 very good point that you just made there, Superintendent Abrams.

22 It wasn't simply downtown residents and  
23 businesses at risk. It was -- there was dangers to your  
24 officers downtown because of the circumstances or conditions;  
25 correct?

26 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Oh, certainly. My officers  
27 were subjected not only to threats of physical assault, but  
28 yelling. I had to get my public order unit teams hearing

1 protection because it was starting to damage their hearing  
2 because they spent so much time downtown.

3 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah. The horns and the diesel  
4 fumes, no doubt you were hearing complaints about that from your  
5 officers.

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Horns, yes. Diesel fumes, I  
7 can't say that I heard.

8 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And now we've heard you say,  
9 Superintendent Abrams, that on January 29th, it was your view  
10 and the view of the OPP that the Ottawa Police Service did not  
11 have the capability to bring an end to this incident or this  
12 event. Is that fair to say?

13 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'd have to look at my notes  
14 on that. That would have been the day that I had the  
15 conversation with Inspector Ferguson?

16 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Right. Exactly.

17 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** So I mean, it was clear that  
18 they were -- that particular day we were dysfunctional and  
19 unable to make a plan. I don't believe I would make an opinion  
20 that just because of what she was experiencing or seeing that  
21 day meant that there was no way that the Ottawa Police Service  
22 could resolve this event eventually. It was just an observation  
23 that day that there was no plan and they were dysfunctional that  
24 day.

25 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** But to be clear, Superintendent  
26 Abrams, even if the Ottawa Police had a great plan -- and we've  
27 heard all the evidence about the struggles of coming up with a  
28 plan that was acceptable to the OPP. But even if they had a

1 plan, it was very clear to you the Ottawa Police Services simply  
2 did not have the resources on the ground to bring that incident  
3 to an end; correct?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** As -- on January 29th, that  
5 would be an accurate statement, yes.

6 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Right. And that remained your  
7 view throughout and, in fact, was the reality. It wasn't until  
8 significant numbers came that they were able to bring it to an  
9 end; correct?

10 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

11 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And it's my understanding,  
12 Superintendent Abrams, that you had a conversation on January  
13 31st with Deputy Chief Bell where he indicated to you that the  
14 Ottawa Police Service at that time was looking at a four-week  
15 sustainability plan. Do you recall that?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I do recall that.

17 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And you were quite surprised, is  
18 my understanding about that?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was.

20 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** You were concerned the Ottawa  
21 Police were looking at already that this could be a prolonged  
22 event and they were just going to try to manage it for four  
23 weeks? That was your understanding at the time?

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct, because I just --  
25 from my experience, we normally plan kind of in 24-hour cycles,  
26 48-hour cycles. To hear that there was a plan that didn't look  
27 like it would have a resolution until at least four weeks was  
28 surprising to me, yes, to hear that length of time that they

1 were planning because -- and I believe that was the conversation  
2 where he basically stated, we don't know how to resolve this.

3 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And I presume, Superintendent,  
4 that it was a concern to you because you could observe yourself  
5 about the significant impact on the residents in downtown  
6 Ottawa; is that fair?

7 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, and I believe in my  
8 other evidence I said as in my experience, as more time goes by  
9 in these events, it only adds more participants, which makes the  
10 job of policing more difficult. As ---

11 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Right.

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- each day and week  
13 passes, it makes the job even more difficult. So, excuse me,  
14 that's why there is a desire to try to end this type of event as  
15 soon as you can.

16 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** For sure. And that leads to  
17 another point, Superintendent Abrams, is that, you know, we've  
18 heard a lot of your testimony about closing the off ramps to the  
19 417, and the OPP did not prefer that option; correct? You were  
20 -- you wanted -- you were content with the trucks to continue to  
21 come downtown Ottawa in the weekends that followed; correct?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, we were happy -- in the  
23 weeks that followed after the main arrival, we were happy to  
24 work with our partners, and most of it was our own partners  
25 within the Province of Ontario was saying there was X number of  
26 trucks coming to Ottawa, we were happy to try to work out and  
27 communicate with them first, hopefully, to say, "Look, there's  
28 no more room downtown. You can't try to get downtown. You

1 know, go to Casselman or go to these other areas." We would try  
2 to do those communications with those operators first.

3 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Through the PLTs?

4 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes.

5 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah.

6 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** If we weren't successful,  
7 yes, Ottawa Police would say, "OPP, can you close this ramp or  
8 this ramp, because there was just no capability to accept those  
9 vehicles. It's going to cause traffic chaos. So can we try to  
10 get them to go to this ramp?" So the only way to get them to  
11 that ramp would be to close other ones. So we would do that,  
12 you know, off and on, but we certainly weren't supportive of  
13 just a total block 24/7 of off ramps or on ramps.

14 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Well, if I understand what  
15 you're telling us, Superintendent Abrams, is that the OPP worked  
16 with the Ottawa Police to try to identify the best routes for  
17 the trucks to get downtown if they were going to indeed come  
18 downtown; is that right? It would minimize the traffic impacts  
19 on the rest of the city.

20 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Certainly, once the protest  
21 was underway and we're into the second or third week, our plan  
22 was if -- with a truck was to try to get downtown, we would  
23 interdict it, stop it, and make arrests under the mischief  
24 authorities, because it was clear their intent was to  
25 participate in what was going on downtown. That's why they were  
26 going there. So the idea and the plan was, probably in the  
27 second or third week, is that if we saw a convoy coming across  
28 in the middle of the night and their intent was to come to

1 Ottawa, we were going to monitor that convoy, try to communicate  
2 with them to say, "Don't go downtown. This is a risk you take  
3 if you go downtown. You're clearly wishing to participate in  
4 what is an illegal event. And if you get off at an off ramp and  
5 intend to head downtown, we will stop you."

6 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** But that was just the last four  
7 or five days when the operation was being rolled out to bring  
8 the event to an end; correct?

9 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Just prior to. That's  
10 correct.

11 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah, so ---

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Just I didn't want to make a  
13 blanket statement that we were allowing -- we were going to  
14 facilitate the arrival of trucks through this whole event. No,  
15 at some point, we were not going to facilitate trucks heading  
16 into the downtown core.

17 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah, but that was around  
18 February 16<sup>th</sup> or 17<sup>th</sup> you stopped doing that. On the weekends of  
19 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> and the 12<sup>th</sup>, there were big signs on the Highway 417  
20 saying "convoy truckers this way"; correct?

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct. I just  
22 wanted to make sure ---

23 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah.

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- your initial statement  
25 was ---

26 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And ---

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- it kind of made it seem  
28 that we were going to allow trucks to ---

1                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Right.

2                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- downtown through the  
3 whole event.

4                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And, Superintendent Abrams, I'm  
5 not sure if you appreciate how the effected residents of  
6 downtown Ottawa felt when they saw the Ottawa -- the Ontario  
7 Provincial Police putting up big signs saying convoy truckers  
8 this way, apparently rolling out a welcome mat to them downtown.  
9 Did you appreciate how the people in downtown Ottawa would have  
10 felt at that time?

11                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I certainly can appreciate  
12 that. In our perspective is we had to rely on Ottawa Police to  
13 say this is where we need those trucks to go. This is where we  
14 think we can house them. So we were only doing what Ottawa  
15 Police were requesting of us to facilitate the movement of  
16 trucks. I appreciate and understand ---

17                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah.

18                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** --- the impact.

19                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** You're out of time.

20                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** I thought I get 15.

21                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** No, you -- according to my  
22 notes, you had 10.

23                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** I believe -- my notes had 15.  
24 May I ask one more question there, Commissioner?

25                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Yes, go ahead.

26                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Superintendent, pardon me,  
27 Abrams, you've told us that you reported up to Commissioner  
28 Carrique and Deputy Commissioner Harkins about your observations

1 and your concerns with downtown Ottawa -- or pardon me, with the  
2 Ottawa Police and how they were effectively doing that. You  
3 would have assumed that they would have reported that up to the  
4 Solicitor General?

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** No, because I'm not familiar  
6 with what type of communication the Commissioner has with  
7 Solicitor General, whether he reports those things to them or  
8 not. I'm not aware of that.

9 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Okay. And but given your  
10 observations of the challenges, the significant challenge the  
11 Ottawa Police Service were having to respond to this event, both  
12 based on the problems you were seeing at senior command, as well  
13 as just the bare resources, did you consider, or do you know if  
14 anyone in the OPP ever considered reporting this either to the  
15 Ontario Civilian Police Commission or perhaps the Ottawa Police  
16 Services Board, so some type of effective action perhaps could  
17 have been taken by others to direct or guide the Ottawa Police  
18 Service towards a more effective response?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was never involved in any  
20 conversations, like, it was just ---

21 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** But did you -- was that ever  
22 considered, or were you aware of that if that was ever  
23 considered?

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I wasn't aware if that was  
25 ever considered, no.

26 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Thank you.

27 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

28 Next call on the Province of Saskatchewan.

1                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Good morning. Can I be  
2 heard in Ottawa?

3                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Yes.

4                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Thank you, Commissioner.

5 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:**

6                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** My name is Mike Morris and  
7 I'm Counsel for the Government of Saskatchewan. Good morning,  
8 sir.

9                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Morning, sir.

10                  **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** We have about five minutes,  
11 give or take today, so it won't be too long. I have some fairly  
12 straightforward questions for you, I think.

13                  Sir, will you agree with me that OPP officers  
14 have authority to enforce the *Criminal Code* and provincial  
15 offences including under the *Highway Traffic Act*?

16                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** They do have that authority,  
17 yes.

18                  **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And am I correct that OPP  
19 officers have always had this authority including in the City of  
20 Ottawa?

21                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes, they're sworn in as  
22 officers in the Province of Ontario.

23                  **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** So it follows that OPP  
24 officers have not required the provincial or federal *Emergency*  
25 *Act* to be invoked to have those powers then; is that correct?

26                  **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. Their powers under  
27 the *Criminal Code* and *Highway Traffic Act* and other provincial  
28 offences were in authority in any city in the province of

1 Ontario.

2 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And will you agree with me  
3 that intentionally blocking a public road with one's vehicle can  
4 constitute an offence under the *Criminal Code*?

5 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There is a block highway  
6 offence under the *Criminal Code*, correct.

7 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And can it also constitute  
8 the offence of mischief?

9 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It can as well, yes.

10 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And can it also constitute  
11 an offence under the *Highway Traffic Act*?

12 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yes. It's a block highway  
13 offence.

14 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Now we've heard some  
15 evidence about what's been called the Coventry Road incident,  
16 and I understand that occurred on February 6<sup>th</sup> of 2022; correct?

17 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Sounds accurate, yes.

18 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And I understand that the  
19 Ottawa Police Service arrested a number of people in relation to  
20 fuel that they were stockpiling at the Coventry Road site;  
21 correct?

22 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's -- I was advised of  
23 that information, yes.

24 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And are you familiar with  
25 the offence that these people were alleged to be committing?

26 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I was advised that they were  
27 arrested for the offence of mischief.

28 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And would that be aiding and

1 abetting mischief which was occurring in downtown Ottawa by  
2 trucks occupying the core?

3 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's how I understand it,  
4 yes.

5 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Assuming these people were  
6 committing an offence, would OPP officers have had the same  
7 authority to arrest them as the OPS?

8 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah, the *Criminal Code*  
9 applies to all law enforcement officers. If an OPP officer  
10 chose and felt they had the reasonable grounds under the  
11 mischief section to make an arrest for that offence, they would  
12 have had the ability to do that if they chose to, yes.

13 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And that's the offence of  
14 providing fuel for people participating with their vehicles in  
15 the downtown core and blockading roads; correct?

16 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** If that -- if the officer  
17 felt that it fit the *Criminal Code* and fit as an offence, it  
18 would have the authority to do that.

19 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** So at this point, we've  
20 heard evidence, a quite a bit of evidence about there being a  
21 lot of trucks in the Ottawa downtown core. My question is, were  
22 there checkpoints for vehicles entering the downtown core before  
23 the Federal *Emergencies Act* was invoked on February 14<sup>th</sup>?

24 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Checkpoints leading into the  
25 downtown core?

26 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Yes, sir.

27 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can only go by what my  
28 officers were asked to do. My officers, OPP officers were never

1 involved in checkpoints. I can't speak to Ottawa Police or our  
2 partners to the MTO. I recall being involved in a  
3 teleconference with the MTO where they were considering doing  
4 vehicle safety checks within the city of Ottawa, but my members  
5 were never involved in any checkpoints.

6 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** To your knowledge, were  
7 there road closures or traffic diversions before the federal  
8 *Emergencies Act* was invoked on February 14th? And I'm talking  
9 specifically to prevent vehicles from entering the downtown core  
10 in Ottawa.

11 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can say there was, because  
12 on the early days of this event those were the areas my officers  
13 were asked to attend. And when I attended down there to check  
14 on them, they were essentially making sure that certain streets  
15 were closed in the downtown core. So there was cement barriers  
16 that blocked some streets, and some streets were blocked with  
17 physical police officers with cruisers blocking streets.

18 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And am I correct then that  
19 decision on blocking those streets would have been -- that would  
20 have been the decision of the Ottawa Police Service?

21 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** The Ottawa Police Service or  
22 the City of Ottawa under their authorities to do that with their  
23 own streets.

24 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And do I understand  
25 correctly, I believe I heard you say that there were road  
26 closures and blocked streets before February 14th when the  
27 federal *Emergencies Act* came into effect. Is that correct?

28 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** There was, yes.

1                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Okay. If I can, I'd like to  
2 talk to you a little bit about a demonstration that occurred in  
3 Ottawa in April, known as the Rolling Thunder demonstration.  
4 Are you familiar with that one?

5                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** You're going to have to do  
6 it very quickly, you're already over your time.

7                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Okay. I will be quick,  
8 Commissioner. Thank you.

9                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I am aware of it, and I was  
10 assigned as the Strategic Commander for that event as well.

11                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And I understand there was  
12 no emergency legislation in place when Rolling Thunder occurred  
13 in April; correct?

14                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct.

15                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And checkpoints, or I guess,  
16 roadblocks or controlled access was used for Rolling Thunder.  
17 Is that correct?

18                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Correct. My members were  
19 used in the same kind of context to do traffic points and to  
20 restrict flow of vehicles on certain streets, yes.

21                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And Rolling Thunder was  
22 successfully managed and resolved; correct?

23                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would call it a successful  
24 event, yes.

25                   **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Thank you, sir. Those are  
26 my questions.

27                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you. And now if I  
28 could call on JCCF Democracy Fund?

1                   **UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:** I believe they are  
2 attending.

3 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ALAN HONNER:**

4                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Good morning, Superintendent.  
5 Good morning, Superintendent. I am Alan Honner. I'm a lawyer  
6 for the Democracy Fund.

7                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Good morning, sir.

8                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Earlier today counsel for  
9 Canada asked you about towing guidelines from the OPP  
10 Commissioner and you couldn't comment on those. If you can't  
11 comment on this question, it's fine. But are you aware that on  
12 February 13<sup>th</sup>, 2022, before the declaration of the Public Order  
13 Emergency, the OPP had confirmed that seven towing companies  
14 were willing to provide services, and a total of 34 heavy duty  
15 trucks were available to the OPP in connection with this protest  
16 in Ottawa?

17                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would not have been aware  
18 of that, because that was not part of my -- under my command, or  
19 part of my mandate.

20                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Thank you. I'll ask that  
21 question to another witness later on. Can we pull up  
22 OPP.IR.0000001? This is the OPP institutional report, and can  
23 we just go to page 36? Just to put this in context, what we're  
24 looking at here is the OPP role in the police response to the  
25 Ottawa blockade. And do you see that chart there -- just maybe  
26 scroll down a little bit. So we have a chart here, it's called  
27 "OPP Frontline Officers Provided to Ottawa Police Service[s]".

28                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I see it.

1           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Okay. So do you notice that --  
2 well, first of all, let me ask you, do these numbers seem  
3 accurate to you? Do they accurately reflect the frontline  
4 officers provided to the OPS on the dates listed?

5           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** It does, and I think it's  
6 important to clarify when they speak about frontline officers,  
7 it is strictly just those officers. These aren't -- these  
8 numbers don't include Public Order Unit officers, they don't  
9 include intelligence officers, they don't include aviation  
10 services. There is many other OPP resources that were used in  
11 Ottawa that aren't captured in these numbers. Just for clarity.

12           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Yeah, understood, and thank you  
13 for clarifying that. What I notice when I look at this chart is  
14 that the frontline officers increase significantly on February  
15 16th, and then again on February the 18th. And obviously, you  
16 would agree with that, it's in the chart.

17           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Yeah.

18           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** And now, if we could go back  
19 just a page 35. And you know, perhaps, Superintendent, I don't  
20 need to go back to page 35. Would you agree with me that one of  
21 the reasons these officers were able to be deployed to Ottawa at  
22 that time was because resources were freed up from Windsor?

23           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I suppose there were more  
24 resources from Windsor, but the reason for the increase in the  
25 numbers would have been to bolster increased traffic points that  
26 needed to be bolstered in that period of time, in order to  
27 support the Public Order Unit plans. So I can't say that the  
28 increase that you see on the chart is directly connected to the

1 successful conclusion of Windsor. It was more related to  
2 operational issues and plans here in Ottawa.

3 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Okay. Can we just scroll down  
4 to where it says February 15th? Pardon me, so it says here:

5 "Ottawa Police Service[s], OPP and RCMP  
6 planning sections were physically  
7 integrated at the RCMP..."

8 And then later on in the next paragraph:

9 "Following the reopening of the  
10 Ambassador Bridge, 400 additional OPP  
11 members were rapidly deployed from  
12 across the province."

13 So some of those went to Ottawa and some went  
14 elsewhere I suppose?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** That's correct. And it was  
16 in this period of time when we talk about most of those 400  
17 additional officers were frontline officers, and within the OPP  
18 the frontline officer component in Windsor was not as strong.  
19 We had a larger Public Order Unit component in Windsor, so the  
20 400 additional unit members, those were frontline members that  
21 came from around the province, and that's why we had to defer  
22 block training and cancel discretionary leave to be able to get  
23 that number of officers to Ottawa.

24 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** And I'm almost out of time  
25 here, but would you agree with me that the reason for the  
26 redeployment of these frontline officers two insert was not  
27 related to the emergencies act, and that it would have happened  
28 anyway?

1           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I'm sorry, you have to  
2 repeat your question again.

3           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Yes, absolutely. Would you  
4 agree with me at the deployment of these frontline officers to  
5 Ottawa, and the increase in numbers on the 16th and on the 18th  
6 was not directly related to the invocation of the *Emergencies*  
7 *Act*, it is something that would have happened in any event?

8           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I would agree with that. It  
9 was directly related to what we knew now was an operational plan  
10 with Public Order that needed extra support.

11           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** And that was the operational  
12 plan of February 13<sup>th</sup>, 2022; correct?

13           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I never saw the plan, so I'm  
14 not certain of what the date was, but it was the plan that the  
15 Integrated Planning Team came up with.

16           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Was it called the Integrated  
17 Mobilization Operational Plan?

18           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I can't be certain of the  
19 title of it, I'm sorry.

20           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Okay. But in any event, that  
21 plan was in place prior to the invocation the *Emergencies Act*?

22           **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I know it was being worked  
23 on because the Integrated Planning Team came February 9th, they  
24 started their work on the 10th and the 11<sup>th</sup>, the *Act* was in  
25 effect on the 14<sup>th</sup>. Because I wasn't on that side and I wasn't  
26 part of that team, I can tell you for sure exactly what date  
27 that that plan was finalized.

28           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** That's fine. I suspect we'll

1 hear that from Chief Superintendent Pardy today.

2 Thank you very much, sir, those are my questions.

3 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Any examination by  
4 the OPP next?

5 **UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:** Commissioner, the OPP have  
6 (indiscernible)

7 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Any re-examination?

8 **--- RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. ERIC BROUSSEAU:**

9 **MR. ERIC BROUSSEAU:** Just one series of  
10 questions, very briefly.

11 Superintendent Abrams, you gave evidence about  
12 the February 9th meeting, and you were asked in cross-  
13 examination about Darwin Tetreault and the commitment for -- the  
14 commitment sought for 400 RCMP officers, recall that?

15 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I recall, yes.

16 **MR. ERIC BROUSSEAU:** Can you tell us, was there a  
17 similar commitment sought or offered on behalf of the OPP at  
18 that meeting?

19 **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** I don't recall us speaking  
20 about Public Order Unit commitments.

21 We already had a large amount of public order  
22 sections in the city already. I think it was more -- the  
23 discussion was more about how we could get extra. Certainly,  
24 OPP could provide a couple more sections, but in that meeting,  
25 in Ottawa Police Headquarters, I don't recall us talking about  
26 the OPP POU component that may be able to assist. Chief Pardy  
27 may have talked about that, but I don't recall that.

28 **MR. ERIC BROUSSEAU:** Okay, thank you.

1                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. So that completes  
2 your examination and cross-examination. Thank you very much for  
3 appearing and for your evidence. It's complete, you're now free  
4 to leave.

5                   **SUPT. CRAIG ABRAMS:** Thank you, Commissioner.

6                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

7                   Okay, so we're I think at the time where  
8 everybody's entitled to a break. So we will take a break until  
9 five after twelve, and then we'll come back and go with our next  
10 witness, who I understand is Chief Superintendent Pardy.

11                   **THE REGISTRAR:** The Commission is in recess for  
12 15 minutes. La commission est en pause pour 15 minutes.

13 --- Upon recessing at 11:49 a.m.

14 --- Upon resuming at 12:06 p.m.

15                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Good afternoon. Okay, we  
16 have another witness, Counsel? Thank you.

17                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Good afternoon, Commissioner.  
18 It's Frank Au, Senior Counsel for the Commission.

19                   Our next witness is Chief Superintendent Pardy.

20                   **THE REGISTRAR:** Superintendent, will you swear on  
21 a religious document or do you wish to affirm?

22                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Swear.

23                   **THE REGISTRAR:** For the record, please state your  
24 full name and spell it out.

25                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Carson Pardy, surname  
26 Pardy, P-A-R-D-Y.

27                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** No, I think he said he'd  
28 swear?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

2                   **THE REGISTRAR:** Oh, apologies. You'd like to  
3 swear on a religious document?

4                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Sorry?

5                   **THE REGISTRAR:** Would you like to swear on a  
6 religious document or affirm?

7                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I'll swear.

8                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** On a religious document?

9                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Sure.

10                  **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** The Bible?

11                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The Bible's good.

12                  **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay.

13 --- CHIEF SUPT. CARSON PARDY, Sworn:

14 --- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. FRANK AU:

15                  **MR. FRANK AU:** Good afternoon. Please have a  
16 seat.

17                  Chief Superintendent Pardy, do you remember  
18 attending an interview, well actually, two interviews with me  
19 and my Commission colleagues in the summer?

20                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I do, sir.

21                  **MR. FRANK AU:** And after the interviews, we  
22 provided you with an interview summary?

23                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You did.

24                  **MR. FRANK AU:** May I call up the document  
25 Number WTS00000033.

26                  So Chief Pardy, this is the summary that we've  
27 sent you for review?

28                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was the version of it,

1 yes.

2 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. This is the version that  
3 you approved.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

5 **MR. FRANK AU:** And do you adopt this content ---

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

7 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- in its entirety?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** Are there any changes or  
10 corrections you'd like to make?

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think, like all  
12 documents, context is important, but I'm sure that will come out  
13 in evidence.

14 **MR. FRANK AU:** That's right. Okay. Now, Chief  
15 Superintendent Pardy, I understand that you recently retired  
16 after serving more than 30 years with the OPP?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Thirty-six-and-a-half  
18 years, sir. I started my policing career in '86. I left active  
19 duty in July, July 15th, but I'm officially retired now for  
20 three weeks.

21 **MR. FRANK AU:** Only three weeks.

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Only three weeks.

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** Congratulations. Now, you were a  
24 former Critical Incident Commander?

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

26 **MR. FRANK AU:** And you have, throughout your  
27 career, worked for many years in the National Capital Region on  
28 major events?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I spent 28 years of  
2 my OPP career, six wonderful years with the RCMP in New  
3 Brunswick, but my 30 year OPP career, 28 of it was spent in  
4 eastern Ontario in various roles. And the latter part, the last  
5 12 years of my career was in the senior leadership role as a  
6 superintendent, and I did a lot of work in the National Capital  
7 Region with major events, presidential visits, North American  
8 leader summits, Canada Day events, et cetera, yes.

9                   **MR. FRANK AU:** And in the course of your career,  
10 have you collaborated frequently with members of the Ottawa  
11 Police Service?

12                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

13                   **MR. FRANK AU:** And what do you know of their  
14 reputation in terms of managing or responding to large-scale  
15 events like protests and demonstrations?

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** First class.

17                   **MR. FRANK AU:** First class.

18                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** First class.

19                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Now, are you aware of any changes  
20 within the OPS in recent years that might affect their ability  
21 to respond to these kinds of events?

22                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, certainly, upon my  
23 arrival in -- with the Integrated Planning Team, I asked the  
24 question, "What's going on? What happened to you guys?" And  
25 certainly the pandemic has had an impact, retirements, people  
26 moved on, lack of major events to keeping you -- keeping those  
27 skills honed when people move on. The emergency readiness,  
28 emergency preparedness is much like crime prevention, nobody

1 wants to pay for it when nothing's happening, and that's across  
2 all sectors.

3 But certainly, you know, there's been a lull,  
4 perhaps since about 2016, with the massive large-scale events,  
5 that since -- that they have had in Ottawa. So it's just been a  
6 considerable passage of time that there hasn't been anything  
7 major, but yet, Ottawa is renowned for almost daily protests of  
8 some sort.

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** So I'm going to take you back now  
10 to the events back in January and February. I understand that  
11 in January of this year, you were the Commander of the OPP  
12 Northeast Region; right?

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct, sir.

14 **MR. FRANK AU:** And then, in early February, you  
15 were asked to lead the Integrated Planning Group to assist the  
16 Ottawa Police Service?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

18 **MR. FRANK AU:** So let's talk about the specific  
19 assignment, your lead role with the planning group, the  
20 Integrated Planning Group. When were you asked to take that on?

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was the evening of  
22 February 7th that I received a telephone call from my  
23 supervisor, who is Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, asking  
24 that -- advising that they were putting together a team of -- a  
25 team to go to Ottawa to assist Ottawa, and asked if I would be  
26 interested in leading that team. He felt that I was a good fit  
27 for it with my background, and he gave me, you know, 10 seconds  
28 to say I'm going to do it. I accepted the assignment, and that

1 very night packed a bag and headed to Orillia for a briefing the  
2 following morning.

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** And the following morning, what  
4 time was the briefing?

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I believe it was about  
6 9:00 a.m. in the Commissioner's office.

7 **MR. FRANK AU:** Who attended?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Commissioner Carrique was  
9 there, Deputy Commissioner Harkins, Superintendent Mike McDonnell  
10 was present, Superintendent Craig Abrams was on video link. I  
11 believe perhaps the Commissioner's executive officer may have  
12 been present as well, but I don't particularly recall.

13 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. And we've just this  
14 morning heard from Superintendent Abrams.

15 Now, could we call up the witness's Will Say,  
16 Number OPP00000792, please?

17 Now, Chief Pardy, we have -- the Commission has  
18 received a Will Say that's going to be shown on the screen. I  
19 just wanted to ask you, do you recall when this Will Say was  
20 first prepared?

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was started while I was  
22 still in Ottawa.

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** When in Ottawa?

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** During the month of  
25 February. My supervisor, Deputy Commissioner Harkins, said --  
26 suggested that, you know, start putting my mind to developing or  
27 preparing a Will Say for the events leading up to and to the  
28 conclusion in Ottawa. I started it with high intentions of

1 catching up and keeping it live, but within a few hours my  
2 schedule was overtaken, and -- so I had maybe one page done  
3 while I was in Ottawa, and I completed it when I went back to my  
4 regular duties in North Bay.

5 **MR. FRANK AU:** And when did you complete it?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** First week of March.

7 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. Now, tell us about the  
8 nature of your assignment. What was the mandate?

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, the mandate was to  
10 provide Ottawa Police support. I was given a broad range to ask  
11 for anything I needed. I received from start of the deployment  
12 to the conclusion of deployment that type of support from, not  
13 just my organisation because I was an OPP officer but leading a  
14 team, integrative team from multiple organisations. So it  
15 wasn't just OPP, it wasn't about the OPP, but I was giving  
16 incredible support to ensure that we got what we needed,  
17 understanding the complexities of the events in Ottawa and the  
18 evolving events that were happening both provincially and  
19 nationally.

20 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So a moment ago you were  
21 starting to tell us about this nine a.m. briefing ---

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- involving, among others,  
24 Commissioner Carrique of the OPP. Tell us about that briefing.  
25 What was discussed?

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I got an overview  
27 from Superintendent Abrams as to the state of the union in  
28 Ottawa, that the concern was there wasn't a plan. They were

1 asking for a lot of resources, but there was no concrete plan in  
2 terms of how those resources were going to be utilized. There  
3 was dysfunction. There was a loss of confidence and faith being  
4 displayed by the public. The narrative in the media was  
5 certainly slanted, you know, there was no -- in terms of the  
6 protest and by the protesters. Generally, it was -- reached --  
7 it was a crisis in Ottawa.

8 **MR. FRANK AU:** Now you mentioned earlier that the  
9 purpose was to support.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You know, one of my most  
11 common phrases that I uttered throughout my time is -- in Ottawa  
12 with their senior executive, their officers is, we're here to  
13 help.

14 **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And ---

16 **MR. FRANK AU:** What kind of help?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Whatever they need. You  
18 know, we were there to help build and complement any plans and  
19 direction that they had. There was never an intent, and I was -  
20 - this was explicit in my assignment, we were not going to  
21 Ottawa to take over, man and control of the event. We were  
22 going there to support them. Certainly, there was a goal to  
23 integrate or unify commands. This is an event that was clearly  
24 now beyond the capability of one single organization just by its  
25 size and the need for resources. It stretched well beyond what  
26 Ottawa Police themselves could provide, which, in my world,  
27 that's generally the kickoff for developing, like, a unified or  
28 integrated command with others. So, you know, that was the

1 focus, to get there, to have a team of dedicated people, of  
2 which I only knew one of the people that were assigned to me. I  
3 was going to be meeting these people that evening when I  
4 arrived. We were given -- I was given a contact with the Ottawa  
5 Police. And later that morning, I got in my vehicle, and I  
6 started making my way, and spent the next four hours on the  
7 phone.

8 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So you were in Orillia at  
9 9 a.m., and by 5:35 that afternoon, you were in a meeting with  
10 the members of the OPS; right?

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** Who did you meet with at that 5:35  
13 p.m. meeting?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I know I had someone  
15 taking minutes for that meeting. I know Deputy Chief Trish  
16 Ferguson, who I'd known previously, was at the meeting,  
17 Superintendent Patterson. There was a number of other folks  
18 with them, both on conference and video link. I know that  
19 initially, even in my own minutes it reflected that Chief Sloly  
20 was present at the meeting because that was on the invite, but  
21 he did not make that meeting due to an emergency -- an emergent  
22 family issue.

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** Was delayed; right?

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I don't recall him joining  
25 and the minutes don't reflect any comments or whatsoever from  
26 the Chief. My recollection is he did not join the meeting at  
27 all.

28 **MR. FRANK AU:** All right. And we heard from

1 Deputy Chief Ferguson from the OPS yesterday. I believe she  
2 said that the Chief -- the former Chief was delayed, but he did  
3 join by teleconference or some other means of remote  
4 communication.

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And that is very possible.  
6 As I said, I reviewed the minutes from the meeting and it --  
7 when you look at all the minutes that we took throughout the  
8 event, it is very clear, in my humble opinion, who was speaking.  
9 There was certainly no indication from those minutes that he was  
10 there, but it's very possible that he was, that he did join.

11 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. Now if we scroll down,  
12 this will say to the next page, right, so this -- the first dark  
13 bullet,

14 "Planning team held its first meeting  
15 at 1735 hrs from RCMP [Headquarter]  
16 with the OPS (all OPS were on video or  
17 conference call). Also note that  
18 Counsel for the OPS, Christiane  
19 Huneault was present..."

20 Do you recall her being present on -- by video  
21 conference?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Oh, yes, sorry.

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** And okay. Now let's talk about  
24 what was discussed at that meeting. Tell us what happened.

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You know, we started the  
26 meeting by just doing introductions of those that were available  
27 from my team. My team were still not all in Ottawa. They were  
28 still arriving. But we did have Inspector Tim Skinner from the

1 York Region Police; one of my planners from our Emergency Unit  
2 in Orillia, Brad Taylor was present; Superintendent Phil Lue  
3 from the RCMP; and -- sorry, then Sergeant, now Staff Sergeant  
4 Darwin Tetreault from the RCMP as well was present.

5           You know, we stated our objective. We're there  
6 to help. What do you need? We need a plan. Let's start  
7 building on. We're there to build -- building on what your  
8 objectives are. And they proceeded to give us a broad overview  
9 of their concept of operations for the occupation. And it was  
10 just -- there was a concept of operations.

11           We had lots of questions. We received an update  
12 from Superintendent Patterson, and he was the incident -- the  
13 Event Commander at that time, about things that were on the  
14 horizon, or potential arrests and some strategic takebacks, if  
15 you will, in the downtown core. Listening intently just to find  
16 out. Our goal, start to finish in the meeting is learn as much  
17 as we possibly could. You can only help when you have a true  
18 understanding for what the needs are and to understand those  
19 needs. And we left that meeting with a commitment from Ottawa  
20 Police that they would provide the plans to us.

21           We asked for e-versions, whatever version they  
22 could get to us would be very helpful, so that we could see what  
23 they have on paper in terms of a plan and then what we would  
24 reasonably need to do to complement that plan. Also, it was  
25 critical for us to have access to the Ottawa Police. This is --  
26 we're there to work with them, to get through this, so we wanted  
27 to establish a liaison who had the authority to access and  
28 provide the information that we would need.

1           **MR. FRANK AU:** Was there any discussion at that  
2 meeting about the nature of integration between the OPS and the  
3 group that you were bringing to Ottawa?

4           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was raised by me at  
5 that meeting that they would consider ---

6           **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay.

7           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- integration or a  
8 unified command and that there's inherent benefits with it. You  
9 know, from my experience, I -- just about all of my major events  
10 that I had been involved, what we ended up having here in Ottawa  
11 with the integrated command has been my experience.

12          **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

13          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You know, whether it's a  
14 presidential visit, you still have the police of jurisdiction  
15 who have the lead, or the RCMP because of their IPP  
16 responsibilities or internationally protected persons  
17 responsibilities under legislation, but when you call on  
18 multiple organizations to participate, they bring their command  
19 structure. You inject your advice to them. You work as a team.  
20 Ultimately, someone is leading that and makes the final call.  
21 But as an integrated team, you're all on the same page. You're  
22 not working in silos. You're working collectively with the same  
23 objectives and goals.

24          **MR. FRANK AU:** Let's talk about the members of  
25 this team that you were assembling and bringing to Ottawa. It's  
26 called Integrated Planning Cell or Integrated Planning Group?

27          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** They call it the -- that  
28 was the assignment, to create this Integrated Planning Cell. We

1 quickly deviated from the word cell and just called it our  
2 Integrated Planning Group.

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But, yes, I was provided  
5 with planners from Toronto Police Service, two planners,  
6 Sergeant Arlene Duffy and Constable Isabel Ethier. Their  
7 background and their credentials were impressive in terms of  
8 emergency planning. I had Inspector Tim Skinner, who I already  
9 mentioned from York Region Police. His background is in Public  
10 Order maintenance and command and control, again, a wealth of  
11 knowledge. I had Tom Warfield from the Peel Regional Police  
12 Service. Tom came to us with a background in case management to  
13 ensure that we were capturing to the best that we could in a  
14 very kinetic and dynamic environment as much of the information,  
15 versions and what not as we went forward. We had Brad Taylor, a  
16 planner extraordinaire from the OPP. Brad is a civilian member,  
17 but his expertise is in emergency planning. We rely heavily on  
18 Brad for his expertise.

19 Then, of course, we had the two RCMP officers,  
20 Phil Lue, who became my right arm throughout the event. Phil's  
21 background was in major incident command, National Standards,  
22 and had extensive background in training and developing and  
23 mentoring people in the incident command world.

24 And Darwin Tetrault, who to this day has  
25 impressed me incredibly with his leadership in public order  
26 command.

27 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So ---

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And he's renowned

1 nationally and connected internationally as it relates to public  
2 order maintenance.

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So yesterday when we spoke  
4 to -- when Deputy Chief Ferguson testified and she explained the  
5 process of developing a plan, an operational plan, she referred  
6 to subject matter experts.

7 So this group of people that you're bringing to  
8 Ottawa, are these subject matter experts, then, in the various  
9 areas?

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir. In fact, I  
11 would say that I was the only one that wasn't a subject matter  
12 expert.

13 **MR. FRANK AU:** All right.

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I was just brought there  
15 to bring in this team together and get them working and lead our  
16 way through this.

17 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. Now, we've heard from some  
18 witnesses about the importance of operational plans, and I just  
19 want your view on what are the components, the key components,  
20 of a good operational plan.

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, the key components,  
22 you know, have to align with your objectives and your goals and  
23 your -- and then that drives your strategies in terms of what  
24 that operation is meant to entail.

25 Certainly you need to have a clear understanding  
26 in creating a mission or the event. A mission statement is  
27 something that, in every event that I've ever been involved in,  
28 whether it was a peaceful event or not, is something that is

1 critical that your members, your employees, your officers on the  
2 ground, everybody is in line with the mission of the plan.

3 From there are commander's objectives and the,  
4 you know, what are we looking to achieve with this plan and then  
5 every single -- so if it's a public order issue, you would need  
6 -- the key aspect there is the public order consult and a good  
7 idea, okay, what is the nature and scope of the event and what  
8 kind of public order plan will we need to inject with it.

9 You need crime, you need victims, you need key  
10 things like messaging, communication. Logistics is key. In  
11 fact, at major events from a policing perspective when we  
12 debrief up, then our success or our fail on the backs of good  
13 solid logistics support. When you get people there, what are  
14 you doing with them, where are they staying, how are we feeding  
15 them, what's their duties, how are they being briefed. That all  
16 has to be fleshed out so that when you have people arrive, you  
17 have a seamless operation.

18 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. Now, we've heard  
19 references to an overall or overarching plan and sub-plans for  
20 specialized areas. So were those what you were trying to  
21 describe to us?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely. And I was  
23 speaking with people about -- I had confidence also we were on  
24 the same page and understood that.

25 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. And in terms of an overall  
26 plan or overarching plan, does that refer to something that  
27 takes you from start to finish?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

1                   **MR. FRANK AU:** What about contingencies?

2                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, that's always built  
3 into your planning. When you look at public order as an  
4 example, it's filled with contingency plans. If -- this is the  
5 intent. If it doesn't work, this is -- this is our main action  
6 plan or direct action plan and then there would be an alternate  
7 action plan if they had to deviate.

8                   **MR. FRANK AU:** And command and control structure,  
9 should that be reflected?

10                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely.

11                  **MR. FRANK AU:** Why is that important?

12                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Again, you know, you --  
13 when you're developing plans for major events, the ultimate goal  
14 is to succeed. And in order to succeed, there needs to be --  
15 we're police officers. We're creatures of habit. There needs  
16 to be clear line with communication, there needs to be clear  
17 command and control, who is in charge, who is responsible for  
18 this right down the line. In major events, you might have a  
19 major event commander right down to a commander on the ground.  
20 All have distinct roles.

21                               But roles and responsibilities are absolutely key  
22 to getting through the event and in a successful way.

23                  **MR. FRANK AU:** At the time you arrived on  
24 February 8th, did you know if the OPS had experienced planners  
25 like the ones you brought to Ottawa to help them develop this  
26 kind of a plan?

27                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I was making an assumption  
28 based on my experience with OPS that, in fact, they did have

1 that depth, although some of the ones that I had worked with in  
2 the past were absent and I learned had retired because, as I  
3 said, the OPS have always been renowned -- we've been there to  
4 support them countless times in major events.

5 We're different organizations. We have different  
6 structures. But make no mistake about it, they were good at  
7 what they did.

8 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So you told us that on  
9 that first meeting -- at that first meeting, you were shown this  
10 strategic concept of operations document but you didn't have a  
11 copy; right?

12 You didn't -- you weren't given a copy at that  
13 meeting.

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** There was references to it  
15 on that date. I do believe I may have been given a copy, but --  
16 -

17 **MR. FRANK AU:** And you said you asked for more.

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We asked for more and they  
19 indicated that there was a nod from Superintendent Patterson  
20 that any plans that were approved would be, in fact, supplies to  
21 us.

22 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So we go to the next day,  
23 February the 9th, at 7:00 a.m. There's a note in your will say  
24 that you weren't getting the plans yet.

25 And we go to page 3 of the will say, the second  
26 bullet -- sorry. Maybe scroll down a bit.

27 So sorry, scroll up, please.

28 The second bullet, discussion around injunctions

1 and then stressed we needed to develop a plan -- I'm sorry. I  
2 think I'm looking at the wrong page.

3 Okay. I found it now.

4 So go down again. I apologize.

5 After February -- the heading February the 9th,  
6 do you see the second bullet?

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

8 **MR. FRANK AU:** And the last two sentences:

9 "I learned that everything had to go to  
10 the Chief before it could be actioned or  
11 released to our team."

12 Now, I just wanted to ask you about that. What  
13 did you mean by this?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we learned very,  
15 very early in the -- in our time in Ottawa that the Chief was  
16 very much engaged and that, ultimately, everything that they  
17 intended to do had to be approved by him.

18 **MR. FRANK AU:** Who told you this?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I heard it from just about  
20 every OPS employee that I dealt with there in some way, shape or  
21 form.

22 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay.

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was very clear to me in  
24 my dealings with senior officers, Chris Rheaume, whose name is  
25 there, Rob Drummond, who was at times working with us in  
26 different aspects, Patricia Ferguson.

27 I didn't deal a whole lot during my initial days  
28 with Deputy Chief Bell, but certainly it was very, very clear

1 that Chief Sloly was to be informed of and approving all aspects  
2 of the operation.

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** Now, in fairness to the former  
4 Chief, you did tell us that there was some departure of senior  
5 officers; yes?

6 So isn't it quite understandable that he wanted  
7 more things to go through him to ensure that, you know, the  
8 important decisions are made with the benefit of his input?

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I don't lay blame, sir. I  
10 look at it this was an incredible event unfolding in his city  
11 that was -- the loss of confidence that you were seeing in the  
12 media in the police service undoubtedly brought a lot of stress  
13 to bear. That he wanted to be looped in on everything that was  
14 going on, I can't fault him.

15 **MR. FRANK AU:** And you also mentioned earlier  
16 that the OPS counsel, Christiane Huneault, was present.

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. I did find that to  
18 be -- from my experience, to be a little bizarre.

19 **MR. FRANK AU:** Why's that?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, needless to say,  
21 I've been involved in a lot of major operations over the years  
22 and there's always consult with legal on our legal authorities  
23 and common law authorities and the different tactics were used  
24 to make sure that we're sound within -- in the law.

25 However, it was a first-time experience to have  
26 counsel actually sit through operational discussions.

27 **MR. FRANK AU:** But wouldn't it be helpful to have  
28 a lawyer around in case any legal questions arise?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well again, as it became  
2 more protracted, the event, I suppose it could be. You know,  
3 where you would have counsel there immediately to give advice  
4 back on legal points that were being discussed. But as we  
5 proceeded, it certainly came across a little bit more than that,  
6 ---

7                   **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

8                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- that she was  
9 tantamount to an approver of the action or the plan, which was  
10 very concerning. It's police operations.

11                   **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm. Okay. So that was your --  
12 that's the morning of the 9<sup>th</sup> when you were still looking for a  
13 plan and not getting it yet.

14                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

15                   **MR. FRANK AU:** And then that -- around noon that  
16 day, you got to meet with the OPS team again; right?

17                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

18                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Where did you go?

19                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well we had called for a  
20 meeting to discuss things more broadly. And it was downtown  
21 Ottawa at the Ottawa Police Station, 474 Elgin Street.

22                   **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

23                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was an upstairs board  
24 room. We couldn't bring all of our team. I would have liked  
25 to. But we -- you know, we were going to be somewhat  
26 restricted. And we were still in the pandemic, so we were  
27 mindful of all these things still going on.

28                   So we brought a smaller part of the team,

1 including Craig Abrams, who also joined our team initially,  
2 along with Mike Francis, two OPP officers who had been in Ottawa  
3 already, assisting Ottawa, one, from a POU perspective, one from  
4 the strategic command perspective.

5           Myself, Tetreault, Skinner, and Phil Lou, and  
6 there was another RCMP officer. I believe his name was Charles  
7 Mason, was present with us at that meeting, along with the OPS  
8 command team and their counsel.

9           **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. Well tell us what happened  
10 at that meeting?

11           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, again, we discussed  
12 a few different documents that they provided, their strategic  
13 operations.

14           **MR. FRANK AU:** That was the same one that you saw  
15 yesterday?

16           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Very similar. And yes, I  
17 believe it was the same.

18           **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

19           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** A broad or overarching  
20 kind of concept of operations for the truck demonstration. And  
21 we had discussions about that. We were given -- we were asking  
22 for numbers. We had -- there was a sergeant -- or S/Sgt.  
23 LeBlanc from the Ottawa Police Service who provided us the  
24 breakdown on numbers, what they needed to sustain operations.  
25 And the number, if I'm not mistaken, was 516 IFTEs, or police  
26 officers, to sustain operations at all the checkpoints that they  
27 needed. We had a lot of debate about that. Ultimately, you  
28 know, there's some math issues that we came to terms with.

1                   But again, our goal was there to completely  
2 understand. We didn't just go in blank and say, "What do you  
3 need? Here you go."

4                   So we had discussions about that and then we had  
5 discussions about -- well, overview provided to us by Supt.  
6 Patterson of an operation at Rideau and Sussex that they were  
7 contemplating.

8                   It was -- my notes reflect that it was scheduled  
9 for 4:00, with a possibility of being moved up to 11:00 p.m.  
10 that night.

11                   As I noted, I brought those that I did to this  
12 meeting for a specific purpose. And, you know, we had discussed  
13 prior to, "We're going there as a team. If you have input to  
14 give, give it. You know, we have a lot to get done here in a  
15 short period of time. Let's not hold anything back here."

16                   So Darwin Tetreault asked if he could speak when  
17 he was being presented this thing, and I do appreciate when I  
18 heard the tail end of Supt. Abrams' evidence that he mentioned a  
19 number of 400. The number in my mind, in my notes, was 800. He  
20 said based on his knowledge of POU, when you look at the  
21 dynamics of this event, the number of areas that were blockaded,  
22 and the work that had to be done, we would need approximately  
23 800 POU officers to effectively dismantle this protest.

24                   But furthermore, and the key thing for me,  
25 hearing from a subject matter expert with his level of  
26 experience, is that once you start this operation, you should  
27 not stop. And their intention, as it was presented to us, was  
28 kind of do it -- to use the words that were used, "chunk by

1 chunk". And there was recognition that it would be very  
2 resource intensive, that it would take a significant demand on  
3 resources to do it that way.

4 **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But we didn't have a  
6 significant number of resources. And we -- the best advice in  
7 evidence -- or sorry, best advice I was receiving right out of  
8 that meeting from our SME is that strategically, if you're going  
9 to do this appropriately, when you start your POU action, you  
10 should not stop. You need to start moving systematically  
11 through all the points to shut it down.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And he suggested that we  
14 pump the brakes, let's stop this, let's not proceed with this  
15 operation, and ultimately that is what happened. Although I did  
16 have conversations with the incident commander who was assigned  
17 to the operation just by happenstance, ---

18 **MR. FRANK AU:** Is that Burnett?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Paul Burnett. Yes. And  
20 ultimately, that operation did not happen, but that was -- back  
21 to the meeting, that was his inject into it.

22 There was a lot of discussion around resources,  
23 because when raised that number, and again, the number sticks  
24 out to me because it ultimately was the number of POU,  
25 approximately, that we needed to successfully dismantle.

26 So Darwin Tetreault is from the National Capital  
27 Region, he lives in this area, he runs these programs nationally  
28 for public order maintenance, he is a Public Order person

1 himself, and he had given a lot of thought to in understanding  
2 the zones which had been presented the day before in terms of  
3 all the checkpoints and key areas of concern in the red zone.  
4 So, you know, I thought, you know, very clearly he's already put  
5 some significant insight in terms of what needs to be done to  
6 successfully shut this down.

7           So Chief Sloly very passionately, and very  
8 concerned about the reliability of getting resources. He was  
9 very concerned that we would come through. He wanted  
10 guarantees, with no caveats, that "If you're going to say you're  
11 going to give us X, you're going to give us x. Period. No  
12 questions asked." We just stressed that we're building a plan,  
13 we have the support of our organizations to get what is needed  
14 to develop a plan to successfully shut this down.

15           **MR. FRANK AU:** All right. So you've covered a  
16 lot of ground there. Let's try to unpack that a little bit.

17           First, with respect to the numbers, as it relates  
18 to the Rideau/Sussex operation. I just want to be clear,  
19 because we heard some evidence about doubling the number, but  
20 here it's quite the opposite; isn't it? Like, they were  
21 preparing for an action, planning for using 400, and you're  
22 telling us that according to the subject matter experts in your  
23 group, you're going to need 800?

24           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, they didn't suggest  
25 400. I think that was Craig Abrams' evidence, that he thought  
26 that Tetreault suggested you would need 400 to do it.

27           **MR. FRANK AU:** Oh.

28           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** In my view -- my notes

1 reflect that Tetreault said you need 800 to effectively --  
2 because when you start ---

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** I see.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- this POU action, when  
5 you start kinetic action in this way, you can't stop, ---

6 **MR. FRANK AU:** All right.

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- which means when you  
8 look at the number of areas that needed to be ---

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- controlled, needed to  
11 be taken back, that was his immediate assessment, and that  
12 proved to be very accurate, as our planning assumption of that  
13 day, and as we then engaged all the SMEs to develop that plan.  
14 It was exactly what was needed.

15 **MR. FRANK AU:** Does that go back to something we  
16 talked about earlier? Planning from beginning to end and  
17 anticipate the different ---

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It absolutely does,  
19 because we did have a number of times throughout my time in  
20 Ottawa where there was deviations, like, sudden deviations from  
21 the plan that would impact the broader plan if we were to do it.  
22 But yes, planning from end to end is always your goal. You  
23 always like to have lots of time to plan. We were planning in  
24 crisis mode and doing it as quickly as possible and trying to  
25 consider everything that needed to be considered, from the  
26 residents, to victims, to the cold weather, the conditions in  
27 the City of Ottawa. Everything needed to be factored into the  
28 plan.

1           **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. Now, you also said  
2 something about the former chief being very passionate.

3           Now, I want to take you to your will-say at page  
4 3. Sorry, yeah, page 3 at the very bottom. So here:

5                         "Chief Sloly was very passionate about the  
6 impacts the demonstration was having on  
7 the city and he was looking to break the  
8 occupations however they had limited  
9 ability to affect this due to base line  
10 levels of staffing

11                        I offered that we were there to ensure  
12 that he had what was needed to sustain  
13 operations but needed a plan. He advised  
14 they were working on last minute plans."

15           Does that reflect what happened at that meeting?

16           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It does, sir.

17           **MR. FRANK AU:** So let me ask you this. As I  
18 understand it then, you were offering to help and then you said  
19 you needed a plan. But putting this in context, because this  
20 happened on February the 9<sup>th</sup>; right? So we're already more than  
21 a week into the protests, and the Commission has heard evidence  
22 how that has caused significant social impact on the residents  
23 and so on. And if the suggestion is that you need a plan before  
24 we can send resources, isn't that problematic? Because they may  
25 not, at that stage, have even the resources to do the planning?  
26 So how do they get more resources?

27           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well that's a very loaded  
28 question. Essentially you need a plan to be able to communicate

1 with police leaders. When you're asking for resources from  
2 around the province, and in this case, around the country, you  
3 need to be able to articulate what that need is and why that  
4 need exists. And in doing that, it's always about, you know,  
5 what are my officers going to be doing when they get there? How  
6 -- what are the logistics? What are the plans, the briefings?  
7 Everything is something that you always provide.

8                   We're in a state right now that, you know, I  
9 learned really quickly that staffing was an issue for OPS.  
10 Staffing is an issue with just about every policing organization  
11 out there for a myriad of reasons.

12                   So as a regional commander coming into this from  
13 another region where you're going to be called upon to provide  
14 resources to supplement an operational plan, you'll pulling from  
15 resources that you have available to police your communities.

16                   And oftentimes, in a lot of my detachments, we're  
17 already at our base level. So when you're still, because of a  
18 crisis, you're going to pull -- you're going to pull them only  
19 when they're needed, not to sit around waiting to know what  
20 they're going to do when they get there. Plan is absolutely  
21 critical.

22                   And it can be a concept, because we developed a  
23 concept of operations within 48 hours of being in Ottawa. A  
24 concept of operations that we ultimately used throughout the  
25 event.

26                   **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

27                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** So you can have that and  
28 know that you're building this, this, this, and this, and we're

1 going to need to staff those up, so let's start preparing that.  
2 But it can't just be, "I need this number." We need to know  
3 what these people are going to be doing when they get there,  
4 right down to where are they staying? Who is feeding them? You  
5 just -- we're human beings. You need those basics in place.  
6 None of that was in place.

7 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So let's take a look at  
8 this plan that they did show you on the 9<sup>th</sup> at this meeting.  
9 Could we call up, please, OPP00000774? So if we  
10 go to page 91, please?

11 **THE REGISTRAR:** Sorry, counsel. Can you repeat  
12 the page?

13 **MR. FRANK AU:** Page 91.

14 **THE REGISTRAR:** Ninety-one (91)? Thank you.

15 **MR. FRANK AU:** Yes.

16 So looking at the cover, does this resemble the  
17 document that you saw at that meeting on February the 9<sup>th</sup>?

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir, it does.

19 **MR. FRANK AU:** And if we go to the mission  
20 statement at page 96?

21 So the mission statement simply reads:

22 "To end the unlawful elements of the  
23 Ottawa Truck Demonstration and restore  
24 safe and open neighborhoods and  
25 businesses."

26 What do you think of this mission statement?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well it's a mission  
28 statement. It wasn't broad enough for my liking. You know, it

1 was -- it was just really, really focused and not encompassing  
2 the broader event.

3 My experience with mission statements, safety  
4 needs to be factored in. Officers -- our officers need to know  
5 -- every officer needs to know. It's drilled into them. every  
6 briefing, the mission for the operation is drilled into them.  
7 so safety for the residents, safety for officers, safety for the  
8 protestors' Charter rights often are embedded. So you have all  
9 those considerations in a more broader mission statement.

10 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. Now, we heard from Deputy  
11 Ferguson yesterday that by February the 13<sup>th</sup>, your group has  
12 collaborated with Supt. Bernier of the OPS to come up with  
13 another plan.

14 So can we call up that other plan? And the  
15 number is OPP00001851.

16 **THE REGISTRAR:** Sorry, can you repeat that?

17 **MR. FRANK AU:** OPP00001851. Can we see the  
18 entire front page, please? Or maybe the next page has the date.  
19 There we have it.

20 Do you recall this as being the plan that was  
21 developed by the 13<sup>th</sup>?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir. That -- and  
23 that is my signature on it.

24 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. Can we go to the mission  
25 statement at page 8, please?

26 So this mission statement reads:

27 "Using an integrated response, the Ottawa  
28 Police and policing partners will keep the

1                   peace, enforce legislation, and maintain  
2                   public safety for the duration of the  
3                   Ottawa Truck Demonstration, with the  
4                   utmost respect to the individuals Charter  
5                   of Rights and Freedoms with priority on  
6                   community and emergency services personnel  
7                   safety & wellbeing."

8                   How does this one compare with the one we saw  
9 before?

10                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well it is a mission. The  
11 other one is more an objective. This is the broader mission of  
12 the entire integrated response. When it's all done, we'll have  
13 accomplished this, to ensure safety for all involved, maintain  
14 public safety for the duration, et cetera. So the mission is  
15 your very high level, your strategic direction you want to go  
16 in.

17                   **MR. FRANK AU:** No you said a moment earlier that  
18 the other one, the shorter one, wasn't so much to your liking,  
19 but is it a matter of subjective preference or is it something  
20 more objective?

21                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I would say no, it's more  
22 objective. I mean, I go back to my training in incident  
23 command, my involvement in multiple North American Leader  
24 Summits, presidential visits, G8, G20, First Nations issues,  
25 blockades. No, we've always been taught very early, your  
26 mission needs to encompass that broader range to ensure how  
27 you're going to accomplish your goals and what you're hoping to  
28 accomplish.

1                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So your group came and four  
2 days later, after the February 9<sup>th</sup> meeting, you have this plan  
3 developed collaboratively with OPS.

4                   So I guess my question is, if this can be done  
5 within a number of days after your group arrived, why didn't you  
6 come earlier?

7                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well that's not a question  
8 that I can really answer. I went the day ---

9                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

10                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- that I was asked to  
11 go. Before then, I was commander for the northeast region. I  
12 was alive to what was going on with the convoy, because it came  
13 through my region. We had an Ops plan for that. But that's a  
14 question that perhaps should be posed to somebody else.

15                  **MR. FRANK AU:** Yes, I'm sorry. It is not a fair  
16 question to you. You were chosen to lead ---

17                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

18                  **MR. FRANK AU:** --- the project. You weren't the  
19 one who came up with the idea.

20                  But looking back, knowing what we know now about  
21 the OPS capacity to develop something like this, would you agree  
22 that it would have been very helpful for a group of experts like  
23 yours to offer assistance to the OPS, let's say the Monday after  
24 the first weekend, instead of on February 9<sup>th</sup>?

25                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah, that's a fair  
26 statement. Sure.

27                  **MR. FRANK AU:** All right. Let's talk about --  
28 now, you said the February 9<sup>th</sup> plan that was presented to your

1 group missed a lot of the key elements of a good plan. In your  
2 view, the February 13<sup>th</sup> plan, was that good enough?

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was getting there. I  
4 mean, we were, -- as I mentioned, when you're building a plan in  
5 crisis, you're ensuring that you are encompassing all key  
6 elements to that plan, knowing that there was - literally,  
7 things are going to be continuing to be built into that plan  
8 once the event is even finished, you know, because it's based on  
9 your concept you know what you're going to do and how you need  
10 to resource it, but you're still continually -- the plan will  
11 continue to evolve through the duration of the event.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. Now, one of the things  
13 that you also told us that arose during this February 9th  
14 meeting is the former Chief's request for -- he was seeking some  
15 assurances. He was asking for some kind of a guarantee that the  
16 resources would arrive; right?

17 And I take it that you disagree that that kind of  
18 guarantee is to be given?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It wasn't that I disagreed  
20 that the guarantees could be given. I think we need the context  
21 of the conversation.

22 You know, there's debate about some  
23 misrepresentation of numbers in the media that he had with  
24 Superintendent Abrams. There was discussion -- because he made  
25 it very clear, from my view, in conversations that I had, that  
26 there were people, in the Ministry that wanted him to fail and  
27 he had sources in the Ministry that were letting him know that,  
28 you know, people wanted him to fail.

1                   And I just assured him that, well, we're not  
2 those. We're here to help.

3                   **MR. FRANK AU:** But what about the argument that  
4 to plan properly one needs to know a little more about what kind  
5 of resources you can count on?

6                   So for example, if the OPS were to develop a plan  
7 based on having 1,800 officers available, that plan wouldn't  
8 have been very helpful if those people are not actually coming;  
9 right?

10                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I'm going to suggest  
11 the opposite. If they had a plan that -- an operational plan  
12 that encompassed 1,800 officers with duties assigned in a  
13 rotating cycle, then we would have been -- refined, likely, that  
14 plan to ensure that it was sound, and we could have done that  
15 fairly quickly, and started our deployment because we actually  
16 started deploying officers on our team pretty much on day one as  
17 needs were arising.

18                  **MR. FRANK AU:** All right. Now, can we go back to  
19 the will say, please?

20                         Document number is OPP00000792. Page 4.

21                         I'm looking for the -- okay. Do you see the  
22 sentence, "The overall tone"?

23                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

24                  **MR. FRANK AU:**

25                                 "The overall tone of this meeting was  
26                                 somewhat unprofessional and  
27                                 disrespectful. Chief Sloly was very  
28                                 clearly under tremendous pressure to act

1 and was very suspicious of levels of  
2 commitments from police agencies."

3 Tell us more, why you said that.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, as I said, when we  
5 attended this meeting we fully anticipated to, you know -- and  
6 I'm not looking -- I don't look for thanks, but expected that we  
7 were going to be welcome there, that he was going to be happy  
8 that we were there.

9 You know, the meeting -- well, the meeting  
10 overall, the tone, I would say, was very antagonistic. It was  
11 disrespectful in terms of we're there to help and he's just not  
12 trusting it. It was very clear he had confidence issues in what  
13 we were there to do.

14 **MR. FRANK AU:** It wasn't what you expected.

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Certainly not what we  
16 expected.

17 I think just about everyone on my team at some  
18 point in time within the minutes of leaving the meeting received  
19 apologies from other members of his command for his behaviour.

20 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. Now, if we scroll down on  
21 the same page a little further -- oh, we may go into the next  
22 page now.

23 I'm looking for the sentence that starts with  
24 "After the Chief and his team left".

25 Right. Thank you.

26 "After the Chief and his team left the  
27 room, Insp. Debbie Palmer remained with  
28 our team and we again pressed for copies

1 of their plans, e-versions, and she  
2 stressed the Chief's comments that some  
3 aspects of their plan had not yet been  
4 approved."

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

6 **MR. FRANK AU:** Tell us what ---

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I want to stress as  
8 well notwithstanding the tone of the meeting, it did not change  
9 our result. You know, we went -- Debbie Palmer was the person  
10 that was initially -- the name that was initially provided to me  
11 as our go-to person. She was replaced the following morning by  
12 Chris Rheaume, but that's what -- like the Chief had meant there  
13 still was some last-minute planning going on. And she said she  
14 would do her best to get it for us.

15 You know, in the end, we really never did receive  
16 a plan from the OPS.

17 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So at the end of this  
18 meeting on February 9, was there any agreement between the OPS  
19 and the Integrated Planning Group on any operational plans going  
20 forward?

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we just committed to  
22 continue to build and work with his team and to build a plan to  
23 complement what their objectives were from their conn ops they  
24 provided us.

25 **MR. FRANK AU:** And was there any agreement about  
26 the degree of integration?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No.

28 **MR. FRANK AU:** Now, we expect that we may hear

1 evidence from Mr. Sloly that, to the extent the -- his approval  
2 is required, he gave all the approval necessary on February 9th.  
3 What would you say to that?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I obviously wasn't there  
5 because I received no such information of approvals. I think  
6 it's reflected in the follow-up meetings we had when I would  
7 call him and say, "What's our status?". "Well, we need a  
8 meeting before we can -- we need another meeting before we --  
9 for me to understand that before we can move forward".

10 So there was no implied -- certainly no implied  
11 or explicit approvals for anything.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** Commissioner, I saw you looking at  
13 me. Is that a sign?

14 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** If it's a good time for  
15 lunch ---

16 **MR. FRANK AU:** This is a good time.

17 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** --- we'll take an hour for  
18 lunch and come back after.

19 **MR. FRANK AU:** Thank you.

20 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Very perspicacious on your  
21 part.

22 Okay. So they're going to break for lunch and  
23 we'll come back in an hour.

24 **THE REGISTRAR:** The Commission is in recess for  
25 one hour. La commission lever pour une heure.

26 --- Upon recessing at 1:02 p.m.

27 --- Upon resuming at 2:00 p.m.

28 **THE REGISTRAR:** Order. À l'ordre.

1 The Commission is reconvened. La commission  
2 reprend.

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** Good afternoon, Commissioner.

4 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Good afternoon.

5 Okay. We're ready to go?

6 **MR. FRANK AU:** I am.

7 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Go ahead.

8 **--- CHIEF SUPT. CARSON PARDY, Resumed**

9 **--- EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. FRANK AU (cont'd)**

10 **MR. FRANK AU:** Chief Pardy, just before the lunch  
11 break, I was asking you questions about the meeting on February  
12 the 9th.

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

14 **MR. FRANK AU:** And I just want to finish that off  
15 by taking you to one more document of that meeting. This is not  
16 your notes, but someone at the OPS was also taking notes.

17 So if I could call up document number  
18 OPS00014454, please.

19 Page 138, please.

20 So if we go to the bottom of the page, please.

21 Do you see a reference from the Chief that starts  
22 with -- there we go.

23 So the Chief -- the former Chief of the OPS, Mr.  
24 Sloly, apparently asked the question:

25 "We can add the info that was provided  
26 by the RCMP, but we haven't agreed not  
27 to proceed with our plan for tonight."

28 And then he asks:

1 "Are we still separate entities or are u  
2 folding into our incident command  
3 system?"

4 There's a notation that the OPP said, "Yes, we  
5 should" -- I think it's probably. "Yes, we should prob[ably]  
6 fold into the OPS command structure."

7 Do you recall having that kind of exchange?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I do recall an exchange  
9 about working under their command.

10 **MR. FRANK AU:** Yes.

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** In the Integrated Command  
12 Structure, that's kind of how it does work, but there was some  
13 clear differences of opinion, I think, in terms of what  
14 integration would look like, which I -- which I'm sure we'll get  
15 to as we go through.

16 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But I had no issues. We  
18 had some very loose talk around where we would work. The  
19 location that we were situated at had significant capacity to  
20 expand, and that also became a contentious issue because it took  
21 some time even to get us to work in the same area, which proved  
22 the added layers of difficulty to it.

23 Eventually, it did happen and it became quite  
24 seamless.

25 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. And this is also  
26 consistent with what you've been telling us all along, that you  
27 were there to offer help but not to take over.

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We were explicitly -- I

1 was directed from my Commissioner that we are not going to  
2 Ottawa to take over. The Chief and the police of jurisdiction  
3 still have primacy over his event. We're there to assist them,  
4 hopefully in an integrated and unified fashion.

5 **MR. FRANK AU:** And this may be a question that's  
6 unrelated to the February 9th meeting, but since we've heard so  
7 much about the Hendon reports, I'm just curious. Were you one  
8 of the recipients of the Hendon report at around January-  
9 February of this year?

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** As a Regional Commander, I  
11 was receiving the Hendon reports.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** Were you reading them?

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Reading them and just --  
14 oftentimes there was aspects that would just repeat going  
15 through the changes and the -- because I knew it was internally  
16 produced by the OPP Intelligence Bureau, and attended briefings  
17 as required on significant changes that would occur.

18 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So with that, if I could  
19 now take you to the events in the subsequent days following the  
20 February 9th meeting.

21 Did work continue on February the 10th in terms  
22 of working on this plan, a new plan from the Integrated Planning  
23 Group or making improvement to the OPS plan that you were shown  
24 on the 9th?

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I appreciate that when you  
26 look at it from an appearance perspective, they look like very  
27 different plans. At its core, however, the plan that we  
28 developed was a build-on in support of, to complement the plan

1 that -- the concept that they had in place ---

2 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- which was all  
4 strategically directed in the same way about ending the protests  
5 and bringing Ottawa back to a state of normalcy.

6 **MR. FRANK AU:** And that makes sense because you  
7 came to offer support ---

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- and you asked what they had so  
10 that you could build on it.

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct, sir.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** So if I could take you to the next  
13 document, OPP00004283.

14 So if we could shrink the page so we could see  
15 the entire page, please.

16 So this is a document that we received from the  
17 OPP. It looks like a draft document of some sort. At the  
18 bottom it says it's prepared by the Integrated Planning Cell,  
19 RCMP, OPP, you know, those police services that you talked about  
20 earlier.

21 And I want to take you to Section 3.1 of this  
22 document.

23 So now if we can enlarge it.

24 So this part of the document appears to be an  
25 assessment of the current situation as you found it on February  
26 the 10th, which is the date of this draft document. You see  
27 that under "Current", the first bullet says, "Not intelligence  
28 led".

1           Do you agree with the assessment that the OPS  
2 operation at that time was not Intelligence led?

3           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Not in the way, certainly,  
4 that I would have anticipated, no. I do not believe.

5           You know, when you look at intelligence-led  
6 policing, you're looking at your threat assessments, your risk  
7 assessments and how you can effect some positive change using  
8 that intelligence.

9           They were in crisis mode and in crisis mode, they  
10 -- I did not feel that they were using the intelligence to look  
11 at the broader event, see about how they could dismantle this  
12 event peacefully.

13           **MR. FRANK AU:** And when your group was trying to  
14 build on whatever plan that you saw on the 9th, what was your  
15 objective like in terms of incorporating any available  
16 intelligence that was available to the group?

17           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, two of the key  
18 things that we did as a team is I arranged intelligence and PLT  
19 briefings for my team at the highest level, so Superintendent  
20 Morris and his entire team joined us. Inspector Marcel Beaudin  
21 and a number of both, I believe, OPP and OPS PLT joined us.

22           We wanted their perspective on the lay of the  
23 land, the current intelligence, what we know, what we don't  
24 know, what are the gaps. And likewise with the PLT in terms of  
25 how are things going, what can be improved upon, what is -- what  
26 levels of authority did they have to engage, what is the plan  
27 moving forward, is there opportunities that we could capitalize  
28 on to persuade some of the protestors to leave on their own

1 accord, et cetera.

2                   So we see those briefings. I wanted my planners  
3 and my team, all the tacticians, I wanted them to be fully aware  
4 in that point in time what we were dealing with.

5                   We did a subsequent and additional briefings  
6 throughout from those entities just to make sure that there was  
7 -- if there's any change that we might need to pivot to adjust  
8 to those changes.

9                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. And I think I saw some  
10 references in your notes that on the 10th you got some input  
11 from Marcel Beaudin.

12                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

13                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Was he the person from the OPP in  
14 charge of the PLT group?

15                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Marcel, he's got a  
16 background -- he's an Inspector with our Indigenous Policing  
17 Bureau and he has a background, yes, in provincial liaison.

18                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So on the same document  
19 that's on the screen, if we go down further, we see a section  
20 with the PLT. So there we go. And, Chief Pardy, you see  
21 there's some -- there's not complete, I assume, because it's a  
22 draft a document, but there's some information incorporated  
23 under this section. And if we scroll down slowly, so that the  
24 witness can have a quick look?

25                   Now does this capture in broad terms the kind of  
26 information you were looking for in order to inform the new  
27 approach?

28                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It does. You know, you

1 need to know the sentiment of the community, what the desired  
2 outcomes are. PLT do amazing work at ensuring that they  
3 understand all sides, and that's what the good negotiators do,  
4 and they are just that. They are negotiators. They're trained  
5 to do what they do, to understand the perspective of all sides,  
6 to ensure that information around expectations around the law  
7 are properly communicated to all sides, and to do their best to  
8 prove and gain -- build those relationships, build that trust  
9 with the people, so that what they say -- they know that they  
10 can take what they say to the bank and they're going to be  
11 following through with what they say.

12           **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm. Now if I could take you  
13 back to your willsay, Madam Clerk, at OPP00000792. I believe it  
14 was on this day, February 10<sup>th</sup>, Chief Pardy, that the -- one of  
15 the subject matter experts from the RCMP, Darwin Tetreault,  
16 prepared the concept of operations that was based on the  
17 information that you were gathering. So if we go to page 5 of  
18 this document, I want to go down to the bullet that starts with  
19 on February -- on the 10<sup>th</sup> of February. There we go. Do you see  
20 this bullet, that tells us that Sergeant Tetreault was preparing  
21 this,

22                           "...concept of operations based on the  
23                           totality of the information that [you  
24                           were getting] from the OPS but more  
25                           importantly intelligence that would  
26                           support a systematic and safe action  
27                           plan to [dismantle] the entire protest  
28                           zone."

1           So does this also refer to something you told us  
2 earlier about not doing things block by block ---

3           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct, sir.

4           **MR. FRANK AU:** --- but to have start to finish of  
5 the entire protest?

6           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct, sir.

7           **MR. FRANK AU:** If I could take you to the next  
8 document, I believe this is your notes, OPP00001792. So this is  
9 still February the 10<sup>th</sup>. And if we go to page 28, the time I'm  
10 looking for is 1925. There we go. You have a telephone call  
11 with looks like Deputy Harkins, and there's a -- can we make the  
12 -- look at more of the page? Oh, there we go. I think go down  
13 a little bit, please. "Obstacles with OPD still" -- can you  
14 read this? These were your ---

15           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

16           **MR. FRANK AU:** --- notes; right?

17           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** "Obstacles with OPS still  
18                           exist at the Chief level however we're  
19                           working effectively with this rank and  
20                           file."

21           **MR. FRANK AU:** So first of all, why are you  
22 saying that there are still obstacles at the Chief level?

23           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we're at this point,  
24 we still don't have their plan. It's -- was a frequently --  
25 frequent made request to get what they had, to get access to  
26 their people, and the replies were all we're waiting for the  
27 Chief.

28           **MR. FRANK AU:** And the second part where it says

1 we're working effectively with the rank and file?

2 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** Who are these rank and file?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Everyone from their  
5 command team, their strategic command, Deputy Ferguson, Chris  
6 Rheaume, those that were sent to our unit to assist with the  
7 planning. We didn't have their planners embedded with us until  
8 some days later, but we were back and forth with them as well.

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm. If we go to the next day  
10 now, so on same -- these are your notes, but we go to page 32,  
11 please? And the time I'm looking for is 12:30. So there are  
12 two points being made here. You may be -- perhaps you can read  
13 those better.

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah, so the first says,  
15 "We don't know what resources are  
16 deployed here before and beyond any  
17 request [that] we have [made -- we  
18 have] been coordinating."

19 And this was -- this -- that bullet is in essence  
20 in reference to silos. You know, others are doing something.  
21 We all need to be out of those silos. If we're asking for  
22 something, you're asking for something, are we asking for the  
23 same thing. We need to break those down.

24 It was a constant pressure. We were asking for a  
25 lot of resources here, so we needed to ensure that we were  
26 effective in our request.

27 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The second bullet says,

1 "Anything sent to [the] OPP POC from  
2 [the] Chiefs executive office -- can we  
3 get that, please!"

4 And those were some requests that the Chief had  
5 made, so can we just please get access to what requests have  
6 been made, what replies have been received. He just said he too  
7 is very frustrated. I asked if the Chief's Executive Officer  
8 was looking after resources. He advised that he was working on  
9 getting that information for me.

10 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. Now on that day, February  
11 the 11<sup>th</sup>, you also attended a meeting with the -- with a group,  
12 the Integrated Planning Group. That might have happened  
13 actually earlier that day, and I want to take you to the  
14 document -- the minutes of that meeting. It's a document  
15 provided by the OPP, so OPP00001837. And I want to take you to  
16 page 5, near the top.

17 Oh, no, it says not enough memory. Maybe while -  
18 - oh, there we go. So if we can go to page 5, please? Right.  
19 So there's a reference to something you said at that meeting.

20 "...we're here to build a plan to  
21 support our partners, but we have no  
22 information. Can't deploy when we  
23 don't know what we're deploying to. We  
24 have an OPS Plan but it does not give  
25 us enough information to deploy 500  
26 officers without a more comprehensive  
27 plan.

28 Intelligence picture will inform

1                                   this..."

2                                   And so on. There's a reference to 500 officers.  
3 Tell us more about that.

4                                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Back on our February 9<sup>th</sup>  
5 meeting, I think it was Sergeant or Staff Sergeant LeBlanc from  
6 the OPS did provide us a bit of a breakdown in terms of their  
7 plan and intersections, what the numbers they needed, and that  
8 number was 516, if I'm not mistaken, from the February 9<sup>th</sup>  
9 meeting. We were trying to understand that. We later learned  
10 that it was based on a three-shift rotation. Most organizations  
11 work on a two-shift rotation, so the needs -- again, I mentioned  
12 earlier, we corrected some of the math, but it's around that  
13 number at that time. And that was based on their concept --  
14 without duties assigned, but based on their concept of  
15 operations we would need approximately -- not approximately.  
16 They would need 1600 officers to maintain this on a 24/7 cycle.

17                                   **MR. FRANK AU:** I see. Now let me take you to  
18 your willsay. At page 6, please? You notice that I'm taking  
19 you to lots of documents. Sometimes these contemporaneous  
20 record help ---

21                                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** M'hm.

22                                   **MR. FRANK AU:** --- to tell the story. So if we  
23 go to page 6, at 1645, so scroll down a little bit, please. So  
24 1645, that's 4:45 p.m.

25                                   "... our team presented our proposed  
26 plan to senior command in the RCMP and  
27 the OPP with significant support. This  
28 plan was a detailed concept of

1 operations for which our team would  
2 build the entire POU plan however it  
3 still relied heavily on injects from  
4 the OPS planning team."

5 Now I suppose that goes back to something you  
6 told us earlier that you were building on what was given you ---

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

8 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- that you thought was  
9 inadequate for the purposes of resolving the protest situation.  
10 And by this time, at 4:45, you had something ---

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- to present to the senior  
13 command. What was that proposed plan?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well it was the plan that  
15 we actually executed in the end. That concept of operations was  
16 developed at that stage and with a POU plan that was going to be  
17 very detailed in terms of the number of resources that were  
18 going to be needed, which came to fruition, that same 800 number  
19 I mentioned earlier. We talked about everything from  
20 communication to restoring trust and confidence in the Ottawa  
21 Police, to responding to the narrative, to change the narrative,  
22 because the narrative certainly was not reflective of what was  
23 actually going on on the ground, what we could see on the  
24 ground. So it was that all encompassing concept of operation  
25 and plan to dismantle the protest effectively, start to finish.

26 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. If we go further down.

27 So you see the bullet that starts with:

28 "Superintendent Lue and I presented the

1 plan at a high level to her..."

2 Her referring to the person in the bullet before,  
3 which is Deputy Chief Ferguson. You presented it to her:

4 "...and she immediately voiced her full  
5 support. She preferred however that she  
6 be permitted time to present it to the  
7 Chief and we agreed to prepare and forward  
8 a slide deck for her use, which was  
9 completed, and that we would be available  
10 regardless of time to answer questions."

11 So you're making yourselves available ---

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

13 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- to answer questions, but  
14 you're waiting for her to get an answer from the Chief? Is that  
15 your understanding?

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. So we presented it,  
17 and her response was very favourable, which we felt good about.  
18 And I was prepared to go to the Chief myself if necessary. But  
19 based on the dynamic that we'd been seeing, and the feedback,  
20 you know, we trusted her judgement, and she felt that it would  
21 be best for her to present it. It was -- you know, it was late  
22 into the evening, about 9:30ish when we finally got a deck to  
23 her, hoping that we would get a response probably not that  
24 night, but certainly by first thing in the morning.

25 **MR. FRANK AU:** Now, you may or may not know this,  
26 but we heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson yesterday that she was  
27 actually off that day.

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I didn't know that.

1           **MR. FRANK AU:** You didn't know that?

2           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think I found out during  
3 the process that she was, but ---

4           **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. But she still spoke to you  
5 ---

6           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** She answered our calls ---

7           **MR. FRANK AU:** --- at around 9:00 or 10:00?

8           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- always. Yes.

9           **MR. FRANK AU:** Yeah. So that was February the  
10 11<sup>th</sup>, late at night. And then the next day, so we're going into  
11 February the 12<sup>th</sup> now, at 11:45 a.m. on the 12<sup>th</sup>, you placed a  
12 phone call to Chief Sloly. So the two of you had a  
13 conversation. Tell us about that conversation, please?

14           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, if I could, just  
15 prior to that, ---

16           **MR. FRANK AU:** Yes, yes.

17           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- I mean, I put in the  
18 points here, but earlier in the day, I made some outreach to see  
19 if we'd gotten any response back from Chief Sloly on the plan  
20 and whether or not it would be a good time for me to call him.  
21 And I was told it was an ill-advised time to call because he was  
22 in a meeting with -- I believe he was in a meeting at the time  
23 with Bernier, Rob Bernier. So I said, "Well, fine." I left it  
24 until a little later. And yes, I did make a phone call. So  
25 just a short conversation.

26           **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

27           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But I made that call to  
28 him and, you know, when I reflect on my notes and how quickly I

1 was writing, it was temporaneous in that I was writing the note  
2 as I was speaking with him. And yeah, that was the context of  
3 the conversation. You know, "Got the slide deck? Have you had  
4 an opportunity to take a look at it? Your thoughts on it?" His  
5 concern was around what does integration look like? Where do we  
6 fit? How does it fit in other theatres of operation and what  
7 not. And he really felt that a follow-up meeting would be  
8 beneficial to answer some of those questions.

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** So once again, we're at  
11 12:00 o'clock on that date, hoping that we would be greenlighted  
12 to move ahead with, you know, implementing the plan that we were  
13 working on. And we then started preparing for this meeting that  
14 we ultimately had later in that day.

15 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. But staying on this call,  
16 for the moment, so if we look at what is said in the will-say,  
17 on the fourth line:

18 "I advised we were looking to work in a  
19 more integrated fashion that insured  
20 resources were strategically placed where  
21 needed, that I had provided [Deputy Chief]  
22 Ferguson with that plan. He advised he  
23 wasn't sure what was agreed to yet as to  
24 how that integration was to happen..."

25 So he suggested a call. I wanted to ask you, if  
26 you had specific recollection about what he said to you that  
27 day?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well I certainly have it

1 from my notes. And at that time, I was using a scribe. I mean,  
2 my notes are -- you can't be on your notes with an event like  
3 this. I had over 400 pages of notes. You would never catch up  
4 if you weren't doing them live. I wrote my notes. The time has  
5 been my best tool in my 36-year career, to make sure that I  
6 captured the essence of what was said. And I'm going to suggest  
7 that that is the tone of the conversation.

8 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So this accurately captures  
9 ---

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, it does.

11 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- the nature of the  
12 conversation?

13 So if we go further down -- oh by the way, so  
14 around the time that you were having this conversation with the  
15 former chief, I suppose your other members of your team were  
16 having a conversation with Supt. Bernier?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

18 **MR. FRANK AU:** And what did you find out from  
19 other members of your team about what they spoke to Bernier  
20 about?

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Just that we're good to  
22 go.

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So they got the message  
24 that they were good to go, while you were speaking to the Chief,  
25 who asked for a further meeting or briefing?

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct. So I felt that  
27 maybe there was -- well, not me. There was some obvious  
28 miscommunication going on. You know, that we did actually

1 require that meeting with the Chief, I'm going to leave to the  
2 response that I got directly from Chief Sloly that a follow up  
3 meeting was required. And that follow up meeting did occur with  
4 a detailed overview of the plan. So I just felt that maybe  
5 Supt. Bernier misunderstood, or -- it was obviously inaccurate.

6 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So if we go further down,  
7 that meeting that finally happened took place in the afternoon.  
8 So first of all, at 1400, so 2:00 p.m., you placed a call to  
9 Deputy Chief Bell upon learning that the former chief would like  
10 a briefing on the plan?

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** And so you suggested, C. Pardy,  
13 you suggested at 3:30; right?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

15 **MR. FRANK AU:** And then at 3:04, you got a call  
16 from Deputy Bell who apologized, but said that the meeting was -  
17 - has already started and the Chief was insisting that it happen  
18 now. Is that still your recollection?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

20 **MR. FRANK AU:** And then a few minutes later, at  
21 3:10, you and -- I guess you joined -- when you say "We", I  
22 assume that's you and the members of your team?

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah, the key members of  
24 our planning group. Specifically I wanted the subject matter  
25 expert to present the plan.

26 **MR. FRANK AU:** Yeah.

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I introduced it, and then  
28 had the subject matter expert present the plan. Phil Lue was on

1 the call. I can't remember exactly who without looking at the  
2 meeting invites.

3 **MR. FRANK AU:** So I'd like to ask you what you  
4 wrote here at 1510, about the third line down. The end of the  
5 second line:

6 "The tone of the Chief's comments during  
7 this meeting was very troubling to the  
8 point that I asked if the Chief wanted my  
9 team to leave the call to allow him to  
10 speak privately with his team first. He  
11 was blunt in saying no, he would get to us  
12 momentarily."

13 What was this about?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** He was having discussions  
15 that were separate and apart from our purpose to be at that  
16 meeting and it was really direct. Heads were down. You could  
17 sense -- you could feel the tension over the video link in the  
18 room. And we just felt -- and I mean, Phil Lue also spoke up.  
19 We just felt that perhaps it's not our time to be in this  
20 meeting, if he needed some privacy to deal with his people. And  
21 he said, "No, I'll get to your next." "I'm getting to you  
22 next."

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** And then eventually it got to you.  
24 And your will-say tells us that there was a presentation of the  
25 slides; right?

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

27 **MR. FRANK AU:** And if we scroll down a little  
28 bit?

1                   The last sentence of this bullet, do you see "Key  
2 in the plan"?

3                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

4                   **MR. FRANK AU:**

5                                 "Key in the plan was reducing the  
6                                 protestor footprint through compliance and  
7                                 that ensuring safety, above everything,  
8                                 was factored in at all stages."

9                                 So it looks like when you said "key", some  
10 emphasis was put on that point? Can you elaborate?

11                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was. I mean, this  
12 obviously was a significant event in our nation's capital, it  
13 was having a significant impact on its residents, on the  
14 policing, but we also were working hard to ensure that what our  
15 actions do help rebuild that trust and confidence in the police.  
16 It goes back to our mission in ensuring that safety is built  
17 into your mission, and that was a key component for us.

18                                 We wanted to reduce the component -- the  
19 footprint of the protest zone to the utmost extent possible.

20                                 You talk to planners in major events like this,  
21 they'll say, "We're not going to arrest our way out of this.  
22 We're not going to -- it's going to be impossible".

23                                 So you have to look to compliance and appeal to  
24 the better senses of people that are involved to get them to  
25 want to voluntarily exit the zone. And that was a key component  
26 of our plan because we knew that from a capacity perspective if  
27 we had to start putting bracelets on everybody there, we'd need  
28 10,000 officers to do that.

1                   So we had to -- we had to put a plan in place  
2 that was scalable but one that we could accomplish with the  
3 resources that we intended to bring.

4                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Now -- so this is a meeting  
5 between your team and the OPS command team. Chief Sloly was  
6 obviously there.

7                   Who else, do you remember, was present from the  
8 OPS side?

9                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I guess this is the  
10 advantage of video, right. We're on video.

11                   I do believe his command team, his counsel was  
12 there.

13                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Was Bernier there?

14                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, because Bernier was  
15 very vocal and spoke up in support of our plan.

16                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So he was supportive.  
17 What about the former Chief?

18                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Oh, he was -- he was  
19 there. He was ---

20                   **MR. FRANK AU:** No, no. But, sorry, in terms of  
21 how receptive he was.

22                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, a few things  
23 happened during the presentation -- and it speaks to what, I  
24 think, integration and/or unified command brings to the table  
25 about taking this off the shoulders of one individual and  
26 spreading it around and bringing the collective expertise to  
27 bear on the problem.

28                   But during the presentation, Darwin uttered a

1 statement about single point of failure, and admittedly, it kind  
2 of came out that the Chief was the single point of failure. It  
3 was not the intent. It was meant to show that, you know, he was  
4 -- Darwin was very passionate about the fact that, "All eyes are  
5 you on, Chief, what you do, what you say, et cetera. You are  
6 the face of this for the Ottawa Police Service. We're all going  
7 to bring a plan to you so that, essentially, you're not going to  
8 be seen as the single point of failure".

9           The Chief responded -- and understandably. He  
10 responded very quickly that he was not the single point of  
11 failure in this and he -- unless he had confidence in what his  
12 team could do, he's not going to support it or approve it. He  
13 went on a bit of a talk in that regard just to -- I actually, on  
14 behalf of our team, apologized because it was not the intent of  
15 our being there that day. Our intent was to go there and walk  
16 away with kind of support that we were unified and let's get  
17 this done.

18           **MR. FRANK AU:** So at the end of that afternoon  
19 meeting, was anything agreed on?

20           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We still did not have an  
21 approved plan, no.

22           **MR. FRANK AU:** You did not.

23           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** There was no implicit,  
24 explicit approval of a plan that day. That did not come until -  
25 - I'm sorry. Was this the -- this was the 11th?

26           **MR. FRANK AU:** This was the 12th.

27           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The 12th.

28           That did not come until the 13th.

1           **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. Now, if we go down on your  
2 will say to page 8, there was a bullet that starts with --  
3 that's right -- "We had discussion about integrating the  
4 command, location of CP". What's CP?

5           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Command Post or Command  
6 Centre.

7           **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So this is in reference to  
8 discussion about where to set up the command post if there is to  
9 be an integrated command; right?

10          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

11          **MR. FRANK AU:** And you said there's some apparent  
12 momentum being gained with a new IC. What's the IC?

13          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Incident Commander. Rob  
14 Bernier.

15          **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So nothing was agreed as of  
16 yet on the 12th, but you were sensing apparent momentum from the  
17 new commander, who was Rob Bernier.

18          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct, sir.

19          **MR. FRANK AU:** And then if we go down further, I  
20 reviewed -- yeah.

21                        "I reviewed and signed off of our  
22 detailed ops plan by the end of this  
23 date, as did the RCMP. All that was  
24 required was approval by OPS."

25                        What do you mean by that?

26          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we had given them  
27 the plan and we had hoped that they would approve it. Again, as  
28 supporters of the OPS, we weren't in a position to start

1 actioning a plan without their approval.

2 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So let's go to the 13th.

3 The first bullet:

4 "We still did not have approval from  
5 Chief Sloly yet. In consult with OPP  
6 senior command forged ahead with  
7 developing roles of senior and strategic  
8 command and the absolute importance of  
9 these roles in support of the Incident  
10 Commanders."

11 Could you explain that to us?

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And that's one of the  
13 significant benefits of integrated command.

14 So the way that we set it up, we had a seniors  
15 table, which is Deputy Commissioners and Deputy Chiefs with the  
16 Ottawa Police Service. We had our Strategic Command, which I  
17 then, after we went kinetic, became a member of the Strategic  
18 Command with -- again, with the RCMP and the OPS. And then we  
19 had our Incident Commanders, the three guys.

20 So the whole goal there is to give them  
21 objectives, be a sounding board. We're able to effectively keep  
22 anything and everything political out of it.

23 They are able to strictly focus on operations.  
24 We're able to give them feedback, report up, report down.  
25 They're never reporting jumping over a rank. They're reporting  
26 to us and we're updating the seniors table to ensure that  
27 they're aware of everything that's going on and the progress  
28 that we're making with our daily objectives.

1                   **MR. FRANK AU:** So you were forging ahead at this  
2 time even though there wasn't a final approval yet.

3                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We -- our team remained  
4 incredibly optimistic throughout this and in spite of the  
5 adversity that we faced at times. And I mean, I'd like to say  
6 this because I think it's important to be said. There was still  
7 amazing collaboration and support to get things done.

8                   Everybody in Ottawa, from the Chief down, wanted  
9 this to be over and we wanted -- we were with them that way. So  
10 there was a lot of tremendous work, and we -- at no time did we  
11 just say -- do a full stop and say, "Well, until we get approval  
12 there's nothing else we can do". There was tons more that we  
13 could do.

14                   So we never stopped from day one until I left  
15 there on the 27th or 28th, whatever it was at that point.

16                   **MR. FRANK AU:** So by 3:50 that day, it appears as  
17 though your optimism was justified because you received a call  
18 from Incident Commander Bernier, who was accompanied by the  
19 major -- Critical Incident Commander Springer. And then if we  
20 go down two bullets, sub-bullets, you see that yes, the plan is  
21 approved; right?

22                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

23                   **MR. FRANK AU:** So he approved it, as the Incident  
24 Commander was entitled to do, and then at 6:05 p.m. that day, if  
25 we go down further, you discussed the above with Deputy Chief  
26 Ferguson. She advised that she fully agreed with Bernier's  
27 authority to sign off, "that we were good to go".

28                   Was that accurate?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It's accurate. I made  
2 that call because of concerns in all partner organizations that,  
3 look, we don't have approval from the Chief yet, which is what  
4 we'd been expecting all along. So that call got made to Deputy  
5 Chief Ferguson and, following that call, I forged ahead and was  
6 completely confident we were going ahead, we're moving in.

7                   **MR. FRANK AU:** So with both Bernier and Ferguson  
8 confirming the authority to sign off, was that sufficient for  
9 you on the 13th?

10                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I accepted it and moved  
11 on. And I remember telling my boss, "Are we certain that the  
12 Chief is on board? I'm good with it. I'm moving in".

13                   I've got someone -- I've got a signed document in  
14 my hands. I'm moving forward.

15                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So there was optimism as  
16 of the 13th, but as we read on in your will say, it appears that  
17 on the 14th, the next day, there was still a few more issues to  
18 iron out.

19                   So I want to take you first to -- so page 9,  
20 February 14th, the bullet that starts with "Key issues".

21                   Do you see?

22                   So scroll up. That's right.

23                   "Key issues dealt with through the day  
24 related to OPS need to have their lawyer  
25 approve the plan, which was understood  
26 based on everything they had been going  
27 through, however, was unusual in the  
28 context of a lawyer approving an

1 operational plan."

2 Now, we spoke about this a little bit. And  
3 during our interview you clarify that perhaps approval was not  
4 the best term, and you said maybe review was a better word.  
5 Could you explain that, please?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I challenged this a  
7 couple times with some other people, can you help me out here,  
8 can you intervene, can you, you know, give me some better  
9 context. And I know that Chris Rheame made a call to the  
10 lawyer and that's what came back. Well, no, I'm not approving  
11 the plan. I've been asked to review it before it's actioned.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm.

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** In my view, however, as  
14 much as approval may not be the right word to use, if a plan  
15 cannot be actioned before it's reviewed, then it's not approved.

16 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. So that's the first issue  
17 on the 14<sup>th</sup>.

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

19 **MR. FRANK AU:** Another issue that you spoke  
20 about, if we go down the page, please? The bullet that starts  
21 with furthermore.

22 "Furthermore, it was determined  
23 throughout this date that Incident  
24 Commander Bernier was being pulled away  
25 continuously to brief his Chief and  
26 this was creating frustration within  
27 our planning group, especially as it  
28 related to the POU component. I

1 tactfully addressed this concern with  
2 the OPS."

3 How did you tactfully address it?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I just tell them we need  
5 it -- we -- he is critical, absolutely critical to this  
6 operation. He is the key decision maker, a key incident  
7 commander, and he needs -- his input is absolutely unequivocally  
8 required, especially as we were looking at the POU to plan,  
9 which was the crux of our plan to dismantle the protest. He was  
10 absolutely vital to its success and needed.

11 So obviously, I was the person that often went to  
12 OPS to have discussions, but throughout my time there, I would  
13 get the feedback from the different planning components that we  
14 need access to this. We need access to this. Can we make this  
15 up? So I was the guy trying to work our way around any barriers  
16 that we were facing. And I know that the lead planners who I  
17 had tremendous trust and confidence in just said, "We need him,  
18 and he's being pulled away again. We need him back here ASAP.  
19 If we're going to put this together, his input is critical. We  
20 can't spend hours and hours developing a tactical solution that  
21 the incident commander can't support."

22 **MR. FRANK AU:** So those are the first two issues.  
23 There was a third issue. If we go up the page, I want to take  
24 you to the bullet that starts with "while it was established."  
25 There we have it.

26 "While it was established that all key  
27 commanders would be kept in the loop,  
28 it was learned that the mayor of Ottawa

1 had engaged with protesters and  
2 negotiated them to all move to  
3 Wellington Street and that OPS made  
4 some decision on action."

5 So and then the next bullet says that Incident  
6 Commander Bernier briefed you at around six -- just after six  
7 o'clock, that due to the mayor's decision, it was a good time to  
8 take positive action on those who stayed outside of Wellington.

9 Now in your interview with us, you describe this  
10 action plan as uncharacteristic of Bernier. Why did you say  
11 that?

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was just that we -- he  
13 was well aware of the overarching plan that we had created for  
14 them that would systematically dismantle the protest zone. And  
15 to go back to the chunk-by-chunk dismantling would require  
16 additional resources and we knew that. We challenged Bernier on  
17 the plan, but we brought key members of the team in to a PLT  
18 intel. POU, they actually supported it. So it wasn't, like, we  
19 don't want to do this. Okay. Now we have a plan and we're  
20 going to pivot, so we need to adjust. So are we all on the same  
21 page as to where we're going. And, I mean, ultimately, it did  
22 not happen.

23 **MR. FRANK AU:** What did not happen?

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The ---

25 **MR. FRANK AU:** The action?

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- the action.

27 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And I'd wrestle in my

1 brain, I do believe it relates to a resource reliability from a  
2 POU perspective. So this is the tactical portion of our  
3 operation plan with POU. So ultimately, it did not occur  
4 either, because it was -- again, it was contrary to the plan,  
5 the systematic plan that had been proposed. But, again, when we  
6 put the team together, POU said, "Yeah, we think it's doable if  
7 it can resource." PLT felt that they had exhausted all that  
8 they could do with this particular group. And intel gave us  
9 nothing that would suggest that it would be ill-advised to do  
10 so, so it's, like, okay, we're good to go. Now we have to start  
11 resourcing. And I do believe it ultimately came down to a  
12 resourcing issue why it did not occur.

13 **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So it would appear that  
14 all of these issues on the 14<sup>th</sup>, the first day of the supposed  
15 integration caused you sufficient concern that the -- early the  
16 next morning, you spoke to the OPP Commissioner Carrique; am I  
17 right?

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Sorry, which date?

19 **MR. FRANK AU:** I'm sorry?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The next day you say?

21 **MR. FRANK AU:** The next day, yeah, February the  
22 15<sup>th</sup>.

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Fifteen.

24 **MR. FRANK AU:** Let me show you a document that  
25 may help refresh your memory. OPP00001785 at page 28, please.  
26 So this appears to be a phone call that you made to Commissioner  
27 Carrique where you raised some of these concerns and about the  
28 unified command, and you asked for his intervention.

1                   So if we go down the page, looking for where it  
2 says -- is this page 28? I'm looking for the reference where it  
3 says the elephant in the room.

4                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah. So I reviewed those  
5 notes. I, unfortunately, after retiring, my notes all went back  
6 to archives, and I just got them back yesterday.

7                   **MR. FRANK AU:** So you remember reading that?

8                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I remember reading this,  
9 but this is not in reference to a conversation with the  
10 Commissioner. It might have been from an earlier conversation,  
11 but at that time, I was in a meeting with a broader group. I  
12 was called out for a conversation with the Commissioner in  
13 relation to providing an update to the Ottawa Police Services  
14 Board. It was a brief callout from that meeting. I do,  
15 however, recall talking about the challenges.

16                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

17                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You know, I had made  
18 statements through this that publicly we're integrated, but in  
19 reality, we're still missing a lot, so we're truly not  
20 integrated until we reach all of these points. We are still at  
21 times working in silos. So if -- in an action that's going to  
22 happen if the broader group who's planning for resources to  
23 support it is not aware of it, it just makes it difficult to  
24 action. You need to have a plan.

25                   **MR. FRANK AU:** So you might have just anticipated  
26 my question, because I was going to ask you for the context  
27 where this conversation took place and explain this statement  
28 that you apparently made to Commissioner Carrique. The elephant

1 in the room is -- can you read that to us?

2 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, it's not my writing,  
3 so I ---

4 **MR. FRANK AU:** Oh, okay. So ---

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** If my scribe wrote that  
6 down ---

7 **MR. FRANK AU:** --- we're on equal grounds here.  
8 The elephant in the room ---

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** In the room is everything  
10 we have been ---

11 **MR. FRANK AU:** We have done.

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- they have done so far  
13 have been blocked by the OPS Chief.

14 **MR. FRANK AU:** So these are notes that attribute  
15 things that -- to you things that you apparently said. Have you  
16 -- did you say this?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Conversations, yes, that,  
18 you know, we were in an intense planning meeting that morning  
19 because we got our approval the day before, like, we're good to  
20 go. We were in a significant meeting when I got called. My  
21 phone started ringing and I did not answer it after multiple  
22 times, and finally I got the nod that, you know, the  
23 Commissioner needs to speak with you ASAP, can you -- so I x-ed  
24 the meeting and I left my scribe at the meeting. And I went and  
25 had a separate meeting with the Commissioner and the two  
26 deputies, and it's in different notes. So my scribe wasn't with  
27 me. I took another notebook, and I took my own notes. So  
28 there's other notes ---

1           **MR. FRANK AU:** Right.

2           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- that overlap the exact  
3 same time here.

4           **MR. FRANK AU:** So in that context, you asked for  
5 his intervention.

6           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And I recall -- like,  
7 because I knew that they had a relationship certainly much more  
8 significant than mine. I had only -- I met Chief Sloly at a  
9 swearing in for the -- for his job and at a conference once, I  
10 believe. But I really didn't know him like the Commissioner  
11 did. And I just thought if you have any influence that you can  
12 talk with him so we can move things along, please do so. And  
13 again, it's based -- in fairness to Chief Sloly, it is now based  
14 on how things have gone and what I'm being told that it's -- you  
15 know, we're waiting for the Chief on this. We're waiting for  
16 the Chief on that. We have to wait for the Chief on this. So  
17 I'm just asking, you know, if there's something we can do to  
18 intervene, please, let's do it, so we can move this thing along.  
19 Everybody on the team had a goal, to get out of Ottawa as  
20 quickly as we could but doing so safely and efficiently with a  
21 plan that would end these protests.

22           **MR. FRANK AU:** Right. So that was the morning of  
23 the 15<sup>th</sup>. As we know, later that day, the former Chief resigned.  
24 And in your interview with us, you said that the implementation  
25 of the February 13<sup>th</sup> plan moved more quickly after Chief Sloly's  
26 resignation. What did you mean by that? Moving more slowly --  
27 moving more quickly?

28           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was just that. You

1 know, he resigned and it was like, "Let's go." Everybody for  
2 OPS were ready to go. And we just fully implemented everything  
3 that was in the plan.

4 **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay.

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And there were still  
6 barriers. I mean, we still had our issues. I don't want to  
7 think that -- I don't want anybody to think that it was just  
8 Chief Sloly.

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** Yeah.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We had issues right  
11 throughout the plan in Ottawa that we wrestled to the ground.  
12 But, you know, once that happened, for example, the meeting that  
13 I was called to go to with the Board also got cancelled. So  
14 that freed up my time to put focus where it needed to be.

15 **MR. FRANK AU:** Now, in my remaining time, I hope  
16 I have another -- I believe I have another 15 minutes. Yeah, so  
17 in my remaining time, I want to ask -- focus your ---

18 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** You have a little over 17  
19 minutes.

20 **MR. FRANK AU:** Oh, that's very good news indeed.

21 So now the -- we've been speaking about the  
22 February 13<sup>th</sup> plan, and that was the one that you and Lue, and  
23 Bernier approved. And then as I understand it, the integrated  
24 planning group continued to work with the OPS to develop that  
25 plan until it was finalized on or around the 17<sup>th</sup>. Is that  
26 right?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

28 **MR. FRANK AU:** And between those dates, the 13<sup>th</sup>

1 and the 17<sup>th</sup>, something happened on the 14<sup>th</sup>, which was the  
2 invocation of the *Emergencies Act*.

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

4 **MR. FRANK AU:** So I want to ask you now about,  
5 like, can you confirm whether the final plan of February 17<sup>th</sup>  
6 contemplated the use of any powers or any measures made  
7 available under the *Emergencies Act*?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, it did.

9 **MR. FRANK AU:** Sorry?

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It did. It did  
11 incorporate.

12 **MR. FRANK AU:** And tell me about that?

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, like every plan, one  
14 of the things that every operational plan considers is your  
15 people. Our people are the absolute most valuable asset that we  
16 have in any operational plan. It's important that we have  
17 information and inform them of everything.

18 So we ensured that our officers were aware of the  
19 piece of legislation that Parliament had given us, and to use it  
20 to the best of our ability.

21 **MR. FRANK AU:** Now, during your interview with us  
22 in the summer, and I guess in September as well, you said the  
23 group had a lot of debate about the authorities that the Act  
24 provided and so on. But did the police in Ottawa end up needing  
25 the *Emergencies Act* to tow vehicles?

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No.

27 **MR. FRANK AU:** Explain to us why not.

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, you know, if we

1 didn't have the *Emergencies Act*, that would imply that we  
2 couldn't tow vehicles. We tow vehicles every day, but for  
3 different things. We have laws under the *Highway Traffic Act*,  
4 we have common-law authorities that we use on a regular basis.

5           So we -- you know, if a vehicle is used in the  
6 commission of an offence, it's evidence, or whatever the case  
7 may be, we have various authorities to seize and/or remove or  
8 tow that vehicle. So we did not need the *Emergencies Act*.

9           We had legislation under the province that  
10 assisted us when it comes to towing or removing permits and  
11 CVORs and impounding vehicles.

12           But again, we did not explicitly need those  
13 authorities to tow a vehicle.

14           **MR. FRANK AU:** M'hm. And you also said that the  
15 police would have managed to put an end to the protest without  
16 the *Emergencies Act*. They would have done so within the  
17 timeline that the cell was contemplating before the Federal  
18 Government declared an emergency. Could you elaborate on that,  
19 please?

20           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well I think it just says  
21 what it says. Our operational plan, when we put it in place, we  
22 did not have those authorities. It did not suddenly turn us on  
23 our wheels that we had to change a lot. We just added it.  
24 There's a plan. It helped. I'm not going to say that it was  
25 not useful. It certainly -- it provided us with some  
26 authorities relating to tow, relating to perimeters, relating to  
27 preventing people from going into the red zone, et cetera. But  
28 we could have done that anyway.

1                   **MR. FRANK AU:** So in your view, was the  
2 *Emergencies Act* necessary to end the protest in Ottawa?

3                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's a loaded question.  
4 I'm a police officer. Parliament gives us legislation. We  
5 don't make legislation. They provide it to us and we use it to  
6 the best of our abilities. They gave us a piece of legislation  
7 to use. We were thankful for it and we used it to the best of  
8 our abilities to incorporate into our plan.

9                   **MR. FRANK AU:** And in your view, was there a  
10 police solution to the demonstrations?

11                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** A police solution?

12                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Policing ---

13                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

14                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Policing solution?

15                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** There was a solution and  
16 we reached that solution. We had some help with EMCPA, the  
17 *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act*, regulations that  
18 we have with the Province, and the *Emergencies Act*, but in my  
19 humble opinion, we would have reached the same solution with the  
20 plan that we had without either of those pieces of legislation.

21                   **MR. FRANK AU:** In -- within around the same  
22 timeline that ---

23                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

24                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Okay. Is there anything else that  
25 you want to tell the Commissioner that I haven't yet asked you?

26                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I don't think so, sir.

27                   **MR. FRANK AU:** Thank you very much.

28                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Thank you.

1 So counsel for former Chief Sloly, please.

2 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TOM CURRY:**

3 **MR. TOM CURRY:** I'm Tom Curry. Nice to meet you.

4 Chief Pardy, the events that you became involved  
5 in in the first week of February, I think the 8<sup>th</sup>?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

7 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Unprecedented, in your  
8 experience?

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely one of a kind,  
10 sir.

11 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And unforeseen by anyone in your  
12 command in the northeast region at the time that the convoy  
13 protestors who came through the northeast travelled through  
14 there? Is that fair?

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No. I would say that in  
16 my role, my operations superintendent, who prepared an Ops plan,  
17 which was largely traffic based, but in partnership with the  
18 municipal police services that the convoy went through, the  
19 Hendon Reports, what we were hearing, we kind of felt that  
20 Ottawa was kind of in for it.

21 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right. And in your command at  
22 that time, did the OPP have an opportunity for you to share your  
23 conclusions or what was going on in the northeast as the convoy  
24 came along?

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well all of that was  
26 reported up. There was a major incident commander overseeing it  
27 as it went through the northwest region into my region. PLT was  
28 engaged heavily with the protestors. They were travelling in

1 vehicles. You know, for example, they split at Highway 11 and  
2 17. The weather in the north was terrible. The heavy trucks  
3 came down the 17. The smaller vehicles, we felt was safer, the  
4 weather was less severe because of the lake effect of the  
5 Superior, they went via Highway 11. So the convoy split there.

6 Everything -- I mean, I was not deeply involved.  
7 In fact, I was in Sioux Ste. Marie, Ontario, I arrived there  
8 7:30/8:00 p.m. at night for business the next day, because at  
9 that stage, I had a team that looked after them and I trusted  
10 that they had a plan, the Ops plan that the Ops superintendent  
11 has signed off on, intel-led, good to go, "Just keep me informed  
12 if there's any difficulties." I was doing my regular business.

13 I remember it distinctly, because it took me 15  
14 to 20 minutes to turn into my hotel because the convoy was  
15 coming through with a steady stream of tractor trailers, so I  
16 couldn't get a turn.

17 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And so the -- if I follow that,  
18 you were in the Sioux, your team is running the convoy,  
19 observing the convoy, presumably you had squad cars, marked  
20 vehicles, unmarked vehicles ---

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

22 **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- in the presence of the convoy  
23 as they came into and exited your region?

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

25 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And passed along whatever  
26 intelligence could be gathered about the scale of the protest  
27 and those PLT interactions?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We did, but it didn't work

1 that way, sir. I mean, this is a major event for the OPP. So  
2 there's an incident commander in Orillia. Everything is being  
3 fed up through logs with PLT. We're seeing it, but we're not  
4 having to really report it because Orillia is actually getting  
5 it.

6 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. So does Orillia --  
7 well, two things -- thank you for that.

8 Two things. Northeast Region would never have,  
9 on that basis, been in contact with anybody at OPS at that  
10 stage.

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, sir.

12 **MR. TOM CURRY:** What Northeast Region does, is  
13 feeds that intelligence into Orillia, a Central Command. Is  
14 that true?

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And then would it be -- in your  
17 experience, would it be expected that if there was something to  
18 be gained from that intelligence, that should be shared with a  
19 partner police service, here Ottawa ---

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

21 **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- that it would be passed along  
22 to say "Something troublesome your way is coming".

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, but I mean, I didn't  
24 learn something troublesome is coming based on them coming  
25 through my region. I learned that from the briefings that we  
26 had.

27 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Got it.

28 And is the -- are the briefings that you had,

1 would we understand the same information that you had if we read  
2 the Hendon reports?

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Generally, yes.

4 I mean, in the case where we participate in the  
5 calls just to get, and large it was my Ops Superintendents that  
6 would be engaged in those meetings and briefing me. You know,  
7 we widely -- it was widely felt that, you know, they're going to  
8 Ottawa for the long haul. They're going -- just because of what  
9 they were looking to accomplish, we knew nobody was going to  
10 give in to those sorts of demands like ending the -- ending the  
11 demand -- health mandates for the country and shutting down  
12 government or having people from government removed. That was  
13 just not going to be accomplished.

14 **MR. TOM CURRY:** It made the -- in your view, the  
15 PLT effort to engage protestors with that agenda -- well, first  
16 of all, it was unsuccessful, wasn't it?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** In what way, sir?

18 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Well, the PLT didn't negotiate  
19 the departure of protestors until the moments before the public  
20 order plan, your plan ---

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct, sir.

22 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Got it.

23 And the -- at the time that they came through the  
24 Northeast Region, your team would have been in touch,  
25 presumably, with the next region over, which I guess is this  
26 region, the East Region.

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** East Region, yes.

28 I mean, in -- again, we're one organization, so

1 it's not like we're separate organizations here. It's pretty  
2 seamless. The PLT, there will be handoffs. These are people  
3 that work together, intel, all -- again, these are people that  
4 work together.

5 So my point is, my region wouldn't continue on to  
6 here. There'd just be a handoff kind of to the next team and my  
7 team go back to their regular business.

8 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood.

9 And you, yourself, personally, had no contact  
10 with anyone in the Ottawa Police Service until the moment that  
11 you got a call from your Deputy Commissioner.

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That is correct, sir.

13 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Now, OPS for a minute,  
14 it's obvious, isn't it, that they would not have had, on their  
15 own, with their own resources, a policing solution. They needed  
16 help.

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's fair.

18 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And they have -- you've told us  
19 that you've been part of providing help to the OPS over the  
20 years, as has the RCMP.

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

22 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And as have other municipal  
23 police services.

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

25 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And you've worked with that  
26 group, you told us, on other occasions. And that would be the  
27 universe of resource -- pools of resources. Would that be  
28 right?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's fair, yes.

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Assuming that we're not going to  
3 go another step into military -- aid to civil power through the  
4 military, just sticking with police services, it's OPP, RCMP,  
5 municipal police services and I suppose I should add the  
6 Parliamentary Protective Service.

7                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

8                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And the resources that they  
9 needed were the subject of estimates provided by the OPS through  
10 communications from Chief Sloyly to Commissioner Carrique and to  
11 Commissioner Lucki, among others.

12                   Did you ever see the spreadsheet of the resource  
13 requests that had been made to Commissioner Carrique, for  
14 example?

15                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I don't think I saw it  
16 before my arrival there. I know we discussed it because I know  
17 -- I distinctly recall being broken down right -- even down to  
18 civilian members and analysts and e-crime analysts and a whole  
19 myriad of resources. So I do recall seeing the list. We may  
20 have discussed it on that February 9th meeting. There was a lot  
21 of things in a short period of time.

22                   But yes, I was aware.

23                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And the objective when a police -  
24 - and I appreciate it's unprecedented, so you have not seen  
25 previously a municipal police force that has been overwhelmed by  
26 protestors as this one was.

27                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No. That's fair.

28                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** And so the main -- the main

1 objective from the perspective now of an Ottawa Police Service  
2 would be to get the help it needs to restore order in the  
3 community.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

5 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And I think you learned probably  
6 from your briefings and you observed firsthand that the  
7 situation was quite grave here in Ottawa during the time of the  
8 -- of that protest.

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It's a fair statement.

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** There -- obviously, residents  
11 were in distress and the city was quite -- in its core, quite  
12 paralyzed.

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was. I mean, I have  
14 friends in the downtown core that live in the downtown core and  
15 reported to me the devastating impact that it had on their  
16 ability to just sit and think in their own living room.

17 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right. And as to the police  
18 service, when we speak about a service that is overwhelmed, the  
19 best they could do with their own resources was -- I think I saw  
20 in one of your notes was that they could maintain control of the  
21 perimeter.

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

23 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And they were not possessed of  
24 the -- of sufficient resources to mobilize any kind of  
25 operation.

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

27 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Now, when the circumstances are  
28 those circumstances, would you agree with me that the top

1 priority for that police service is to get help?

2 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

3 MR. TOM CURRY: And to try to reach out to  
4 policing partners, OPP, RCMP, the ones that we talked about;  
5 yes?

6 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

7 MR. TOM CURRY: And that -- and to define -- try  
8 the best you can to define the resources that you need.

9 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

10 MR. TOM CURRY: And you are in the --  
11 understandably, from the perspective of the Ottawa Police  
12 Service, they need to know what resources are available from  
13 other municipal services, OPP or RCMP; correct?

14 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

15 MR. TOM CURRY: Now, the resource demand at --  
16 here in Ottawa was matched by demands in other communities we  
17 know, including Windsor.

18 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: That's correct, sir.

19 MR. TOM CURRY: And I don't know -- it probably  
20 doesn't matter, but the Windsor blockade of the Ambassador  
21 Bridge took -- arose following the convoy protest here in  
22 Ottawa.

23 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: It did.

24 MR. TOM CURRY: Was the -- to your knowledge, was  
25 the OPP able to prevent that blockade? Did it try to prevent  
26 that blockade?

27 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: I mean, I was briefed,  
28 obviously, that -- because it could impact our requests here in

1 Ottawa. I can't speak to the specifics of what was attempted  
2 prior to, sorry.

3 **MR. TOM CURRY:** No, that's fine.

4 But it -- but once the blockade in Windsor was  
5 established, OPP resources were required there.

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** As well, yes.

7 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And at an overlapping period here  
8 with respect to Ottawa.

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay. Now, a couple of things,  
11 if I can.

12 The -- just as to resources and operations, you  
13 told us about a plan that was reviewed -- it didn't go ahead,  
14 but a plan that was reviewed here in Ottawa by the OPS to go  
15 block by block through the protest and you favoured a one-time,  
16 one operation start to finish; right?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

18 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Am I right that the -- that as it  
19 was defined at the time it was defined that the OPS team had  
20 devised a block-by-block strategy because that reflected the  
21 resources that they had at that time? Does that make sense?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, because that's  
23 exactly how it was portrayed in that February 9th. You take it  
24 chunk by chunk, understanding it would be resource intensive,  
25 but one kind of -- one section at a time. That's fair.

26 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And resource demands -- resource  
27 requests, I think you told us that you took action when you --  
28 against -- you made a resource request against what you said, I

1 think, was a concept of plan or a concept of strategy.

2 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Concept of operations.

3 MR. TOM CURRY: Concept of operations.

4 That's a little less than a plan. Is that fair?

5 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: That's -- you know, you  
6 know all components of what you're bringing into your plan and  
7 you've got your SMEs now off building those components, but now  
8 we know where we're going with that concept, with that skeleton.  
9 Our concept was much more detailed than the one that they  
10 provided us ---

11 MR. TOM CURRY: Right.

12 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: --- because it did break  
13 it down in terms of the teams that we're going to need to fulfil  
14 each concept.

15 MR. TOM CURRY: Understood. They had a concept  
16 of plan.

17 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

18 MR. TOM CURRY: You had a more detailed one.

19 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Correct.

20 MR. TOM CURRY: They had a plan; the Integrated  
21 Team brought a more detailed one.

22 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Correct.

23 MR. TOM CURRY: Now, a couple of quick things, if  
24 I can, then, just about -- in terms of the plan for a second.

25 Could I please show you a document? It's, Madam  
26 Registrar, OPS three zeros 10470, please?

27 I think you've seen this, Chief Pardy. This is  
28 -- I don't know if I've got it. Could you scroll down, please,

1 there it is.

2 So you were copied on this. So you see the first  
3 email, it's from ---

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Phil Lue?

5 **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- Phil Lue. And I'm afraid I  
6 don't know his rank.

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Superintendent.

8 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Supt. Lue. Thank you.

9 He writes to you and mainly to Deputy Chief  
10 (Acting) Ferguson, and do you see this? He says:

11 "...find attached a PowerPoint deck  
12 that outlines the plan we have been  
13 working on. Obviously this plan  
14 originated with your plan, which we  
15 examined, bolstered and strengthened."

16 Fair?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Very fair, sir.

18 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And that was your approach?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** This email is just about  
20 proper context. In my evidence in-chief, I mentioned we reached  
21 out to Trish Ferguson on that evening, and we followed up with a  
22 deck. This was the email attaching the slide deck to help her  
23 explain the plan to the Chief.

24 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Got it. Thank you.

25 And I just want to show you one other document,  
26 just to see if...

27 Please could I, Madam Registrar, switch out to  
28 OPS -- I think this one has four zeros, 9639.

1           Yeah. So this is 10<sup>th</sup> of February to the long  
2 list there. Mostly it's -- this is your own service, and it  
3 looks like other services, other municipal services. Do you see  
4 that?

5           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

6           **MR. TOM CURRY:** And the re line -- if we could  
7 just scroll down, please:

8 "As a follow up to our earlier...call, many police agencies have  
9 expressed an ability to support Ottawa Police Service...with  
10 front line boots on the ground. Our Integrated Planning Cell  
11 composed of...are mobilizing resources in support....Could I  
12 please ask that any agency which has officers you can deploy to  
13 support the Plan to please respond to [that OPP email address]  
14 with the number of officers you have available, when...available  
15 and for how long."

16           You sent that?

17           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir, I did. And this  
18 email was what we call the big 12.

19           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

20           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The big 12 police agencies  
21 in Ontario, with a couple of additional ones that had stepped  
22 up, small agencies that actually stepped up and were routinely  
23 supplying OPS with resources.

24           **MR. TOM CURRY:** And you were able to send out  
25 that call for help for resource assistance on the end of that  
26 call for help, for resource assistance on the 10<sup>th</sup> of February,  
27 prior to the finalization of your plan after you had your  
28 concept ---

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely.

2                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay.

3                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You know, from a planning  
4 perspective when you start thinking about your concept of  
5 operations and where you're needing to take it, you need to be  
6 thinking about how you're going to be resource that plan, and we  
7 knew that no one organization in the province had the capacity  
8 to resource that plan. So it's like you're kind of putting the  
9 bug in everybody's ear as early as possible that, "We're coming,  
10 we need."

11                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Indeed. And that -- when you  
12 looked back at what -- or looked at what you were dealing with  
13 when you got to Ottawa, am I right that that's the kind of thing  
14 Chief Sloly had been trying to do up until that time?

15                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It's fair. I mean, I  
16 hadn't watched closely. I know I saw some of the media and  
17 repeated -- asked for a resource, absolutely I saw that.

18                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Thank you.

19                   Could I show the witness, please, OPP, I think  
20 four zeros 1389?

21                   Just get your help, if I could, Chief Pardy, with  
22 a couple of other things.

23                   This is a situation report. Maybe -- can I see  
24 page 8? I'm not certain; I might have the wrong number. If  
25 that's the case, I'll take this down. But could I see page 8,  
26 please?

27                   **THE REGISTRAR:** Counsel, there are only five  
28 pages in this.

1           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Okay, I've got the wrong one.  
2 All right. I'm going to back to it, unless I'm whisked off the  
3 stage.

4           Can I speak for a minute about what you told us  
5 about Chief Sloly? No doubt is there, Chief Pardy, that Chief  
6 Sloly had the hardest job in the country during the time he was  
7 the Chief during this time?

8           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I would agree, sir.

9           **MR. TOM CURRY:** The city was under siege and the  
10 Service was under siege.

11          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

12          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Did you know anything at all when  
13 you got there about the circumstances of Chief Sloly's tenure as  
14 the Chief of Police?

15          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, sir.

16          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Thank you. And any difficulties  
17 that he faced here in Ottawa, either with issues that arose  
18 because of his race or issues that arose because of his  
19 inability to lead the change that he had been asked to lead?

20          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, sir, I was not aware.

21          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Clearly he had, at the time that  
22 you observed it, a very difficult relationship with his command  
23 team.

24          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's fair.

25          **MR. TOM CURRY:** And others ---

26          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

27          **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- below the senior command. He  
28 -- you agree that you observed during the time that you were

1 here, or maybe even before you got here, there were political  
2 issues that were raised about Ottawa Police Services handling of  
3 this crisis.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

5 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Both at the Ministry of the  
6 Solicitor-General, with some controversies about what resources  
7 were here or not, right?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

9 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And at the level of the federal  
10 government, with political leaders making statements about what  
11 was going on in their city.

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

13 **MR. TOM CURRY:** All of which added to the  
14 complexity and challenge here for him?

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely.

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Did you also -- I take it towards  
17 the end of your time here you became aware that the Police  
18 Services Board and the Municipal Council had expectations of  
19 Chief Sloly and the Service; that they would tell them that  
20 there was a plan and indeed be briefed upon it.

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

22 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And that's how you were -- you  
23 were asked to go, and you checked in with your Commissioner to  
24 see if you should?

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, I actually just flat-  
26 out denied and said, "I'm not going," and then I was asked in a  
27 follow-up with the Commissioner in light of the Borden Report  
28 from G20, ---

1           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right.

2           **MR. TOM CURRY:** --- you know, the Board has  
3 certain roles and responsibilities, and he felt it would be  
4 appropriate for me to make a presentation to the Board in light  
5 of those key responsibilities the Board has, which I understood.  
6 And that -- but, again, that can only be done with Chief Sloly's  
7 approval.

8           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. And it's unusual, in  
9 your experience, to brief political actors on operations plans.

10          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** To the detail that we were  
11 seeing, absolutely. Very unusual.

12          **MR. TOM CURRY:** And so a couple of other quick  
13 things, if I can?

14                   Were you aware that a member of Chief Sloly's  
15 service, the OPS, contacted Supt. Morris about his attendance at  
16 the briefing?

17          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, sir.

18          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Without telling Chief Sloly that  
19 he was going to do that; you didn't know anything about that?

20          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, sir.

21          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Were you aware as to how the  
22 senior command had divided its responsibilities here for this  
23 event, and particularly did you know that Chief -- Deputy Chief,  
24 rather, Ferguson was responsible for the plan?

25                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, I knew -- I mean, she  
26 was the person that I dealt with pretty much exclusively after I  
27 arrived in Ottawa, in terms of any -- if I had contentious  
28 issues or things to deal with, or questions about getting the

1 plan approval, it was Deputy Chief Ferguson.

2 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And that Deputy Chief Bell was  
3 responsible for the intelligence lead.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I don't know if I was  
5 aware. I certainly learned that he was but certainly not aware.  
6 I mean, I had met Chief -- Deputy Chief Bell at that initial  
7 meeting, and until he became Interim Chief, I don't think I had  
8 two words with him.

9 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Thank you.

10 I think I've now -- with help from my colleague,  
11 Commissioner, I've got the number I was trying to show the  
12 witness.

13 I think it's three zeros, Madam Registrar, 1839,  
14 please.

15 Bear with me, Chief Pardy. If this is not it, I  
16 -- I'll -- okay, here we go.

17 February 10<sup>th</sup>. Just to orient you, this is a --  
18 these are minutes of an Integrated Planning Cell meeting. You  
19 talked about it, I think, earlier. Just the attendees, am I  
20 correct -- just stopping there -- all of the attendees are from  
21 OPP, RCMP or other non-OPS police services?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

23 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And it was -- just scroll down,  
24 if we could, to page 2. And a little bit further if we could.  
25 Okay. Stop there for a second.

26 One of the things you were asked by my friend,  
27 Mr. Au, is whether thought had been given to taking over the  
28 meeting this -- and taking over the -- from the police of

1 jurisdiction?

2 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** M'hm.

3 **MR. TOM CURRY:** And I think you indicated that,  
4 no, that was not the plan?

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well I think for that to  
6 happen, there had to be a request from the Chief, and the Chief  
7 made it very clear that that wasn't going to happen.

8 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. There was some  
9 suggestion within the group on the 10<sup>th</sup>. You'll see from the  
10 RCMP to support the -- just up -- you'll read -- just stop  
11 there. Thank you. Slowly go back.

12 There was suggestion from the RCMP that maybe you  
13 should take over. And you'll see it says, and I've forgotten  
14 his rank, Tetreault is ---

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** So are you at the bottom  
16 here?

17 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Yeah.

18 "OPS saves face on this - the OPS, in its  
19 own words, is on its knees. We remove OPS  
20 from this slowly, over the course of 4  
21 [to] 6 or 8 shift cycles. They're  
22 exhausted. They go back to work and  
23 police the rest of the City.

24 We're going to build a police detachment -  
25 incident policed by another police service  
26 within your city. Same as a terrorist  
27 plane crash..."

28 And so on. Just then scroll down.

1                   You said:

2                               "[The] OPS is listening to their tactical  
3                               advisors [...]. This is brainstorm."

4                   RCMP, I'll use instead of the word Tetreault,  
5 but:

6                               "...presents a viable plan. Is that the  
7                               only plan? No. Is it an option that  
8                               should be given consideration?

9                               Absolutely."

10                   I won't go through the rest of it, but at this  
11 meeting, consideration was given to thinking about replacing  
12 OPS?

13                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** So I think context is very  
14 important.

15                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Sure.

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And the context is here,  
17 starts with "They're on their knees." We witnessed officers  
18 burn out, just getting up and walking out of meetings saying,  
19 "I'm done. I can't take this anymore." They were burning out  
20 daily. We saw their senior executive, Chief Sloly. The stress  
21 was very evident on all of them. That perhaps if they focused  
22 their efforts on policing the city, we'll build a plan for the  
23 event. Still going to be involved, but just remove them from  
24 the equation to allow them to build some strength, because quite  
25 frankly, they were -- we saw the burnout. We saw the stress.  
26 We saw the anxiety throughout the whole event.

27                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** One of the -- is it fair to say  
28 that one of the things that may have eroded trust between the

1 Integrated Cell Team and Chief Sloly, and maybe others, was the  
2 idea that maybe there was a plan to replace OPS?

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** There was never sure plans  
4 to replace OPS. And we never thought -- we had lots of  
5 brainstorming sessions. You know, we'd start every meeting by  
6 saying, "Listen, we need everything on the table. If you have  
7 an idea, let's consider it." We -- there was nothing offered.

8 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Thank you. Page 8 of this  
9 document, please. This is just -- just shifting gears for one  
10 second.

11 Chief Pardy, help us, if you could, with the  
12 issue of Windsor. There's some references here to the demands  
13 on -- just scroll down I think, please. There we go.

14 "RCMP POU will get to Windsor tomorrow.  
15 OPP has to pivot - if Windsor is a  
16 priority, they have to pivot."

17 Translation -- or the point being made that  
18 Windsor is going to take resources away from, of course, from  
19 Ottawa?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well I think, again,  
21 context is everything. The support that I and my team receive  
22 never changed in terms of we'll get what we need.

23 But going back to my very first meeting with  
24 Ottawa Police, we were very clear that we're looking at this not  
25 just at the local level, but at the provincial and the national  
26 level. And we have to keep our eyes on all that. What's  
27 happening in Coutts could have an impact here. What's happening  
28 in Manitoba could have an impact here. So we, as a team, wanted

1 to be alive to this.

2                   The word "pivot" became very instrumental  
3 throughout the deployment. It was used a lot. We had to pivot  
4 daily on things because a plan needs to be able to pivot and  
5 adjust the impacts to it.

6                   So when Windsor happened, we knew that, okay,  
7 we're not going to get all that is available, because Windsor is  
8 going to need some. And Windsor, it became not the priority, it  
9 became a priority, ---

10                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood.

11                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- in my view. Ottawa  
12 never changed, in my -- I did not say, "Okay, I'm going to put  
13 my folks on Windsor. Thank you very much for letting me know  
14 about Windsor. Now let's get back to what our problem is here."  
15 Our focus still remained solely Ottawa.

16                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. Scroll down a little  
17 bit. Last bullet point on this, words attributed to you.  
18 There's -- last point:

19                                   "RCMP advises 60 hotel rooms [are]  
20                                   available in Vanier..."

21                   And that's on account of the fact that 60 POU  
22 members had to go to Windsor -- you had the rooms, but you  
23 didn't have the personnel because, of course, for the reasons  
24 you've given, Windsor required them?

25                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

26                   **MR. TOM CURRY:** One thing I forgot to ask you  
27 when I talked for a moment about Chief Sloly and his  
28 circumstances, I think you told us that he was unable to attend

1 one of the meetings, he had a different commitment. Am I right  
2 that that commitment was a risk threat assessment against him  
3 personally?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** So him and his family. I  
5 understood it to be not just him, his family as well. I mean,  
6 uncalled for, but there was threats against him.

7 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Right. And that was a death  
8 threat?

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

10 **MR. TOM CURRY:** There were other death threats  
11 that came to your attention?

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

13 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Municipal politicians,  
14 presumably?

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

16 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Many others. Then could I just  
17 ask then, finally, PLT. PLT, in your experience with PLT, they  
18 have had success and they have been unable, sometimes, to bring  
19 protests to an end on their own without further police action?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we have seen PLT  
21 used in a myriad of situations over the years. I'm a big of  
22 them nonetheless. I think it's obvious. We've seen them have  
23 complete success. But it depends. We use PLT in the OPP in our  
24 daily operations now. In my region, for example, I have a PLT  
25 officer in every one of my detachments, plus I had a full-time  
26 component in addition to a designated PLT in every one of my  
27 detachments.

28 They handle contentious issues, right down to a

1 protest as neighbours, between two people, and resolve lots.

2           You know, resolution, if you're saying complete  
3 resolution, there's a massive process and PLT alone was able to  
4 resolve it? That's a fair statement that it doesn't happen  
5 often. But they are an instrumental part of the solution to get  
6 a protest to a workable size that allows us to effectively  
7 dismantle it.

8           **MR. TOM CURRY:** Understood. Thank you.

9           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Thank you.

10          **MR. TOM CURRY:** Thank you, Commissioner.

11          **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you. This may be a  
12 good time for an afternoon break. I think it's -- since we're  
13 going to go for certainly an hour or better. so I'll take a 15-  
14 minute break and we'll come back, if that's okay.

15          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Sure.

16          **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

17          **THE REGISTRAR:** the Commission is in recess for  
18 15 minutes. La Commission est levée pour 15 minutes.

19 --- Upon recessing at 3:27 p.m.

20 --- Upon resuming at 3:42 p.m.

21 --- CHIEF SUPT. CARSON PARDY, Resumed:

22          **THE REGISTRAR:** The Commission is reconvened. La  
23 Commission reprend.

24          **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. We're back. Are  
25 you prepared to proceed? Okay.

26           Next I'd like to call on the Ottawa Police  
27 Service.

28 --- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JESSICA BARROW:

1                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Good afternoon.

2                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Good afternoon.

3                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** My name is Jessica Barrow  
4 and I'm representing the Ottawa Police Service.

5                   We heard earlier in your evidence that the reason  
6 the integrated planning cell was created was to assist OPS; is  
7 that correct?

8                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That is correct.

9                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And you listed a few reasons  
10 that that was the case, but one of the ones that you listed was  
11 to restore the public's confidence in the police; is that fair?

12                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

13                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And would you agree with me  
14 that the loss of public confidence in OPS was related, at least  
15 in part, to the public's perception of inaction by OPS?

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

17                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And that perhaps residents  
18 felt like the unlawful behaviour of protestors was going  
19 unchecked by OPS?

20                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

21                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** In response to that,  
22 however, you are not a proponent of leading with enforcement; is  
23 that fair?

24                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, it's not fair.

25                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** It's not fair. Okay.

26                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I'm a proponent to leading  
27 a measured approach and if enforcement is a part of that, then  
28 absolutely. However, I think you're attributing that maybe to

1 my comment that you're not going to arrest your way out of this.  
2 I could find a hundred police leaders that would say the exact  
3 same.

4 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right. So, I guess my point  
5 was that it's not the place you start; is that fair?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It can be a part of.  
7 Strategic arrests are always a critical part of a lot of these  
8 types of operational plans, but we -- that alone is not going to  
9 solve this problem.

10 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right. And your goal, I  
11 think you explained this earlier, the goal is to try to  
12 negotiate your way out prior to engaging enforcement, unless  
13 necessary?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Negotiation is a part of  
15 the plan. If you looked at our plan in detail, there's a time  
16 when negotiations are no -- and it calls for the next. There's  
17 always graduated steps of enforcement.

18 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right.

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Running parallel to, not  
20 after, parallel to the negotiations and what method are going  
21 on.

22 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Fair enough. But because  
23 you are a proponent of that integrated model of negotiation and,  
24 perhaps, enforcement where necessary, you are a huge proponent,  
25 and I think you've mentioned this earlier, of the value of PLT;  
26 is that fair?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. They have proven  
28 their value over and over in major events over the years, and I

1 would see no reason why we would not incorporate them in any  
2 type of operational plan of this nature.

3 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And you were of the view at  
4 the time of your arrival in Ottawa that OPS was not providing a  
5 supportive environment for PLT?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That is correct. I mean,  
7 I should point out, I have knowledge about, obviously, OPS  
8 background. They wrote the book on this stuff. They do it  
9 well. It just wasn't happening.

10 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Fair enough. And you --  
11 earlier in the Commission hearings, we've heard about the  
12 National Framework. I take it you're familiar with that?

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I am.

14 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And the National Framework  
15 favours the use of PLT wherever possible to negotiate, correct?

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely.

17 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And so, is it fair to say  
18 that the answer in response to the loss of public confidence  
19 wasn't necessarily to go in right away and start enforcing; is  
20 that fair?

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It could, again, be part  
22 of that measured response. It absolutely still could be part of  
23 a measured response where there's blatant offences occurring to  
24 deal with them. Absolutely. But there's no one solution to  
25 this. Go in and enforce you way out of it? Not going to  
26 happen. Negotiate down the size of the footprint? Absolutely a  
27 viable option, along with a measured approach on enforcement.

28 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Fair enough. So, you would

1 say that at the very least, any level of enforcement that was  
2 happening or ought to happen, needed to happen in tandem with  
3 PLT?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

5 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And for that reason,  
6 obviously, the operational plan that ultimately was agreed upon  
7 with Superintendent Bernier as the event commander did involve a  
8 strategic deployment of PLT as part of that, correct?

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

10 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And in fact, I believe you  
11 indicated in your witness statement that the integrated plan  
12 involved a vital PLT communication and negotiation plan; is that  
13 correct?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

15 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And that when you presented  
16 the cell's proposed plan to OPS, the key role of PLT was  
17 actually specifically stressed because the cell was concerned  
18 about the lack of buy in at OPS in relation to the role of PLT;  
19 is that fair?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It certainly wasn't being  
21 used. We were getting information that PLT were in a tent  
22 drinking coffee and not out engaging with protesters trying to  
23 have an understanding of their intentions. Whether or not there  
24 was any room to negotiate to maybe move or leave the area, they  
25 were sitting in a tent drinking coffee.

26 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** So, they weren't being  
27 deployed in a way that you felt was appropriate; is that fair?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think the standard would

1 be. I mean, you're putting this that I felt this? This is a  
2 program that was in the OPP that was borne out of the Ipperwash  
3 Inquiry, and they have proven their weight in gold over the  
4 years in terms of the connection that they can make with and  
5 trust that they can build with protestors or otherwise. You  
6 know, so you can reach some common ground on some issues.

7           If they can fix the issue or resolve the issue,  
8 that's a huge plus, but they have become a vital part. I  
9 mentioned in my cross with Mr. Sloly's counsel, we even use them  
10 now at neighbour disputes. Instead of taking the hard hand of  
11 law enforcement laying charges on both sides, maybe we can  
12 negotiate a settlement here so that people can live in a little  
13 bit of harmony. And it works. It brings about better community  
14 safety.

15           **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** So, I think part of what  
16 you're saying, but you can correct me if I'm wrong, obviously,  
17 is that in order for PLT to be effective, they had to have the  
18 autonomy to actually negotiate effectively; is that fair?

19           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** They have to have the  
20 autonomy, but at the same time, they had the commander's intent.  
21 They had to understand what that autonomy means, what they're  
22 being given.

23           **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right.

24           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And in this case early on,  
25 it is my view, based on everything that I heard, all the  
26 information that was provided to me, that they really did not  
27 have that direction nor autonomy.

28           **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Fair enough. And you were

1 of the view, obviously, again, correct me if I'm wrong, that the  
2 reason PLT wasn't engaged in the way that you're describing in  
3 terms of its effectiveness was because that Chief Sloly didn't  
4 believe in the PLT program?

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think it went beyond  
6 maybe Chief Sloly that others felt that it's time to get in  
7 their -- there's a lot of pressure on them to take action that  
8 is seen to be taken.

9 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Fair.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** PLT is action taken that  
11 nobody sees.

12 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right. So, in terms of ---

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We see it.

14 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** --- you're talking about the  
15 optics of it?

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The optics of it. And so,  
17 I don't think it was just Chief Sloly. I know that in my  
18 meetings and in conversations with him, there was -- he had  
19 mentioned, for example, that they didn't have this type of  
20 concept with the Toronto Police Service when he was there. So,  
21 he was not overly -- as overly familiar with it as we were. We  
22 were told that negotiations had simply failed.

23 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right. So, it perhaps is  
24 not that he didn't believe in it, it may be that he didn't  
25 understand its utility?

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Oh, he certainly still  
27 talked about it and understood where we were going with it.  
28 Absolutely. But you know, it was our belief, because they were

1 challenged by Superintendent Abrams in my meeting with him on  
2 the 9<sup>th</sup> of February about PLT, because we already had it directly  
3 from PLT that they don't have authorities. They don't have  
4 autonomy. They're not doing what they do, and we were told  
5 simply that, oh, they're used, but that's it.

6 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** I'm sorry, who were they  
7 told that by?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think that was  
9 Superintendent Patterson that said that at that meeting.

10 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And so, ultimately, when the  
11 integrated plan was agreed upon with Superintendent Bernier, and  
12 obviously with buy-in from others at OPS, there was an agreement  
13 that PLT played an important role in the dismantling of the  
14 convoy, is that fair?

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, that -- I want to be  
16 careful, but that makes it sound like we negotiated what goes  
17 into a plan.

18 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** No, no. Yes, fair.

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** What we're talking about  
20 what we built is what I would consider in our policing world  
21 right now, for major events and protests, standard practice ---

22 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right.

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- in terms of the  
24 engagement. So, there was agreement, because it's what we do,  
25 and it works. They do provide that layer of assistance to get  
26 us to where we need to be when we take kinetic action.

27 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Okay. I want to talk very  
28 briefly about the chain of command, and have you assist those of

1 us that don't work in policing to understand how the chain of  
2 command works. So, you would agree with me that police services  
3 are paramilitary organizations; is that correct?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I wish.

5 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** You wish you agreed with me?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, I wish they were.

7 There was a time when we absolutely did say that we were, but we  
8 -- I think police services have largely moved away from being  
9 able to characterize themselves. When I joined the job, we were  
10 paramilitary.

11 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Would you agree with me  
12 there is a chain of command ---

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But there is a chain of  
14 command.

15 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Yes. Okay. So, however you  
16 describe it.

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's the only similarity  
18 that ---

19 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Okay.

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- I probably would  
21 agree. There is a chain of command.

22 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** So, there is a chain of  
23 command that one expects to follow, correct ---

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

25 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** --- within a police service,  
26 so however that's described, there is a chain of command?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

28 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And that chain of command

1 requires that where an officer is directed or ordered by a  
2 senior officer to do something, they're required to follow the  
3 command?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

5 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And in fact, it is a  
6 misconduct offence under the *Police Services Act* not to follow a  
7 command ---

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** A lawful order.

9 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** A lawful order. Correct.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

11 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And in addition to that,  
12 would you agree with me that it would be considered  
13 unprofessional to directly question the directions of one's  
14 superior in front of partner agencies?

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's a relationship  
16 thing. I mentioned earlier about my team, I had constables,  
17 civilians, up to chief on my team, and they were given -- you  
18 know, "I need your voice. If you have an opinion, I need you to  
19 tell me I'm wrong." So it depends on the environment and the  
20 expectations of the leader.

21 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Fair enough.

22 I want to talk a little bit about the integrated  
23 command. So when the Integrated Planning Cell arrived in  
24 Ottawa, its first activities -- and we've heard about this  
25 already -- involved meetings with OPS to get a sense of where  
26 their plans stood; is that fair?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

28 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And the Integrated Planning

1 Cell brought with it a fairly significant amount of planning  
2 expertise?

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, it did.

4 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And you indicated with the  
5 exception of you, that these were experts in their field; is  
6 that correct?

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

8 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Okay. And the goal of the  
9 Integrated Planning Cell was to work with OPS to work towards a  
10 more robust overall plan?

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

12 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And we've heard throughout  
13 your testimony -- and I'll use the word criticism, but perhaps  
14 you had described otherwise -- but would it be fair to say that  
15 there's some level of criticism of the level of integration OPS  
16 was allowing with your team at this point in time, when you  
17 arrived?

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think criticism is  
19 probably fair. I ran interference a lot on that very topic to  
20 actually -- you know, as I mentioned, at one point in time,  
21 publicly, it was announced we have integrated. Behind the  
22 scenes, I'm telling my folks, "But we're not there yet." You  
23 know, integration means they're actually working with us; we're  
24 no longer in silos. We're actually talking about the direction  
25 that we're going in. And we had obstacles, but those obstacles  
26 were not just human.

27 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Fair enough.

28 And we do know, however, that Superintendent

1 Bernier was appointed as event commander on February 11th?

2 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

3 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And although perhaps not the  
4 integration level that you would have liked, there was an  
5 integrated command table after he came in, correct?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It started.

7 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** It started.

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The positive work started.

9 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Yes.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And that was borne out of  
11 -- you know, I think the Commissioner has heard reference to the  
12 NCRCC down in Orleans. Well, Ottawa Police Headquarters were at  
13 the NOC. We have command posts in various different places that  
14 add to the complexities of integration. Ideally, you want your  
15 key command positions to be integrated and also have access to  
16 one another.

17 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And ultimately that does  
18 happen, right? Superintendent Bernier moves his group over to  
19 the unit?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah. And as our team  
21 worked towards securing the right position -- right location at  
22 the RCMP Headquarters that could house the type of integrated  
23 team, we're talking well into 100 plus that were needed on  
24 operations day. For every component of the plan, we had to have  
25 a rep there.

26 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right. And that takes time,  
27 obviously, to assemble that number ---

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

1                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** --- of people?

2                   And one of the things that Superintendent Bernier  
3 did when he was appointed as Event Commander was appoint a  
4 Deputy Event Commander; is that right?

5                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

6                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And that Deputy Event  
7 Commander was Inspector Springer?

8                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

9                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And he's from the OPP?

10                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. I think he's retired  
11 now.

12                  **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Oh, a retired member of the  
13 OPP then perhaps?

14                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah, that's right.

15                  **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And part of that integrated  
16 team that was assembled and evolved, I guess is what you're  
17 saying, it was specialties from all different specialty units,  
18 as well as members from a variety of different agencies. Is  
19 that right?

20                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

21                  **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And you felt at this time, I  
22 think you indicated, that even with Superintendent Bernier and  
23 the integrated table in place at this time, that there was at  
24 least a perceived need for Chief Sloly to approve any kind of  
25 planning. Is that fair?

26                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was still that  
27 perception amongst everyone, right down to my bosses calling and  
28 asking me, "But has he approved it?" They understood that

1 Bernier approved it, but they asked if he had, and that was that  
2 follow-up call I had with Trish Ferguson, and I trusted her, and  
3 when she said, "You're good to go," we went.

4 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Right.

5 And, you know, we talked a little bit throughout  
6 this Commission here and with various witnesses about this  
7 Incident Command System. We know that there's multiple  
8 iterations of it, but would you agree with me that irrespective  
9 of which version we're talking about, that the Chief's  
10 requirement to sign off on an operational plan is inconsistent  
11 with that model; is that fair?

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Not only the job, but  
13 inconsistent with approval, yes.

14 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Correct.

15 You indicated that your team met with Deputy  
16 Chief Ferguson on the 11th to present the plan that your team  
17 had created; is that right?

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We did that over phone, I  
19 believe.

20 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Okay. So there was a  
21 meeting of some kind?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

23 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And am I correct in saying  
24 that the plan involved the creation of a unified command?

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

26 **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And you indicated, I think  
27 earlier in your testimony, that Deputy Chief Ferguson was very  
28 supportive of that plan?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Very supportive, yes.

2                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And you also indicated that  
3 Ferguson was your primary contact with the OPS at this time?

4                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

5                   **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And so would you agree with  
6 me that that support that she indicated on February 11th was  
7 generally consistent with the level of collaboration you saw  
8 from her during your interactions with her?

9                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

10                  **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** In fact, in your witness  
11 statement, you referred to Deputy Chief Ferguson as a voice of  
12 reason; is that right?

13                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's fair.

14                  **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Okay. And you also  
15 indicated in your testimony earlier that by this time, all of  
16 the rank and file of OPS was working well with your team; is  
17 that right?

18                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

19                  **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** And on the same day of Chief  
20 Sloly's resignation, you would agree with me that Interim Chief  
21 Bell agreed with RCMP and OPP to implement a unified command; is  
22 that correct?

23                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

24                  **MS. JESSICA BARROW:** Those are my questions.  
25 Thank you very much.

26                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Thank you.

27                  **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

28                  Next, we'll call upon the Government of Canada.

1 --- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:

2 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Good afternoon. I'll check  
3 my time.

4 You indicated in your ---

5 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Just ---

6 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Oh, introduce myself, I'm  
7 sorry. My name is Donnaree Nygard. I'm counsel for Canada.

8 You indicated in your evidence-in-chief that  
9 police services, including the OPP, tow vehicles all the time.  
10 You have the authority to do that. And I just want to make sure  
11 that I'm understanding what you're saying. You're talking about  
12 the authority to tow vehicles, that's something you have, and  
13 you didn't need the EA for that, but you don't -- or you didn't,  
14 absent the EA, have the ability to compel tow truck drivers to  
15 assist with that; is that correct?

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

17 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And that the use of two  
18 trucks, in particular heavy tow trucks, was instrumental to the  
19 plan to clear out the protest in Ottawa, correct?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Unequivocally.

21 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And the integrated  
22 operation was not actually able to obtain the services of such  
23 tow trucks without the use of the EA, the *Emergencies Act*, in  
24 this situation, correct?

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's not entirely  
26 correct, no. So very early on, in fact day one, we engaged with  
27 our OPP Traffic Services and Operation Support Command, Deputy  
28 DiMarco, her team that ran all of our traffic programs. We had

1 a gentleman by the name of Kirk Richardson -- I believe he's a  
2 sergeant with the OPP -- everything tow is expertise, and he had  
3 the relationships with the MTO. So they had been working  
4 tirelessly behind the scenes to build a plan, and I do know they  
5 had some 34 rigs lined up. There were, however, some I'm aware  
6 that were reluctant because of some liability issues, and the  
7 Act gave that support.

8 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Could I have Document  
9 ONT00000179, please?

10 Now, you mentioned Kirk Richardson, that he's ---

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

12 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** --- who was doing this, and  
13 he was doing the organization with the ---

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** He was working with --  
15 directly with MTO.

16 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** All right.

17 If we can just scroll down to the first email in  
18 the chain, just so we can see the beginning? So this is an  
19 email on February 16th from the MTO, and there's a number of  
20 recipients, including Mr. Richardson you can see there.

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** M'hm.

22 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And if you can see in the  
23 first bullet point there, it says there were 13 heavy tow trucks  
24 requested and support equipment, 11 tow trucks confirmed so far  
25 from three towing companies, and they were working on securing  
26 more. So that was the situation which -- I think if we scroll  
27 back up at 1:19 on February 16th, and then if we continue to  
28 scroll up to the next email in the chain, at the bottom of the

1 first page we'll see the time. Now we're at 5:00 in the evening  
2 that same day, and there's a follow-up email. And if we can  
3 just see there that it says in that first line:

4 "Good afternoon: Estimate below (per  
5 day) based on discussion with two  
6 towing companies. The third towing  
7 company has dropped out. We have total  
8 10 trucks at this time."

9 And then you'll see that he says:

10 "Need a letter from the OPP requesting  
11 these companies to provide services and  
12 stating that the Federal Act cover any  
13 damage to their equipment and indemnify  
14 them from damage or other claims  
15 resulting from vehicles towed upon  
16 police direction."

17 And then if we go up to the final email in the  
18 chain, you'll see that it says:

19 "Hi, Veronica. I've told them that the  
20 letter will come tomorrow. They will be  
21 moving tonight based on my and Steve's  
22 commitment, credibility."

23 So would you agree with me that at the end of the  
24 day, MOT was actually only able to obtain two towing companies  
25 and that those were only obtained if they were compelled under  
26 the Federal *Emergencies Act*?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Certainly reading this, I  
28 would say that was my understanding going through, that we --

1 when I say "tows", there's companies with multiple equipment.  
2 It was my understanding we had a significant number available,  
3 but there were holdouts that the *Emergencies Act* absolutely  
4 supported their engagement and -- to bring this to a successful  
5 action.

6 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** But you'll agree with me  
7 that as far as heavy tows are concerned, this email chain makes  
8 pretty clear that they were only able to obtain these two.

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. I'm fully alive to  
10 the fact that there was significant issue with tows. Our  
11 friends from Ottawa Police, in one of their preliminary plans,  
12 were going to use police officers because they could not get  
13 access to tows. They were going to use police officers that had  
14 the ability to drive those types of vehicles to remove them, so  
15 I would agree it was a significant achievement.

16 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Yes. And that the solution  
17 to that issue when it came to the heavy tow trucks was using the  
18 *Emergencies Act* regulation.

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It certainly assisted it,  
20 yes.

21 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Thank you.  
22 You've talked in a fair amount of detail this  
23 afternoon about the importance and the role of the PLTs in ---

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

25 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** --- in the work they do,  
26 particularly to shrink the footprint of a protest before  
27 enforcement action is taken. And I take it, based on what  
28 you've said, you'll agree with me that that was a very important

1 part of your plan here.

2 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

3 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And in fact, I think you  
4 said that if you had had to go in without shrinking the  
5 footprint, you would have needed 10,000 officers to deal with  
6 everyone who was there.

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It just means putting  
8 hands on everybody that's in there and two officers per, just do  
9 the math. You'd need a lot more officers, yes.

10 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And if you can't shrink the  
11 footprint, not only do you need a lot more officers, but it  
12 takes more time to ---

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

14 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** --- control the situation.

15 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's fair, yes.

16 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And also that there's more  
17 risk of violence or injuries when you've got a bigger crowd to  
18 control.

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** There's always risks. I  
20 mean, we assess those risks on a day by day, then, on  
21 operations, hour by hour, minute by minute. You know, when PLT  
22 is engaged, they're really good at reporting back to us whether  
23 or not they believe they're reached their limit and in our plan,  
24 in our measured approach, it's PLT that gives us that final nod,  
25 what's the status, do you have any more room to move. No.  
26 Okay. They're out. We go in with positive action.

27 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** But the bigger -- the  
28 bigger the activity that you're trying to deal with, the more

1 possibility there is for volatility.

2 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

3 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And therefore, the greater  
4 chance of violence and injuries.

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. Although I think  
6 it's important when I hear the words "violence and injuries",  
7 that was a key aspect of our plan -- of this integrated plan ---

8 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Yes, absolutely.

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- to ensure that we --  
10 from start to finish, a systematic dismantling of the process is  
11 done with everything in our power to minimize injury to anybody,  
12 and we succeeded in that.

13 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Absolutely.

14 And you did succeed, and an important part of  
15 that was the ability of the ability of the PLTs to shrink the  
16 footprint significantly before you ---

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Again, it was -- yes, it  
18 was a good part of it.

19 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And the PLT's ability to do  
20 that job is dependent on how persuasive they can be in  
21 convincing people to leave.

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** They're negotiators. You  
23 know, their role is to ensure that the protestors or those that  
24 are inside that perimeter are aware of the law, of the  
25 expectations, you know, around lawful protests. And then when  
26 they go to the point that it's no longer lawful, now you're  
27 committing criminal offences, to inform them, negotiate. It's  
28 about building trust.

1                   Sometimes they make concessions and they're  
2 willing to do things. We have to give them the leeway to make  
3 some concessions if necessary. But this all happens with the  
4 Commanders being fully aware of what's going on with PLT, what  
5 their mandate, what autonomy they've been given, what  
6 authorities they've been given.

7                   **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Yes. And one of the tools  
8 that the PLT has to convince protestors to leave is educating  
9 them on the consequences if they don't leave.

10                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely, yes.

11                  **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And presumably the more  
12 significant those consequences, the more persuasive the PLT can  
13 be in convincing people to leave.

14                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. It's possible, yes.

15                  **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And in this case, when this  
16 plan was actioned and the PLTs went in to do their work to try  
17 and shrink the footprints, one of the tools that was used was a  
18 pamphlet that was handed out; correct?

19                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I believe so, yes.

20                  **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And perhaps I can just --  
21 if I can pull up OPP00001852. This is the Integrated Phased  
22 Approach Plan from February -- this particular version is dated  
23 February 18th, but I understand this is just an update of the  
24 plan that was in place for at least the -- since the 13th ---

25                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

26                  **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** --- and it was going  
27 through various iterations.

28                   And if we can go to page 5, please. Probably,

1 actually, page 6 of the document. It's page 5 on the page  
2 numbers.

3 Yes. Down towards the bottom of the page.

4 Just under the bolding there, this talks about  
5 the pamphlet that was being -- or it was a media release  
6 provided, but as I understand it, there was also pamphlets  
7 handed out that stated the same thing. Is that your  
8 understanding as well?

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

10 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And so there's various  
11 information that was being provided to the protestors to try and  
12 convince them to leave by the PLTs, and it's listed here. First  
13 it mentions *Criminal Code* offences.

14 And if we can go to the next page, it then names  
15 a couple of consequences that, as I understand it, come out of  
16 the Ontario emergency legislation. Is that correct?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

18 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And those consequences, in  
19 particular the driver's licence suspension and the commercial  
20 vehicle operator's registration suspension, those would only be  
21 applicable against people from Ontario; correct?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No.

23 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** So the Ontario legislation  
24 allowed you to cancel the -- suspend the driver's licence of ---

25 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We -- they seized -- if  
26 that was a vehicle from out of province, plates were removed,  
27 the stickers were removed and we would seize. And we have those  
28 agreements with other provinces, yes.

1                   So it's my understanding on enforcement day  
2 that's exactly how it was used.

3                   **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** So your understanding is  
4 that the Ontario legislation allowed you to ---

5                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** They're in the Province of  
6 ---

7                   **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Just let me finish the  
8 question.

9                   Allowed you to suspend the driver's licence of  
10 someone from British Columbia?

11                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** If it was in British  
12 Columbia, yes, that is my understanding.

13                   **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** If we go down, the  
14 following bullets are all, except for the last one, measures  
15 under the federal emergency legislation; correct?

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct. Correct.

17                   **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** So the personal business  
18 accounts -- personal or business accounts, bringing the minor in  
19 -- the fines for bringing minors into the area and travelling to  
20 an unlawful protest site or delivering fuel and other supplies,  
21 those are all under the federal legislation ---

22                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

23                   **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** --- correct?

24                   And you'll agree with me that the addition of  
25 those bullet points provided more persuasive fodder for the PLTs  
26 to convince individuals to leave.

27                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Any piece of legislation  
28 that we're given, we use to the extent that we could possibly

1 use it. Absolutely did support it.

2 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And as a result of those  
3 additional tools, the PLT would have been able to convince more  
4 people to leave than they otherwise may have been able to do.

5 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I don't have any  
6 metrics for their success, but I -- you know, the more that you  
7 can give them, absolutely.

8 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** And so that allowed you to  
9 have a smaller footprint that you were dealing with and perhaps  
10 allowed you to get to that smaller footprint faster.

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Possibly.

12 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Those are all my questions.  
13 Thank you.

14 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

15 Next is the JCCF Democracy Fund.

16 **MR. JASON HONNER:** Good afternoon, Mr.  
17 Commissioner.

18 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Good afternoon.

19 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JASON HONNER:**

20 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Good afternoon, sir.

21 **C/SUPT. CARSONN PARDY:** Good afternoon.

22 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Mr. Commissioner, the ---

23 **MR. JOHN MATHER:** Can you speak up or turn up the  
24 sound a bit? Yeah.

25 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Yes, Mr. Commissioner, can you  
26 hear me better now?

27 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Yes.

28 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Thank you. Counsel for the

1 Government of Canada just brought up a document and showed it to  
2 the witness, and it was about tow trucks. It's against the  
3 rules, but I'm wondering if you would grant me leave to show  
4 this document -- this witness a single document which we haven't  
5 provided notice for, but which may assist him and which may  
6 assist the Commission in understanding how many tow trucks may  
7 have been available?

8 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Well, I'm not sure  
9 mechanically how we can do this.

10 **MR. JOHN MATHER:** A few questions arising out of  
11 that. One is, it is a document that exists in the party  
12 database?

13 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Yes, it is.

14 **MR. JOHN MATHER:** Okay. And is it a -- are you  
15 able to provide the document ID number?

16 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Yes, I am.

17 **MR. JOHN MATHER:** Mr. Commissioner, it's  
18 obviously within your discretion, but the parties nor Commission  
19 counsel have had an opportunity to review the document and see  
20 what it is. I'm not sure what it is, but one of the things that  
21 we can do is once we know the numbers, have an opportunity to  
22 look and see what it is.

23 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** And for what it's worth,  
24 Commissioner, I was going to ask for leave to introduce probably  
25 the very same document.

26 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Well, is there any  
27 objection? Obviously, if the OPP seems to have no problem with  
28 it, I think it should just go ahead. If you can give the number

1 so that we can then get it before the Commission?

2 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Commissioner, can I  
3 just ---

4 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Yes?

5 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** My only comment would be if  
6 it's in relation to the questions I was asking, and because I  
7 wasn't given notice that it was going to be put to the witness,  
8 it may raise an additional question for me. I suspect I know  
9 what document it is, but I'm not entirely sure until I see it,  
10 obviously.

11 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Well, if you want to  
12 follow up on it, you can ask at the time, and obviously, I have  
13 discretion to allow that.

14 **MS. DONNAREE NYGARD:** Thank you.

15 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.  
16 The document is OPP00001585. Can we just go down to the third  
17 page, the top of the third page, please?

18 Sir, here you can see an email, and can you just  
19 actually scroll up a little bit so we can see who the email is  
20 from? So, this is an email from Rose DiMarco. Do you know her?

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, she is a Deputy  
22 Commission of Traffic Services and Operation Support with the  
23 OPP.

24 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** And it looks like this email is  
25 being sent to somebody at the Solicitor General's office as well  
26 as the OPP Commissioner?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

28 **MR. ALAN HONNER:** And if we just scroll down a

1 little bit, she says there are a total of 64 heavy tow companies  
2 in the Province of Ontario. Do you see that?

3 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

4 MR. ALAN HONNER: And I think this is what you  
5 were referring to before. She says, "Companies who would  
6 provide service: 7 with 34 total heavy tow units."

7 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

8 MR. ALAN HONNER: And if we just look down two  
9 lines, she says, "10 companies waiting for callback from the 57  
10 total."

11 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

12 MR. ALAN HONNER: Now, the document that we just  
13 saw from the Government of Canada was, I believe, dated February  
14 17<sup>th</sup>, 2022. So, that's some four days after this document.

15 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Right.

16 MR. ALAN HONNER: And it looks like, perhaps, in  
17 that time, the number of tow companies who were willing to  
18 provide trucks, or the number of trucks that they can provide  
19 decreases.

20 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: It appears, yes.

21 MR. ALAN HONNER: And it could be the case, could  
22 it not, that the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*, which  
23 happened in between these two events, actually caused tow truck  
24 drivers or tow truck companies to become more reluctant to  
25 provide their services, or to put conditions on their services  
26 such as indemnification for damages?

27 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: It is possible, but I  
28 personally don't believe that, sir. There was a reluctance

1 very, very early with tow companies to be engaged. As I  
2 mentioned, the OPS on February 9<sup>th</sup> were unable to get any tow  
3 companies to engage, to the point that they were going to use  
4 their own people, and I do believe there was even reference to  
5 getting even the military to come in and tow some vehicles for  
6 them if needed.

7                   So, while it may have had an impact, I think it  
8 was an issue, and I think that issue was connected broadly to  
9 the broader issue that we were dealing with in the public  
10 domain, namely, the pandemic, this massive protest, and the  
11 unwillingness of some agencies to simply be engaged.

12                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Well, it was an issue on  
13 February the 9<sup>th</sup>, as you say, and it was still an issue on  
14 February the 13<sup>th</sup>, but there were some trucks there.

15                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

16                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** There were some 34 trucks. Can  
17 you think of anything material that changed between the 13<sup>th</sup> and  
18 the 17<sup>th</sup>, other than the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*, which  
19 would cause fewer companies to agree to the OPP using their  
20 trucks or providing services to the OPP?

21                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think the key comment  
22 that I think is appropriate for me on the tow issue is that we  
23 knew it was a contentious -- our team knew it to be a  
24 contentious issue from the very start of our deployment. I was  
25 fortunate to have a team that I could just say, "Can you deal  
26 with this?" And Kurt Richardson, MTO and the folks in that  
27 email went up to Deputy Commissioner DiMarco, took that off on  
28 her plate.

1           So, they might be better -- in a better position  
2 to answer that question. I simply asked for a tow plan, and can  
3 you give me people that have the capability to develop that  
4 plan, and I got a plan, and it worked.

5           **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Thank you very much. Let me  
6 change topics here for just a moment. We heard from your OPP  
7 colleague, Superintendent Patrick Morris not long ago that he  
8 thought some of what the media was reporting was problematic.  
9 Did you hear that evidence?

10          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I did not hear his  
11 evidence, and I think I listened to about 10 minutes of it as I  
12 was doing -- arrived in Ontario looking to do some of my own  
13 prep. So, I didn't spend a lot of time.

14          **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Are you aware that he testified  
15 that he read accounts of, for example, Russia being involved in  
16 the protests, and he found that to be problematic?

17          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think I may have read  
18 that somewhere, yes.

19          **MR. ALAN HONNER:** In your evidence today, you  
20 adopted a will say, and in that will say, you stated the media  
21 was not portraying what was on the ground. Can you tell us what  
22 your concerns were?

23          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, it's just that  
24 things were happening, and this protest group were incredibly  
25 well organized, in my opinion, and the narrative about what was  
26 happening in Ottawa was being controlled or was one sided  
27 and ---

28          **MR. ALAN HONNER:** How would that -- sorry, go

1 ahead.

2                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, and -- that's the  
3 basis for that comment, because there was a lot of good things  
4 happening. You know, we -- there's things that were going on  
5 within the protest group that, you know, we heard about the  
6 bouncy castles and the prayer meetings in the mornings, but we  
7 didn't hear publicly about threats to people inside the  
8 perimeter who wanted to leave, and they didn't want them to  
9 leave. We didn't hear about that publicly. Things of that  
10 nature. It's just one small example of, you know, the narrative  
11 that was out there about, you know, this is a family event.  
12 Bring your kids. There's a bouncy castle. We can have fun.  
13 Yet there were people within that red zone that wanted to leave,  
14 felt threatened and couldn't.

15                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** And you didn't think that was  
16 being accurately conveyed by the media?

17                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was not being conveyed  
18 at all, in my opinion.

19                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** What about something like what  
20 Patrick Morris testified to, that the protestors were being  
21 portrayed as extremists, and he found that to be problematic?  
22 Did you find that to be problematic as well?

23                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I do, because I've been  
24 involved in the events in the past from OAS summits to some of  
25 the G-events where we had a lot of extremists views. There was  
26 fringes of it with the two groups, I believe, that were around  
27 Nicholas and Waller, and Rideau/Sussex maybe, that were of  
28 concern, but they were not a major concern, but there's always

1 that risk of escalation that you see from those extremist  
2 groups.

3                   It was -- the profile of the protestor for this  
4 event was none like I've ever seen in my 36-year career. We had  
5 everything from grandparents -- you know, my first day in this  
6 assignment, I was shown a picture of two officers that had  
7 worked for me in the past who are retired, who were in the crowd  
8 with the protestors. We saw children. We saw a lot of  
9 crestfallen police officers in the crowd, military, nurses. So,  
10 it wasn't your normal group of people that you were dealing  
11 with.

12                   I guess that's the point. Was there still  
13 concerns from our perspective on extremism, absolutely. But we  
14 relied on and trusted the intelligence as it in came in on that  
15 regard.

16                   **MR. ALAN HONNER:** Thank you very much, sir.  
17 Those are my questions.

18                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

19                   Next I'll call on the City of Ottawa, please.

20 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNE TARDIF:**

21                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Good afternoon, Chief  
22 Superintendent. My name is Anne Tardif and I'm one of the  
23 lawyers representing the City of Ottawa.

24                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Good afternoon.

25                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** If I could turn up, or ask to  
26 turn up, OPP00001792?

27                   And, sir, these are your notes. I don't know if  
28 you have a hard copy there that you'd prefer to refer to, but

1 otherwise, it will go up on the screen.

2 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: I'll wait for the screen,  
3 sure.

4 MS. ANNE TARDIF: And could I ask that you turn  
5 to page 3, please, of the document?

6 This is just to show you the date at the top,  
7 sir.

8 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yeah.

9 MS. ANNE TARDIF: The 8<sup>th</sup> of February 2022. And  
10 if we could scroll down to about the middle of page 4? A little  
11 bit lower. There we go.

12 Now, do you see there's an arrow there that has  
13 the words "From federal gov't" at the end of it. And I'm going  
14 to ask you if you could help me out with your handwriting for  
15 the first part of it?

16 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yeah, you may have to help  
17 me with my handwriting. Sorry.

18 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Do you see it there? There's  
19 an arrow just below the middle line of the page.

20 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

21 MS. ANNE TARDIF: What did you write there?

22 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: "Daily siege from federal  
23 gov't".

24 MS. ANNE TARDIF: "Daily siege from federal  
25 gov't"?

26 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yeah.

27 MS. ANNE TARDIF: What did you mean by that, sir?

28 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Just pressure.

1           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Pressure. And was this  
2 pressure that was being placed upon the Ottawa Police Service?

3           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The police service, the  
4 community, to get this result.

5           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** On Ottawa as a whole to get  
6 this result, ---

7           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

8           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** --- basically? And was this  
9 siege being applied just, you know, privately in calls to the  
10 Chief or to City officials? Or was this occurring publicly?

11           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, this is notes that I  
12 took. I'm being briefed on my assignment.

13           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

14           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It might be better from  
15 those who gave me that, but that was my sense from the briefing,  
16 that there's pressure around, like, we've got to get this fixed.

17           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And can you just help us out?  
18 Who provided this briefing?

19           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was jointly provided by  
20 Commissioner Carrique, Deputy Commissioner Harkins, Mike  
21 MacDonell at Injects as related to POU. And Craig Abrams, who  
22 was on video link, gave me -- gave us the overview of the state  
23 that was leading up to that.

24           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Thank you. So we can  
25 ask them about this. And I take it they were relaying this to  
26 you in your briefing, because that meant that the -- or that was  
27 impacting the response in Ottawa? Making things more difficult,  
28 if I can put it that way?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

2                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** If we could turn now to page 12  
3 of the document, please? Okay. And if you could scroll to the  
4 bottom of the page, Madam Clerk?

5                   Now, we can go back if you need me to, sir.  
6 We're on February 9<sup>th</sup> at this point.

7                   If you could stop there, Madam Clerk?

8                   Do you want me to go backwards to see the date?  
9 Or you're all right?

10                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No.

11                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Let me know if you do  
12 want me to.

13                  Do you see the entry there, 1034 ---

14                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

15                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** --- on February 9<sup>th</sup>? And it  
16 says "T/C", which I take it is telephone call?

17                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

18                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** "...from Deputy Harkins..."? Is  
19 that right?

20                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

21                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And he's the Deputy  
22 Commissioner for Field Operations ---

23                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

24                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** --- at the OPP? It says:

25                                 "...need to be looking at this more  
26                                 broadly."

27                  And there's an asterisk:

28                                 "Ambassador Bridge shut down"

1 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

2 MS. ANNE TARDIF: If we could scroll to the next  
3 page, please?

4 Four oh two (402). That's the highway; right?

5 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

6 "...shut down both directions 40 kms from  
7 the border by farm tractors..."

8 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

9 MS. ANNE TARDIF:

10 "economic impact = \$350 million/day."  
11 Right?

12 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

13 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Correct?

14 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Correct.

15 MS. ANNE TARDIF: And then it says, "Big auto"  
16 and there's an arrow:

17 "...24 hrs and they shut down [at]  
18 factories"

19 Is that right?

20 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: It's "shut down  
21 factories".

22 MS. ANNE TARDIF: "shut down factories". Okay.  
23 And this is being reported to you by Deputy Commissioner  
24 Harkins?

25 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Correct.

26 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Okay. And then the next --  
27 I'll skip over the next asterisk, only because I think that may  
28 relate to Toronto? Is that right?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's regarding the GTA  
2 dump, the waste would be impacted on where it could go.

3                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Because of the closure of the  
4 402?

5                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

6                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. So this is an impact on  
7 the Toronto garbage dump arising from the blockade at the  
8 Ambassador Bridge in Windsor?

9                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Not the Ambassador,  
10 because it's Lambton County, and I -- sorry, my geography for  
11 western Ontario is a little off.

12                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

13                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It may have been as a  
14 result of the 402.

15                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** I see.

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It's separate from ---

17                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Understood.

18                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

19                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And then it says:

20                                 "Planning to block access to impact  
21                                 Toronto."

22                   That's what you've just told us.

23                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

24                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And then the final little note  
25 here, it says: "Request to determine what the..." and what's that  
26 next word?

27                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** "...current resource  
28 deployment is to the City of Ottawa."

1           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Perfect. And then if  
2 turn over the page to page 24? And so now we're at February  
3 10<sup>th</sup>. And I'm actually -- if you could just go up to page 23,  
4 Madam Clerk? We'll just see the beginning of this. Do you see  
5 -- oh, down a bit.

6           Do you see at 921?

7           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

8           **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** So this is again a telephone  
9 call with Deputy Harkins. And it says you were -- I guess you  
10 and the deputy were joined later by Commissioner Carrique? Is  
11 that correct?

12          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

13          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And this is on February 10<sup>th</sup>?

14          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

15          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And before we get into --  
16 because I just want to back up a little bit. So we talked about  
17 the call just the day prior on February 9<sup>th</sup>, where you're alerted  
18 to the situation in Windsor and asked about the current resource  
19 deployment to the City of Ottawa. And February 9<sup>th</sup> is the same  
20 day that you had the, I'm going to call it the meeting at Elgin  
21 Street Headquarters ---

22          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

23          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** --- of the integrated planning  
24 group with OPS command? Is that right?

25          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

26          **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And coming out of that,  
27 you mentioned earlier in your testimony there was an ask for  
28 staffing. And I think you said the number was 516? Five one

1 six?

2 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Correct.

3 MS. ANNE TARDIF: And that was a maintenance ask?

4 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

5 MS. ANNE TARDIF: So in other words, that's the  
6 number of officers OPS needed from OPP just to maintain the  
7 current posture and traffic points; right?

8 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes. As I said earlier  
9 though, there was some math problem with it. Ultimately, that  
10 number, you divide 516 by 3, I think it's -- sorry, 174 or 178  
11 or something like that. Because they were adamant in deploying  
12 a three-shift model. And as we talked through it, it was like,  
13 "Oh, we have to tell you, we actually, with the support of the  
14 Ottawa Police Association, they reverted back to the two-shift  
15 model, which would allow you to spread."

16 There are inherent benefits with the three-shift  
17 model, but with my organization coming in, it certainly would be  
18 a benefit to be on the same type of rotation, which they did.  
19 The RCMP, however, remained on a three-shift model.

20 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Okay. So I don't think we need  
21 to get quite to the level of specificity of numbers, but if I  
22 understand it, the maintenance ask on three shifts was 516, five  
23 one six, that's correct?

24 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: On three shifts.

25 MS. ANNE TARDIF: On three shifts. And if you  
26 drop it to two shifts, which you've said you were able to do,  
27 then it's probably closer to 300? Is that about right?

28 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: I would put it in the

1 range of 350.

2 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Three fifty (350). In  
3 other words, it's about a third less?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It's a third less.

5 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Whatever that number  
6 amounts to. Fair enough.

7 So that's the number that comes out for  
8 maintenance of the February 9<sup>th</sup> planning meeting. But of course,  
9 the OPS was also looking for additional POU supports for their  
10 enforcement action; correct?

11 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely.

12 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And the decision of the OPP  
13 coming out of that planning meeting was, "We will meet your  
14 maintenance ask. We'll supply what turned out to be  
15 approximately 350 officers to maintain the current posture, ---

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** M'hm.

17 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** --- but at this time, we're not  
18 going to move forward with the POU ask for the reasons you've  
19 already explained relating to the plan, et cetera."

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah, no, that's not  
21 accurate.

22 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** That's not accurate?

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We continued to deploy  
24 POU, to make plans for POU. We had -- there was obviously a  
25 plan in Windsor at the Ambassador Bridge for action down there.  
26 But that did not slow us down. We knew that of course there was  
27 going to be impact, because we're drawing from the same pool.

28 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Sure.

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But it did not stop. We  
2 just realized at that stage that -- if I'm not mistaken Darwin  
3 Tetreault, in that same meeting, said, "We need that 800."  
4 That's about all that we have in the Province of Ontario.  
5 Suddenly we have to pivot. We're not going to get all that we  
6 have in the Province of Ontario because they're going to be used  
7 and they're going to be needed down in Windsor. And we started  
8 our outreach to Edmonton, Calgary, Vancouver, and the Province  
9 of Quebec.

10                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Well in fairness to you,  
11 let me show you where I thought I saw that information, and you  
12 can perhaps correct me if I'm wrong. Can we go to page 19,  
13 please, of this document? Okay. And -- actually, just scroll  
14 up a little bit, please, Madam Clerk. The following page.

15                   So there's that 516 number; right?

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** M'hm.

17                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Three shifts as documented by  
18 OPS, 516. That's the maintenance number. And we've explained  
19 that they went down to two shifts, so it ends up being more like  
20 350; correct?

21                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah.

22                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And now let's scroll down,  
23 Madam Clerk.

24                   Now, I see a number of POU requests here. And if  
25 we keep scrolling down? Okay. Stop there. You'll see the  
26 lowest POU you get. POU by this stage, 55 plus 600.

27                   So that was their POU ask coming out of the  
28 planning meeting on the 9th; right?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I believe so, yes.

2                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And can we scroll down a  
3 little bit more, Madam Clerk, please?

4                   And you'll see where it says 1635. Do you see  
5 that?

6                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

7                   **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** It says, "Briefed team". These  
8 are your notes, right, sir?

9                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

10                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And then it says, "Will staff  
11 to the maintenance plan which has roles and responsibilities  
12 built in. Continue to build our plan." Right?

13                  So that's what I was referring to.

14                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yeah. And that's  
15 accurate, but ---

16                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

17                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But when we talk about  
18 that in our plan and we continue to build, we're asking as we  
19 need. You know, we add -- also, we're not taking action. We're  
20 not in a position.

21                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Right.

22                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** We needed 800.

23                  **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** And that's what I meant  
24 earlier. For the reasons you've discussed, the plan's not  
25 there. Right now you're staffing to the maintenance ask because  
26 that's what you think is needed in Ottawa right then.

27                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And our ask will  
28 immediately go out for others now. We want others to join in

1 and we need -- we need Vancouver, we need Calgary and Edmonton  
2 to join the team because we need this number and then the  
3 logistics around arranging all that, getting the approvals, the  
4 supports for them to be deployed.

5 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** I understand that. But at this  
6 point, the immediate decision is to staff to the maintenance  
7 plan. Can we agree to that?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

9 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. Now, back to page 24,  
10 please, Madam Clerk. We're going to move ahead to February  
11 10th.

12 And we'll scroll up to the following page, sorry,  
13 9:21. This is where we were, telephone call with Deputy  
14 Harkins. "Joined later by Commissioner Carrique."

15 We'll scroll down to page 24. And if I could  
16 stop you, Madam Clerk, at the "CC".

17 Do you see that there?

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's Commissioner  
19 Carrique, I'm assuming, since he joined the call later?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think so.

21 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay. And it says, "Provincial  
22 priority has changed due to ongoing" -- now, you'll have to help  
23 me with the next word.

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Issue.

25 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Issue. Thank you.

26 "...due to ongoing issue in Windsor.  
27 Both from [I think that's] intel and  
28 impact assessment..."

1 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

2 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Okay.

3 "...it is now our priority [it being  
4 Windsor] while continuing to support the  
5 RCMP/OPS in Ottawa. We may not be in  
6 position to supply Ottawa with all they  
7 need at this juncture."

8 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Correct.

9 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Right. And that's what  
10 Commissioner Carrique told you on the morning of February 10th;  
11 correct?

12 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes. Yes.

13 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Just to put us in time, that's  
14 the Thursday, right, before the weekend? Correct?

15 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

16 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Okay. And it's my  
17 understanding that the maintenance ask, the approximately 350  
18 officers, was actually only fulfilled on the morning of  
19 Saturday, February 12th. Is that accurate?

20 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: You know what; I'd need a  
21 lot of information in front of me to be very specific in terms  
22 of when we finally did it. We certainly made the ask and ---

23 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Yeah. And I -- no one's  
24 suggesting otherwise, sir.

25 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yeah.

26 MS. ANNE TARDIF: I can pull up a document. It's  
27 not a problem.

28 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: No, if you say it was

1 reported that it took till then to do it, I believe that.

2 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was a struggle. A lot  
4 of people did not want to be deployed to Ottawa.

5 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** A lot of people did? I missed  
6 the last part.

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Did not want to be  
8 deployed there.

9 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** To Ottawa.

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

11 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Okay.

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You want people to want to  
13 be there, but it was a struggle.

14 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Right. So there -- and the  
15 circumstances you're describing, Windsor and the reasons you've  
16 just described, that explains why the ask being made took, you  
17 know, from February 9th to February 12th to be fulfilled by the  
18 OPP.

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

20 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Right.

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** And when you say OPP, OPP  
22 and partner agencies.

23 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** Of course.

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It wasn't just -- I just  
25 happen to be OPP, right. We're there with an integration with  
26 multiple agencies. We're all in it together.

27 **MS. ANNE TARDIF:** I understand.

28 To be fair to you, it took three days for ---

1 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

2 MS. ANNE TARDIF: --- OPP together with all of  
3 its partner agencies ---

4 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Sure.

5 MS. ANNE TARDIF: --- to fulfil the maintenance  
6 ask by OPS.

7 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

8 MS. ANNE TARDIF: Thank you. Those are my  
9 questions.

10 COMMISSIONER ROULEAU: Okay. Thank you.

11 Next are the Convoy Organizers.

12 --- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:

13 MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG: Good afternoon, Mr.  
14 Commissioner. Good afternoon, Chief Pardy. My name is Bath-  
15 Sheba Van den Berg, and I'm counsel representing Freedom Corp  
16 and protestors.

17 I have a few questions for you this afternoon.

18 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Okay.

19 MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG: I'd like to ask you  
20 about the February 9th plan referred to earlier today.

21 It contemplated building a public order unit  
22 plan. Is that right?

23 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

24 Sorry. The February 9th plan that the Ottawa  
25 Police presented to us?

26 MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG: That's right.

27 C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY: Yes.

28 MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG: Okay.

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

2                   **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Was the first  
3 operation of that February 9th plan to clear Rideau-Sussex on  
4 Thursday, February the 10th at 6:00 a.m.?

5                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It was going to be 4:00  
6 a.m. with a possibility of being moved up to 11:00 p.m. on that  
7 date.

8                   **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Okay. And was it  
9 Event Commander Patterson who wanted to deploy POUs as part of  
10 executing that plan?

11                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we didn't get into  
12 the weeds in terms of numbers, but POU was part of the plan that  
13 they were going to execute and an Incident Commander had been  
14 assigned on that plan.

15                   **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Thank you.

16                   And yesterday, Superintendent Abrams testified  
17 that the police liaison teams, PLTs, were not involved in the  
18 planning process. And he suspected that Event Commander  
19 Patterson did not communicate this plan to the PLTs. Is that  
20 right?

21                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, that's fair.

22                   **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Were you aware that  
23 at the same time as the Integrated Cell Plan, what you called  
24 the group, that the PLTs were negotiating a plan with some of  
25 the protestors to start moving trucks on February 10th from the  
26 Rideau-Sussex intersection?

27                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I don't have independent  
28 recollection right now. There's so much that was going on.

1 It's possible, yes.

2 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Was the February  
3 9th plan abandoned because there were not enough POU's?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, what happened,  
5 myself and Phil Lue, prior to leaving Ottawa headquarters, met  
6 with Acting Superintendent Burnett. We both knew him, and Phil  
7 had worked closely with him in the years prior.

8 We stopped by to say hello as we were leaving the  
9 building, aware that he was being assigned the task. We did not  
10 -- we didn't get into the details of it other than he told us  
11 that he had some legal concerns that he was seeking advice on,  
12 and that from there he was going to be consulting with his POU  
13 experts.

14 And it's 1820 that they -- we learned that they  
15 did consult the broader group and they didn't find it to be  
16 tactically sound and decided to defer.

17 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And that was on  
18 February 10th?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I learned that on February  
20 10th, yes.

21 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Notwithstanding  
22 what was ---

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No, sorry. I learned that  
24 on February 9th that it was ---

25 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Ninth.

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- that it was shut down.

27 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** We just discussed  
28 now on February 10th we learned that the Commissioner Carrique

1 mentioned to you that there was a lack of availability of POU  
2 resources. Also, did RCMP Sergeant Tetreault also tell you  
3 this, that there was a lack of POU resources?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we knew that, you  
5 know, POU was going to be stretched in the province with the  
6 capacity that we had.

7 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Are you aware that  
8 the RCMP put a freeze for 72 hours from February 10th to 13th on  
9 any POU intervention?

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I'd need to know some  
11 greater context. I'm not sure where that's from.

12 I don't recall it, but I'm not saying it didn't  
13 happen.

14 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Okay. Thank you.  
15 Earlier today, the mission statement of the  
16 February 13th plan was put to you, and it included a reference  
17 to the utmost respect to the individual *Charter of Rights and*  
18 *Freedoms*. Is that right?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

20 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And part of that  
21 February 13 plan to contain a main action plan. Is that  
22 correct?

23 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

24 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And the mission  
25 statement provides strategic direction to operations. Is that  
26 correct?

27 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

28 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** And that the

1 objective of the main action plan was to de-escalate and  
2 negotiate a peaceful resolution and demobilization of the Ottawa  
3 truck demonstration. Is that right?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

5 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** On February 14th,  
6 you continued to work on developing the February 13th plan with  
7 a group of POU SMEs. Is that correct?

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

9 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** The February 17th  
10 plan referred to in your testimony, officially titled  
11 "Integrated Public Order Unit Concept of Operations", is also  
12 referred to as POU tactical plan or action plan; correct?

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes. It's a sub-plan of  
14 the master plan.

15 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Right. And the  
16 objective of that February 17th action plan was to  
17 systematically clear and take down the protests; right?

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

19 **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** I put it to you  
20 that the mission of the February 17th action plan was to ensure  
21 the removal of the protestors in the area of the blockades in  
22 relation to the freedom convoy 2022.

23 "This will be achieved by securing,  
24 isolating and evacuating persons within  
25 the designated blockade zones, to ensure  
26 the safe detention and arrests of any  
27 participants taken into custody, ensure  
28 public and police safety."

1                   You agree that there is no reference to the  
2 *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in the February 17th action plan?

3                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The mission has it.  
4 That's normally where it's contained, but what you read there,  
5 no.

6                   **MS. BATH SHEBA VAN den BERG:** Thank you. Those  
7 are all my questions, and thank you for your 36 years of  
8 service.

9                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Thank you.

10                  **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

11                  If I could now call on the Government of  
12 Saskatchewan?

13 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:**

14                  **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Good afternoon, sir. Can  
15 you hear me?

16                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

17                  **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Thank you.

18                  Sir, my name is Mike Morris, and I'm counsel for  
19 the Government of Saskatchewan. I'm just going to have a few  
20 questions for you today.

21                  Would you agree with me that the OPP, the RCMP  
22 and the OPS did not need the *Federal Emergencies Act* to be  
23 invoked to set up an integrated command structure?

24                  **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** For the purposes of  
25 setting up an integrated command structure, no. We've done that  
26 in ever major event that we've had with OPS in the past.

27                  **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And I gather you'd agree  
28 that those same police forces didn't need the *Federal*

1 *Emergencies Act* to be invoked to come up with an operational  
2 plan for removing the occupation in Ottawa, correct?

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I would agree with that.

4 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And you signed off on the  
5 operational plan that was ultimately used on February 12th on  
6 behalf of the OPP, correct?

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That was a version. There  
8 were multiple versions, but that was a version, yes.

9 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Okay. And I understand the  
10 RCMP approved that same version of the plan on February 12th as  
11 well; is that correct?

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, sir.

13 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And I think we've heard that  
14 the OPS approved that same version of the plan on February 13th,  
15 correct?

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Correct.

17 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And when you signed off on  
18 that plan, you were confident that it could be implemented to  
19 end the occupation, correct?

20 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

21 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And the February 13th plan  
22 did not contemplate any powers under the *Federal Emergencies*  
23 *Act*, correct?

24 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Not at that time, no.

25 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** And as commander of the  
26 Integrated Planning Cell, if you had thought that such powers  
27 were needed, you would have told someone, correct?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we certainly felt

1 that we had what we needed to develop a plan to dismantle the  
2 protest with what we had.

3 **MR. MICHAEL MORRIS:** Thank you, sir. Those are  
4 my questions.

5 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

6 Next, if I could call on the Government of  
7 Alberta?

8 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. MANDY ENGLAND:**

9 **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** Good afternoon. My name is  
10 Mandy England, and I'm asking some questions today on behalf of  
11 the Government of Alberta.

12 Sir, you mentioned in your response to counsel  
13 for the Government of Canada that some tow truck operators were  
14 reluctant due to liability issues to engage in the towing, and  
15 so the *Emergencies Act* was helpful in that respect. Was that  
16 correct?

17 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

18 **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** And so would it be fair to  
19 say that there were tow truck drivers who were willing to do it?  
20 They would not have needed to be compelled to do it, but they  
21 just wanted that additional reassurance about liability?

22 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, that's fair.

23 **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** Okay. Isn't it true that  
24 there are also provisions under the *Ontario Emergency Management*  
25 *and Civil Protection Act* that protect individuals who are acting  
26 in good faith in performing an order under that Act from an  
27 action against them for a liability in performing that duty?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I do believe so, yes.

1           **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** And is it true that there's  
2 provisions under that Act that provide a way for anyone who's  
3 property is damaged where an order under the Act is being  
4 carried out to seek compensation from the province itself rather  
5 than from an individual like a tow truck operator who's carrying  
6 out the order?

7           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, I'll be honest, now  
8 you're getting into weeds of it that I would have to say I need  
9 to look at it.

10          **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** Fair enough.

11          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** But I was looking at it,  
12 and I focused mostly on the enforcement powers it gave us.

13          **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** If what I had just said was  
14 true, that there was a mechanism for that individual to have  
15 sought compensation, would you agree that between those two  
16 items, that if there was an order under the Ontario Act  
17 authorizing the tow truck drivers to provide those towing  
18 services, that those operators would be protected in the same  
19 way by the Ontario Act?

20          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I'm not sure, because I  
21 know we had some difficulties with our earlier planning where we  
22 had a robust tow plan in place, and it all fell apart because of  
23 the indemnity issue and the length of time for that indemnity,  
24 that the operators just felt that given the nature of the  
25 protest, the fear of reprisal, that they needed an extended  
26 period of indemnity that we just couldn't provide.

27          **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** Okay.

28          **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** So again, I left the tow

1 issue to our tow experts, but I would have to look at the  
2 legislation, maybe even consult a lawyer, looking at the  
3 legislation as to how far and how deep the indemnity of either  
4 the EMCPA or the EA provided.

5 **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** That's fair.

6 If the provisions were the same or substantially  
7 similar, though, would you agree that the Ontario legislation  
8 would have been equally helpful then in providing the assurances  
9 to tow truck operators?

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** If you're telling me that,  
11 then I would say it would be.

12 **MS. MANDY ENGLAND:** Thank you very much. Those  
13 are my questions for you today. Thank you.

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Thank you.

15 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Thank you.

16 Does the OPP have any re-examination or any  
17 examination?

18 **MR. TOM CURRY:** Excuse me, Mr. Commissioner, I  
19 believe before we get to the party for the witnesses, the Ottawa  
20 Coalition did have five minutes, and the party for the witness  
21 usually gets to go last.

22 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** I am sorry, I must have  
23 skipped them. I apologize.

24 Mr. Champ, you have five minutes, and I'll even  
25 give you six if you need it, given my error.

26 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** I need four.

27 **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PAUL CHAMP:**

28 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Good afternoon, Chief

1 Superintendent. Thank you for joining us. My name is Paul  
2 Champ. I'm a lawyer for the Ottawa Coalition for Residents and  
3 Businesses.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

5 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Just a few questions for you,  
6 Chief Superintendent. I've represented police officers for many  
7 years, for about 20 years, and it's been my experience that  
8 there's a lot of very strong personalities in policing. Is that  
9 fair to say?

10 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Very fair.

11 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Strong characters, strong  
12 leaders, and sometimes those personalities can conflict?

13 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

14 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And similarly, when you have the  
15 strong personalities in leadership positions, it can be kind of  
16 difficult for them to give up leadership or maybe admit they're  
17 wrong, or seek assistance. Is that fair to say?

18 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes and no. Sometimes  
19 it's a failure of leadership for not asking for help.

20 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** That's fair.

21 Where I was going to go -- I wanted to ask you  
22 about, Chief Superintendent, is that you told us before about  
23 how a chief of police in Ontario can ask the Ontario Provincial  
24 Police to take over their service or assist their service in  
25 cases of emergency, correct?

26 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

27 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And Chief Sloyly didn't do that  
28 in these circumstances?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** No.

2                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** But it's also the case that the  
3 -- under the *Police Services Act*, the Board could ask the OPP to  
4 take over, correct, the Police Services Board?

5                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

6                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Or the Ontario Civilian Police  
7 Commission?

8                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

9                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** So if they have the relevant or  
10 proper information, they could have considered that and weighed  
11 that option?

12                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes, they could have.

13                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And you would agree with me that  
14 given the prevailing conditions in Ottawa at that time, the  
15 Ottawa Police simply couldn't provide adequate and effective  
16 policing services to their community?

17                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I would say they were  
18 stretched as it related specifically to the protest. To say  
19 that they were not otherwise providing -- because Ottawa is not  
20 just the downtown core, sir.

21                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And that's fair. Absolutely.

22                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Because we talk regularly  
23 with them about their ability to respond to their day-to-day  
24 business.

25                   **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Right. But we've heard lots of  
26 evidence, and I don't think it's really in dispute that the  
27 Ottawa Police Services simply did not have the capacity to bring  
28 this event to an end on their own. The numbers were such, the

1 scale was such, it was recognized generally the Ottawa Police  
2 couldn't end this on their own, correct?

3 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** That's correct.

4 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And it took an enormous amount  
5 more of police resources from elsewhere to bring an end to this,  
6 correct?

7 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

8 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** And I'm just wondering, like, I  
9 was taking a look and reviewing the National Framework on Police  
10 Preparedness for Demonstrations and Assemblies, and there's  
11 nothing in there about what happens if the demonstration is of  
12 such a scale that the police force of jurisdiction can't manage  
13 it and then how or in what way there could be a trigger for them  
14 to ask for another service to maybe even take over if they're  
15 having a real problem. Would you agree with me, Chief  
16 Superintendent, that more policy or protocol around that for how  
17 police services can feel comfortable reaching out to get  
18 assistance would be helpful?

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It absolutely would.

20 **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Yeah, if Chief Sloly had had  
21 some more guidance on that or he -- his strong personality,  
22 maybe he felt he was kind of getting it from all sides -- I  
23 think we've heard a lot of evidence from that -- felt embattled.  
24 But if there was a policy there saying, "Hey, at this point,  
25 that's a trigger. You should actually cede responsibility to  
26 another service," that perhaps could have helped this crisis,  
27 would you agree?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Whether or not it's ceding

1 responsibility to another organization, you know -- I'll just  
2 back up and qualify this answer with another statement. The OPP  
3 policy, for example, when an incident exhausts the ability of  
4 the local detachment to respond, we would stand up an EOC, so we  
5 have a more coordinated response.

6           So now we're going to be needing resources from  
7 other -- so it's kind of inbred in our nature that when an event  
8 overwhelms one jurisdiction, OPP jurisdiction, and others are  
9 needed, we stand up a broader group to support, to ensure that  
10 the response. So that the locus is -- we're still focused, and  
11 we can bring in supports.

12           So I don't believe it's about policy that you  
13 would have to cede responsibility, but certainly that when you  
14 are overwhelmed, that it's time to ask and integrate with our  
15 organizations to seek their assistance to collectively bring an  
16 end to the unlawful activity.

17           **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** I hear you, Chief Superintendent  
18 but I guess just what I'm suggesting is that it's a little bit  
19 *ad hoc*, right?

20           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It is now.

21           **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** There's no real good guidance  
22 for a Chief about when might be the right time to press the  
23 emergency button.

24           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I would say there is  
25 probably no guidance or written guidance in that regard.

26           **MR. PAUL CHAMP:** Okay. Thank you very much,  
27 Chief Superintendent.

28           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Thank you.

1                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Thank you.

2                   Now I will call on the OPP.

3                                   **(SHORT PAUSE)**

4                   **--- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:**

5                   **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** Good afternoon, sir, it's  
6 Christopher Diana, counsel to the OPP, as you know.

7                                   I'd like to maybe take a step back a little bit.

8                                   You've answered a lot of questions about, you  
9 know, the details of what happened in Ottawa. Part of the  
10 mandate of this Commission and part of what I think the  
11 Commissioner may be interested in hearing about as well is  
12 taking a look at the bigger picture. Lessons learned is part of  
13 the mandate of this Commission and you're in a unique position,  
14 as a recent retiree, with 36 years of experience doing this kind  
15 of public order policing and incident command, to maybe give  
16 some thoughts that may be of assistance to the Commissioner.

17                                  And the question I wanted to ask you in  
18 particular is about an integrated or unified command. So you  
19 believe in the value of that concept?

20                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely. It's  
21 absolutely critical to our success in any event where it's  
22 beyond the scope of organization.

23                   **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** Right. And what are some  
24 of the impediments? So if we're looking at lessons learned,  
25 what are some of the impediments going forward that the  
26 Commissioner may want to consider while contemplating the  
27 evidence that he hears?

28                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, we've already heard

1 about, you know, the personalities that exist in a lot of police  
2 leadership roles.

3 **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** Yeah.

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Oftentimes that can be the  
5 impediment; they simply don't want to -- they want to do this on  
6 their own. They don't need help, or "I need your help but I  
7 want command and control of your resources."

8 There's no organization out there that I know of  
9 what would ever say, "Okay, we'll send you 500 officers and just  
10 use them gently." It doesn't work that way. You know, when you  
11 stand -- when you deploy five, 600 officers to another  
12 organization, they come with a command and control. If you  
13 don't integrate, you're going to be working in silos. If you  
14 don't integrate, you're not going to be communicating about the  
15 ultimate strategic objectives and goals of what you're trying to  
16 accomplish. So it's absolutely critical that leaders buy --  
17 leadership is actually absolutely key at all levels, in my  
18 humble opinion. If you don't have the leaders, a leadership  
19 team buying in, then it's not going to work.

20 **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** And I think just to maybe  
21 kind of drill down a little bit into the why; why is a unified  
22 command a useful tool? Even if there's an event in a larger  
23 city that has a large police service; Ottawa has a fairly large  
24 police service, Toronto -- or, rather, you know, large police  
25 services may benefit from this concept, but maybe you can  
26 explain why this is useful. Toronto Police Service, for  
27 example, may have a lot of resources, but why is a unified team  
28 useful for a large event?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Well, it's useful because  
2 of, you know, the power of the human brain. The more people  
3 that you have, the more expertise you bring to bear on a  
4 problem, the more communication that you have, you know your  
5 solution is going to be that much more refined and appropriate.  
6 It takes -- as I mentioned earlier in my evidence, it takes the  
7 weight off one pair of shoulders who was feeling the burden of  
8 this event, and I feel for Chief Sloly, the burden that he was  
9 under for this event.

10                   But bringing in an integrated command and all  
11 that it brings to bear with the resources, the subject matter  
12 expertise can only produce a win.

13                   **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** Ultimately, though, it  
14 comes down to whether the police service of jurisdiction kind of  
15 buys into the concept; correct?

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

17                   **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** Thank you, Commissioner.

18                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay.

19                   Can I just check with the Government of Canada?  
20 Are you content; there's nothing further you'd like? No.

21                   Okay. I just have a couple of questions, Chief  
22 Pardy.

23                   About -- there have been words about what the  
24 operation, and it's been referred to, as I understand it, as  
25 ending the occupation but also some people have said ending the  
26 protest. Is there a difference, in your mind, between the  
27 approach of saying the plan is to end the protest, or end the  
28 occupation?

1                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I certainly have used them  
2 synonymous today, as one and the same. It was absolutely, in my  
3 view, an occupation, but it's often referred to as a protest. A  
4 protest can be an occupation. So they're one and the same from  
5 my view.

6                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. And in that, I just  
7 want to ask you if you could have a look at your Mission  
8 Statement, and we've had it referred to and I think it's  
9 OPP1851. And I think we might be at page 8, I think, if I'm  
10 correct for the -- go down a bit or -- yeah, it's up a bit.  
11 It's the Mission Statement I'm looking for.

12                   No, that's not the right document, then.

13                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** It would be in that  
14 document, sir.

15                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Then where would it  
16 be?

17                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Maybe it's down.

18                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** It may be further down. I  
19 think it was ---

20                   **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** I believe it's page 8,  
21 Commissioner.

22                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Page 8?

23                   **MR. CHRISTOPHER DIANA:** If we had just gone down  
24 a little bit from where we were.

25                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** There it is. Okay.

26                   And I'm wondering here you've put in:

27                                   "...with the utmost respect to the  
28                                   individuals Charter of Rights and

1 Freedoms..."

2 And I was wondering; was there any thought about  
3 there are protesters there that may wish to protest  
4 appropriately, if I can call it, without breaking law; i.e.  
5 continue a protest legally in some manner, in some place?

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

7 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Was that taken into  
8 account?

9 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Absolutely was taken into  
10 consideration in our message and through PLT that, you know, you  
11 want to protest, where you are now is deemed illegal, you need  
12 to leave. If you want to protest there's some other venues.  
13 And this is why we put in this mission about the Charter of  
14 Rights, because there is -- there are lawful protests that you  
15 can do and ---

16 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** I guess that's why I was  
17 wondering about your answer as saying ending the protest and  
18 ending the occupation you took as being the same.

19 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The same, but I guess I  
20 should qualify within that red zone that's now deemed to be an  
21 illegal occupation, if you're in there, you're breaking the law.  
22 If you're in there, you need to leave because it has been deemed  
23 illegal, what you're doing, an illegal occupation. So that  
24 meant -- because we had a lot of people that our PLT interacted  
25 with that continually pleaded that, "Well, we're all doing  
26 everything lawful."

27 A lot of them felt they had that plausible  
28 deniability until they -- so PLT had to educate them, okay?

1 It's a lawful protest to a point. Now you've reached a point  
2 there's injunctions, there's criminal mischief going on.  
3 There's all these things that are happening. This protest, this  
4 demonstration, this occupation is now deemed unlawful, and you  
5 need to leave.

6 If they chose -- and we gave people an exit  
7 strategy. If they chose, "Well, we'd like a protest location  
8 where our voice can be heard," that would have been facilitated  
9 by PLT.

10 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. So the PLT was  
11 seeking to reduce -- shrink the footprint, but are you saying  
12 they also would facilitate a continuing legal protest in some  
13 location or in some manner?

14 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** If someone said to them,  
15 "Well, we have a right to protest," they would have said, "Not  
16 here. There's other ways that you can protest but now you're in  
17 an illegal zone to protest." And they would -- I don't want to  
18 say facilitate. I mean, they're not going to, you know, stop  
19 what they're doing so we can -- and they'll set up a place for  
20 you to protest. But they would certainly -- and we have done  
21 that. I'll use the example of G8; we set up the protests with  
22 the stages, everything. You want to protest? Here, you go here  
23 and protest. PLT, they'll help facilitate this, because you're  
24 not getting to there.

25 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Was there any part of the  
26 plan that provided for this aspect that you've just described  
27 that you could continue your protest legally, just not here?

28 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I think by that time we

1 had exhausted all negotiation. And without reading the final  
2 plan, I would say no, because our negotiations with the  
3 protestors had reached the point that they were proving to be  
4 futile. So now enforcement action was next ---

5 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Now ---

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- in that measured  
7 approach.

8 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** --- are you aware of  
9 people after, or members of the public, in media or otherwise,  
10 criticizing, after the fact, the operations, saying they simply  
11 wished to peacefully protest?

12 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I don't doubt -- I don't  
13 independently recall those -- I didn't actually -- I avoided the  
14 media and the news ---

15 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Fair enough.

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** --- so I could focus. But  
17 I don't particularly recall it, but I don't doubt it. We have  
18 to look at that with -- you know, very, very carefully. I'm  
19 certain there was a lot of people in that protest zone, they  
20 realized, like, "Oh, they're actually telling us the truth.  
21 This is an illegal occupation. We have to move." They  
22 skedaddled out of there.

23 As I mentioned earlier about the profile of the  
24 protest, it was unlike anything we'd ever seen. There was a lot  
25 of good people in there that simply wanted their voice to be  
26 heard. We knew that. But they were mixed with a lot of dangers  
27 while inside, in terms of the potential and threats of violence  
28 that existed in there.

1           So we gave the opportunities. That was all part  
2 of negotiations. They even looked at having alternate locations  
3 for the trucks to go so that they could stage there, and we'll  
4 bus you to the protest. And that did not work out.

5           **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** And so just to close that  
6 loop, so are you -- do you feel the plan was adequate in terms  
7 of allowing continued protests for those who may wish it at --  
8 in retrospect?

9           **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** At the stage where we  
10 executed this plan and went kinetic, i.e., we went hands on with  
11 the operation, that was the option that was left available to  
12 us, with all other aspects of the plan exhausted.

13           I do believe that we acted appropriately,  
14 professionally, and accomplished not only our mission, but all  
15 of our goals and objectives in terms of, A, assisting in  
16 restoring the confidence and faith in the City of Ottawa and the  
17 Ottawa Police, returning Ottawa to a relative state of normalcy  
18 for business to be able to open, and doing so without injuring  
19 people and having to arrest too many people.

20           We know our -- you know, a lot of people put a  
21 lot of stock in arrest, arrest, arrest. We also know our  
22 justice system just doesn't have the ability for us to arrest  
23 and charge 3,000 people. We all know what would happen there.

24           So I believe that we accomplished those goals,  
25 and did so and returned -- because very shortly thereafter,  
26 there were protests again in the City of Ottawa that were  
27 permitted and were peaceful.

28           **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** One other thing I just

1 want to explore briefly. You spoke about PLTs. And I don't  
2 know how to put it. It was not necessarily embraced as it maybe  
3 should have been by OPS in this operation. Is that fair?

4 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** In their initial.

5 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Yes.

6 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** The leading up.

7 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** I meant the initial.

8 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** You know, within a day of  
9 our arrival there, we engaged with Marcel Beaudin, who I believe  
10 you're going to be hearing from. And we got things back on --  
11 we -- they -- collectively, when I say "we", got it back on  
12 track with a PLT focus.

13 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Now, a lot of the work of  
14 PLT involves, as you've talked about, negotiating, de-  
15 escalating.

16 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

17 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** And for those who wish to  
18 bring a quick end to a protest, PLTs maybe are not viewed in the  
19 same way? Or they're viewed as delaying what they wish as a  
20 result?

21 **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I -- my personal opinion  
22 is if we took an enforcement action directly every time just to  
23 end it, we'd be sitting for another Commission of Inquiry about  
24 a lack of a measured approach. So in my humble opinion, I would  
25 use PLT in every circumstance. They may last 10 minutes and be  
26 rendered ineffective, but we tried. We've given -- we've tried  
27 a negotiation route. We've tried the de-escalation route. It  
28 did not work. Before we go kinetic.

1                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** You may be going the wrong  
2 direction -- you're thinking I'm going the wrong direction. I'm  
3 not disagreeing with that.

4                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Okay.

5                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** What I'm trying to get at  
6 is the public often is not aware of the role and importance of  
7 PLTs because they want results. Would that be fair? In some  
8 cases.

9                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** I would say that's a fair  
10 statement, sir.

11                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. And I guess all I'm  
12 asking is, do you think an important component in a protest such  
13 as this is educating the public on the need for the process to  
14 be worked through, negotiation, et cetera? In other words,  
15 because we heard a lot about public pressure to close ---

16                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Yes.

17                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** --- this down. And I'm  
18 just asking whether there is a role for public education?

19                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** There's a significant  
20 role. In fact, when you look -- I'm sure you'll get this from  
21 Insp. Beaudin. A lot of what PLT does, because it's not just  
22 with the protestors that they deal with. A lot of what they do  
23 is education as well.

24                   You know, they -- our PLTs are active not just in  
25 the middle of a crisis. They're active all -- so education is  
26 absolutely critical. The public needs to know. When we engage  
27 PLT in these events, we have PLT members who are dealing with  
28 the Business Association. We have PLT members dealing with the

1 residents so that we know, collectively, all of the issues that  
2 we're facing. So they're not just negotiating with the  
3 protestors necessarily. They're looking at everybody that is  
4 impacted by.

5 Education. I would love for every member of the  
6 public to become a PLT. One of our goals in our communication  
7 strategy was to make every uniformed officer, with their  
8 messaging, from the constable on the street up to the Prime  
9 Minister of Canada, if we could get everybody saying the same  
10 message, we're educating the public, we will succeed. That was  
11 the stated goal right within our mission.

12 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. Thank you very  
13 much. And thank you for your testimony. Very -- we appreciate,  
14 even though you're in retirement.

15 Yes, I'm sorry?

16 **MR. BRENDAN MILLER:** My apologies. I have just a  
17 few questions -- this is, for the record, Brendan Miller,  
18 Counsel for Freedom Corp -- arising from your questions. I had  
19 none until some answers came out. There is just probably about  
20 two minutes of questions I would like to ask, if I may, sir,  
21 with respect to the evidence from the witness regarding there  
22 being no more ability to negotiate, et cetera, given that I  
23 understand that that wasn't the case, sir.

24 **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** I'm -- there is no  
25 provision for re-examination. We're not going to reopen it.  
26 There will be plenty of witnesses you can question about the  
27 process as they come through. But I'm not going to reopen,  
28 because you wouldn't be the only one.

1                   **MR. BRENDAN MILLER:** Very well, sir. Thank you.

2                   **COMMISSIONER ROULEAU:** Okay. So with that, thank  
3 you for your testimony, and especially since you're retired.  
4 Appreciate it.

5                   We're going to rise until Monday morning at 9:30.  
6 Thank you.

7                   **C/SUPT. CARSON PARDY:** Thank you.

8                   **THE REGISTRAR:** The Commission is adjourned. La  
9 Commission ajournée.

10 --- Upon adjourning at 5:11 p.m.

11

12                   **C E R T I F I C A T I O N**

13

14 I, Wendy Clements, a certified court reporter, hereby certify  
15 the foregoing pages to be an accurate transcription of my  
16 notes/records to the best of my skill and ability, and I so  
17 swear.

18

19 Je, Wendy Clements, une sténographe officielle, certifie que les  
20 pages ci-hautes sont une transcription conforme de mes  
21 notes/enregistrements au meilleur de mes capacités, et je le  
22 jure.

23

24



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25 Wendy Clements